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PREFACE 
 
“Bioinvasion is a deeply unsatisfying policy topic. It is messy, frustrating, depressing and unpredictable: it does 
not lend itself to a neat solution.”
2
 
“Give a weed an inch, and it will take a yard.” 
 
Although this research has been concluded after the 2010 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Punta del 
Este Uruguay, the results of the meeting have been mostly excluded from the thesis with the exception of a 
statistics relevant to the Report by IAATO incorporated into the introductory chapter. 
The citation style used in this thesis is primarily sourced from the Melbourne University Law Review 
Association, Australian Guide to Legal Citation (2
nd
 ed, 2002). However, in some cases the style differs. In 
particular, abbreviations and acronyms are used to describe some treaties and subsidiary instruments under 
those treaties in a manner departing from the guidelines. A full list of these abbreviations is contained in the 
preliminaries, as well as the comprehensive bibliography at the end of the thesis. 
  
                                                                
2
 C Bright, Life Out of Bounds  (1998), 2. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Globally, invasive non-native species introduced by human vectors are one of the main drivers of biodiversity 
loss and the damage to the functioning of global ecosystems is arguably irreversible. Antarctica is the only 
continent to remain relatively unaffected but the warming climate and changing patterns of human use are 
eroding the natural biogeographical and climactic barriers that have isolated Antarctic species and ecosystems 
in their natural evolution.   
Biosecurity is the exclusion, eradication or effective management of risks posed by NNS to the environment 
and broad obligations exist at the global level to engage in biosecurity measures to protect biological diversity. 
Although the issue has been significant attention in the context of the Antarctic Treaty System, including a 
permit based regulatory system for the intentional introduction of non-native species, there is no clear 
strategic focus on mitigating against unintentional introductions. Moreover, as only half of the tourist and 
fisheries operators are flagged to States outside the ATS, significant risks remain outside the ambit of the 
regional management organisation. The thesis evaluates the extent regional and international legal regulations 
address non-native species issues in the Antarctic through a vector based approach that focuses on the three 
main pathways of potential introduction; National Antarctic programs, tourist operators and fishing vessels.  
The research shows there are gaps and inconsistencies in all the levels of response and a lack of strategic 
planning mechanisms and compliance processes that limit the individual efforts of States to address the issue. 
The obligations found in the Antarctic Treaty System create specific obligations to take into account the 
indirect environmental effects of Antarctic activity and addressing non-native species has been prioritised 
within some of the relevant institutions but there remain systematic issues that cannot be resolved without 
fundamentally altering the environmental management of the area.  
The thesis proposes the development of a strategic biosecurity response within the Antarctic Treaty System 
that integrates the lessons learned at the domestic and global level. Although developing a unitary framework 
should be a priority, States should work incrementally to develop mechanisms based on risk assessment and 
analysis with an end goal of binding measures under the Antarctic Treaty System. An institution that binds the 
disparate approaches of States operating in the area with a mandate to strategically integrate comprehensive 
preventative, surveillance and response measures into Antarctic and relevant international management 
processes is essential. More fundamentally the thesis argues that strategic area based planning, reporting and 
inspection processes are necessary to address the cumulative impacts of Antarctic actor’s activities and ensure 
all actors within the Antarctic area comply with biosecurity objectives. 
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1 
1 
VECTORS OF NON-NATIVE SPECIES IN THE ANTARCTIC AREA 
“From prehistory to the present time, the mindless horsemen of the environmental apocalypse have been 
overkill, habitat destruction, introduction of animals such as rats and goats, and diseases carried by these 
exotic animals…In recent centuries, and to an accelerating degree during our generation, habitat destruction is 
foremost among the lethal forces, followed by the invasion of exotic animals.”
1
 
“It can no longer be assumed that the remoteness and extreme climatic conditions of Antarctica will protect it 
from the unintentional introduction of non-native species.”
2
 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis focuses on legal mechanisms that address the unintentional introduction of non-native 
species (‘NNS’) in the maritime and continental Antarctic areas and the Southern Ocean south of the 
Antarctic Convergence.3 The need for comprehensive and strategic legally-backed responses to NNS 
in the Antarctic was identified in a 2006 Workshop on NNS in the Antarctic. The Workshop identified 
the considerable risks that NNS pose to the Antarctic environment and the lack of any systematic 
response to the issue.4  
The Antarctic continent is perhaps the only terrestrial space on the planet left relatively untainted by 
the anthropogenic spread of NNS and the resultant environmental impacts. However, the oceanic 
                                                                
1
 E O Wilson, The Diversity of Life (1992), 253. 
2
 B Mansfield and N Gilbert, ‘Availability and Applicability of Legal Tools for Managing *NNS+’, in M Rogan-Finnemore (ed.), 
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and atmospheric barriers limiting the spread of NNS to the Antarctic have been steadily eroded with 
increasing human activity across the area and significant recent climate change in the maritime 
Antarctic. 5 Invasive NNS are one of the main direct drivers of biodiversity loss across all biomes with 
collective costs to industry, biodiversity and management agencies conservatively estimated in the 
hundreds of billions of US dollars.6 An effective method of containing the spread of NNS is to impose 
functional biosecurity measures on the vectors of introduction.  
Biosecurity is the exclusion, eradication or effective management of risks posed by NNS to the 
environment,7 and ranges from planning mechanisms to minimise NNS introduction, to monitoring  
and responding to an introduction to limit its impact on the environment. A biosecurity framework is 
usually instituted by the State that has sovereign power over an area or activity.8 However, States 
engaging in scientific activity in the Antarctic have put aside territorial interests and agreed to 
manage the area south of 60o latitude collectively through regular meetings and a system of related 
agreements under the Antarctic Treaty 1959 (‘AT’).9 Despite parties to the Antarctic Treaty (‘AT 
Parties’) committing to comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and planning actions 
to avoid damage to Antarctic biodiversity and habitats under the Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty of 1991 (‘PEPAT’),10 the only relevant biosecurity measures in 
PEPAT focus on issuing permits for the purpose of controlling intentional introductions.  
AT Parties have not set out an adequate preventative framework to address the threat of the 
unintentional introduction of NNS despite the fact that the Committee of Environmental Protection 
(‘CEP’) established by Article 12 of PEPAT lists NNS management as the top priority of its five year 
work plan.11 The fragmented and highly sectoral legal and institutional response is one of the most 
significant international problems with biosecurity. This is a particularly significant issue in the 
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Antarctic context, with biosecurity being addressed regionally, globally and in relation to specific 
Antarctic industries and domestic programs without any overarching strategy.  
This thesis will support a strategic approach to biosecurity through an examination of the gaps in the 
international and regional legal framework addressing NNS in the Antarctic and a proposal for the 
development of a comprehensive regime to better address the risk of NNS introduction. It will do so 
by adopting a vector-based analysis that focuses on the three main pathways of NNS into the 
Antarctic environment: National Antarctic Programs (‘NAP’) primarily engaged in the support of 
scientific endeavour; tourist operators; and fishing vessels. The introductory chapter will evaluate 
the need for legal regulation in the Antarctic (focusing on the specific aspects of human interaction 
with the area which pose a particular biosecurity threat), define biosecurity terminology and explain 
the structure of the thesis. 
1.2. THE ISSUE: NON-NATIVE SPECIES IN THE ANTARCTIC 
Despite the low level of recorded NNS introductions in the Antarctic area compared with the sub-
Antarctic islands,12 a growing number of studies firmly reject the notion that the extreme 
environment of the Antarctic may be immune from the impacts of species from outside the 
Antarctic.13 Not enough is known about Antarctic biodiversity to draw decisive conclusions about the 
environmental impacts of NNS, particularly on marine and microbial indigenous populations, but 
predictive risk assessments, based on whether NNS have become invasive in other similar climactic 
and geographic conditions, indicate invasions are possible.14 Low species diversity and relatively 
simple community structure renders the Antarctic environment particularly vulnerable to highly 
adaptive NNS.15 Ecophysiological studies demonstrate that a range of non-indigenous terrestrial 
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organisms can survive in the extreme conditions of polar environments.16 Natural dispersion is 
possible with air and water currents, natural debris and migratory birds and mammals carrying biota 
great distances,17 but studies in the sub-Antarctic indicate anthropogenic factors are by far the most 
prevalent cause of NNS introductions in higher latitudes.18 The established NNS identified in the 
Maritime Antarctic are found near human occupation and related to station activities.19 Moreover, 
human activity is responsible for spreading NNS between Antarctic locations. NNS that are pre-
adapted to Antarctic conditions are likely to be genetically similar to indigenous species and may 
significantly impact biodiversity in the Antarctic.20 
TABLE 1.1: IDENTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHED NNS ACROSS ANTARCTIC BIOGEOGRAPHICAL ZONES
21
   
Biological group Entire sub-Antarctic Continental Antarctic Maritime Antarctic 
Plants (terrestrial) 108 1 2 
Invertebrates (terrestrial) 72 0 2-5 
Vertebrates (terrestrial) 16 0 0 
Plants (marine) 1 0 1 
 
Although all human interaction with an area increases the risk of introduction, certain aspects of 
activity in the Antarctic pose a particular biosecurity threat. The thesis focuses on each of the three 
major human activities in the Antarctic by analysing the regulations that apply to the aspects of the 
activities that threaten NNS introduction. The only permanent presence in the Antarctic is 
maintained by NAPs. Involvement in the decision making processes of the Antarctic Treaty System 
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(‘ATS’) requires an AT Party to demonstrate its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial 
scientific research activity there, such as establishing a scientific station or despatching a scientific 
expedition.”22 An estimated 4000 summer and 1000 winter personnel populate the 37 permanent 
and 16 summer-only active stations, with a large number of temporary field camps set up across 
continental Antarctica. Stations and field camps are usually established on ice-free areas and 
generally sites that favour human settlement also favour NNS.23 Scientists regularly move around the 
Antarctic area for research purposes and ships and planes make a number of trips for the purposes 
of personnel change-over and re-supply of scientific stations.  
Globally, transport vectors are one of the most significant pathways for the unintentional 
introduction of NNS and only a few legal tools exist for identifying and mitigating the risks posed by 
transport.24 The increasing use of air routes allows rapid transfer of species into the Antarctic and 
between the different regions of the continent.25 Marine NNS are introduced through the biofouling 
of vessels’ surfaces and marine debris and their presence in ballast water, sewage and other 
biosensitive wastes.26 In the sub-Antarctic and Antarctic, established NNS have been attributed to 
hull fouling,27 although there have been no identified instances of the establishment of NNS through 
ballast or marine debris.28 In addition, NNS can be present in cargo, clothing, vehicles, scientific 
equipment, fresh food and building supplies, highlighting the importance of comprehensive 
decontamination procedures.29 All cargo items used in Australian sub-Antarctic research have the 
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potential to act as NSS vectors.30 Untreated waste generated by permanent operations and shipping 
also can introduce NNS into the environment.31 Despite the disposal of sewage demonstrably 
spreading human microorganisms into the Antarctic marine environment, sea-ice and intestines of 
invertebrate marine species32 almost 35% of stations still dispose untreated sewage into the sea.33  
Tourism operations pose different challenges for managing the risks of NNS introduction. Only a very 
small proportion of industry-affiliated operators participate in multi-day land-based expeditions in 
the continental interior,34 lessening the impact of waste disposal and food vectors.35 In addition, a 
considerable proportion do not make any landings, limiting possible impacts to marine transport 
vectors36 and these voyages are likely to decrease when the International Maritime Organisation’s 
(‘IMO’) Antarctic heavy fuel ban is implemented.37 However, despite projected short term decreases 
in overall tourist numbers, longer term trends indicate a continued increase in shipborne tourism 
making landings along the Antarctic Peninsula.38 Frenot et al identified four patterns of tourist 
activity that increase the potential for the industry to introduce NNS into the Antarctic area and 
between Antarctic locations.39 
Firstly, tourist visitation usually focuses on areas with high to medium biological diversity, the most 
sensitive areas for NNS introduction.40 The concentration of visitation and traffic in these areas 
increases the possibility of introduction and necessitates area-based regulation. However, the 
                                                                
30
 Whinam, ibid, 209. 
31
 G A McFeters, J P Barry and J P Howington, ‘Distribution of enteric bacteria in Antarctic seawater surrounding a sewage 
outlet’ 27(4) Water Research 645. 
32
 J T Lisle, J J Smith, D D Edwards, and G A McFeters, ‘Occurrence of microbial indicators and Clostridium perfringens in 
wastewater, water column samples, sediments, drinking water, and Weddell Seal feces collected at McMurdo Station 
Antarctica’ (2004) 70 Applied and Environmental Microbiology 7269. 
33
 Tin, above n 6, 19. 
34
 Very little data is available about non-members of the International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators (‘IAATO’), 
although the IAATO does not believe any non-member ships have planned operations in the Antarctic in 2011 to 2013. This 
does not include yachts with fewer than 12 passengers. IAATO, IAATO Overview of Antarctic Tourism: 2009-10 Season and 
Preliminary Estimates for 2010-11 and Beyond ATCM XXXIII IP 113 (2010), 24. 
35
 Hull and Bergstrom, 215; 233 of the 36881 tourists that visited the Antarctic in the 2009-2010 season visited the 
continent. Ibid, 3. 
36
 Nine vessels in the 2009/2010 season carrying almost 15,026 passengers, ibid, 3. 
37
 IAATO, ibid, 9. 
38
 H J Lynch, et al, ‘Spatial patterns of tour ship traffic in the Antarctic Peninsula region’ (2009) 22(3) Antarctic Science 123, 
127-129. 
39
Frenot, above n 13, 58-59.  
40
 Lynch, above n 38, 128. 
7 
popular areas change from year to year complicating area protection.41 This is related to the 
tendency for tour operators to explore for new sites which increases the potential for the dispersion 
of NNS. Hitchhiker organisms moving between islands with similar climates are more likely to 
establish successfully and typical visitor itinerates include successive visits to a number of sites 
within the sub-Antarctic and Antarctic, progressively moving to more extreme environments.42 In 
addition, the range of tourist activities has continued to increase from the 1980s-early 1990s model 
of observing immediate wildlife to undertaking extensive walks, marathons, short overnight stays, 
climbing, kayaking, SCUBA diving and hovercraft operations.43 All these activities increase exposure 
time to the environment and require additional equipment than the traditional Antarctic expedition, 
increasing the potential for NNS contamination and introduction into new environments.44 Tourists 
themselves are likely to have travelled to other high latitude or high altitude locations, with viable 
NNS, within six months before departing to Antarctic.45 
Uncertainty surrounds the potential for fisheries activities to introduce NNS. The biosecurity risk is 
related to the discharge practices of the ship, the nature and extent of fouling and the movement of 
the vessel in relation to the underlying marine ecosystems.46 In the Antarctic, comparatively little is 
known about marine habitats and biota or the potential impact of fishing vessels.47 However, a 
significant amount is known about the nature and volume of fisheries activity. 37 ships currently 
have been licensed to fish in twelve of the Food and Agricultural Organisation (‘FAO’) of the United 
Nations (‘UN’) Statistical Areas in the Southern Ocean for the 2009-2010 summer season.48 In the 
sub-Antarctic, fisheries are managed by sovereign authorities and fish have been intentionally 
introduced into inland water systems in the sub-Antarctic Kergulen Islands for food.49 A review panel 
on fisheries management efforts in the Southern Ocean identified that certain fisheries activities 
pose a “significant risk” of introducing NNS through hull fouling, ballast water discharge and the use 
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of substantial quantities of imported bait associated with longline fisheries.50 Outside the Antarctic, 
a causal relationship has been found between the spread of pathogens and non-native bait.51 
Nevertheless, the uncertainty of fisheries operations poses significant issues in deciding the 
management steps to address NNS in scientific activity. 
 
FIGURE 1.1: SUMMARY OF THE PATHWAYS OF NNS INTRODUCTION INTO THE ANTARCTIC AREA  
 
1.3. DEFINITIONS AND APPROACHES 
A variety of terms are used to describe NNS and the stages of introduction, causing considerable 
confusion in the literature and inconsistency across legal frameworks.52 Clear definitions are 
particularly important in an international legal context where terms must be operationalised and 
interpreted in a variety of domestic contexts.53 For the purposes of this thesis, the approach of 
Frenot et al in the benchmark review of the presence and status of NNS in the Antarctic is adopted, 
                                                                
50
 CCAMLR Review Panel, CCAMLR Performance Review Report (2008) <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/e-
Prfrm%20Review%20Report%20Jun09.pdf> at 19 September 2009 [11]. 
51
 A M Picco, ‘Amphibian commerce and the spread of infectious disease in wildlife’, (D Phil Thesis, Arizona State 
University, August 2008). 
52
 Shine, above n 24. 
53
 Shine, ibid, 44. 
Marine Traffic
- Ballast Discharge
- Bio Fouling
- Waste
- Fishing (NNS Bait 
and Fouled 
Equipment)
Personnel and 
Visitors
- Disease
- Hitchhikers
Cargo
- Intentional 
(Research, Food, 
Hydroponics, 
Building Materials)
- Hitchhikers
Air traffic
- Hitchhikers
- Intra-
continent  
travel 
- Waste 
- Research 
 
9 
but further elaborated for the purpose of facilitating a precautionary legal approach.54 It is important 
for the definition of NNS to encompass all taxa and also reflect the variety within Antarctic taxa, 
including introductions from one part of Antarctica to another. This thesis adopts the appropriately 
precautionary 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (‘CBD’) 55 definition of an NNS56 as “a species, 
subspecies or lower taxon, introduced outside its natural past or present distribution, including any 
part, gametes, seeds, eggs, or propagules of such species that might survive and subsequently 
reproduce.”57 Introduction broadly involves the intentional or unintentional movement of NNS 
across any geographic barriers. NNS are distinguished based on the extent of their pervasiveness of 
their spread and the extent the organism overcomes natural and artificial filters.58 A controlled NNS 
exists under the strict control of humans. Transient NNS59 escape that control, survive in small 
populations but are either removed or die out through natural processes.60 Persistent NNS61 survive, 
establish and reproduce for many years outside of human control but do not expand in range or 
significantly impact indigenous species. Invasive NNS spread into and displace indigenous 
communities.  
TABLE 1.2: FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING OPERATIONALLY IMPORTANT TERMS FOR BIOSECURITY IN THE 
ANTARCTIC 
Filter Breached Consequence Terminology Example 
Geographic Introduction into the Antarctic Controlled NNS Food/hydroponics
62
/pot plants
63
/fouled 
ballast water 
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Artificial Introduction beyond human 
control, die out naturally or 
removed 
Transient NNS Microorganisms in discharged waste 
water
64
/fly infestation in station
65
 
Environment (local) Reproduction over years in 
natural environment but no 
dispersal 
Persistent or 
established NNS 
Poa annua near Polish Arctowski 
Station
66
  
Community suitability 
and local dispersal 
Broad dispersal and 
displacement of indigenous 
populations 
Invasive NNS Rabbits on Macquarie Island
67
 
This thesis will evaluate the domestic, regional and international approaches to biosecurity in the 
Antarctic in relation to the framework recommended by the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (‘IUCN’).68 International best practice, gathered by the IUCN, indicates three 
approaches are essential to any effective legal response to NNS.69 Firstly, the framework must be 
based on ecosystem-based management. An ecosystem is defined by the CBD as a “dynamic 
complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their non-living environment 
interacting as a functional unit”70 and biosecurity is essentially a tool to preserve ecosystem 
integrity. The ecosystem approach to biosecurity involves international cooperation to strategically 
manage the risks NNS pose to land, water and living resources within a functional ecological unit and 
integrating management within a larger biogeographic framework.71 Furthermore, the prohibitive 
cost of responding to NNS invasions in the sub-Antarctic highlights the importance of planning and 
implementing strategies to prevent unintentional introductions. Prevention should involve limiting 
activity in sensitive and pristine areas, imposing decontamination measures on incoming vectors as 
well as establishing appropriate monitoring and contingency plans to ensure NNS do not become 
established. Finally, as there is a level of uncertainty in the consequences of any introduction, a level 
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of precaution should be incorporated into all decision-making involving the risk of NNS 
introduction.72 One of the issues in the framework of the ATS is uncertainty as to the level of 
acceptable risk permitted in the Antarctic context. Some pristine areas in the sub-Antarctic exclude 
all activity apart from monitoring and management and science relevant to management.73 PEPAT 
reserves the Antarctic area as a “natural reserve for peace and science”, allowing for the freedom of 
science and peaceful activity within the context of comprehensive environmental protection. The 
balance between peaceful use and environmental protection is particularly critical in the realm of 
biosecurity, where any human presence threatens introduction. This thesis will explore to what 
extent a precautionary approach to biosecurity, in the context of preventative, ecosystem-based 
management, may be implemented in the Antarctic area, given the tools available under current 
global and regional legal instruments.  
1.4. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Each of the sources of biosecurity regulation for the Antarctic are explored in the thesis. The  
Chapters evaluate the extent that regional, global and Australian and New Zealand regimes provide 
for preventative biosecurity measures for each of the vectors of NNS and a compliance regime to 
support those measures. Throughout the five chapters, the thesis explores the capacity for AT 
Parties to adopt a precautionary biosecurity framework in the Antarctic, in the context of the 
balance between environmental protection and peaceful use at the heart of the ATS.  
Chapter Two evaluates the regional approach to NNS through the ATS and other related 
instruments. The potential for AT Parties to adopt a biosecurity framework is explored in the context 
of the legal status of the continent and the tools mandated to protect the Antarctic environment 
under PEPAT. The responses to the specific threats posed by tourism and fisheries are also explored, 
particularly the regulation of the spatial extent of both by the ATS and self-regulation of Antarctic 
tourism by the International Association of Antarctic Tourist Operators (‘IAATO’). 
Chapter Three discusses the applicability of global instruments in the Antarctic area with a focus on 
international biodiversity law and the law of the sea and the extent both complement the regional 
approach to the issue. The marine areas of the Antarctic are high seas under the United Nations 
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Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (‘UNCLOS’)74 and thus all States have a qualified freedom to 
navigate the area under the customary freedoms codified in the treaty.75 Linking with the global 
protection of biodiversity, Chapter Three examines the biosecurity provisions in the international 
regime of the high seas and their appropriateness in an Antarctic context. 
Chapter Four assesses the legal rules discussed in the previous chapters in the context of domestic 
implementation with a discussion of Australia and New Zealand’s biosecurity policies towards the 
Antarctic.  Both have implemented express domestic policy attempting to minimize or eliminate the 
introduction of NNS into the Antarctic area through their scientific operations. In addition, both have 
developed frameworks to address biosecurity threats in the sub-Antarctic. Contrasting and 
comparing the approach of the two States protecting pristine areas under their sovereign 
jurisdiction in the sub-Antarctic and their activities in the Antarctic will permit an exploration of the 
suitability of an international approach to biosecurity in the Antarctic.  
The last chapter of the thesis consolidates the gaps and priorities isolated in the previous three 
chapters and identifies the components and methods needed to institute a comprehensive 
biosecurity framework in the Antarctic. The foundations are already being set by a Intercessional 
Contact Group (‘ICG’) of the CEP that has established a programme of work on the issue of NNS.76 
Key to the effectiveness of the regime will be ensuring that main objectives and guiding principles 
adequately provide for a precautionary approach to biosecurity. A permanent advisory body should 
form the basis for a clearing house of biosecurity best practice, driven by States like Australia and 
New Zealand that have already implemented effective biosecurity policy for their Antarctic activities. 
The integration of biosecurity into current tools gives AT Parties the opportunity to strengthen their 
monitoring, inspection and reporting measures to ensure they provide for compliance. Chapter Five 
of the thesis will ultimately argue for commitments in a legally binding form, setting precautionary 
standards and taking collective steps to ensure compliance by all Antarctic actors, particularly 
through strategic planning processes and departure state control.  
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2 
REGIONAL APPROACHES TO ANTARCTIC BIOSECURITY 
 
“The issue of non-native species should be given the highest priority consistent with the high environmental 
standards set out in the Protocol; a ‘zero tolerance’ approach.”
 1
 
“The fault for degradation of the Antarctic environment will lie neither in frail law nor in frail policies of 
preclusive restoration. The law and policy are clear. Rather, the fault for failure will lie in a lack of political will 
among the *AT Parties+ to monitor activities, enforce compliance and compel compensation for liability.”
2
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The arbitrary sectors that comprise territorial claims to the Antarctic area are not a boundary for 
NNS. Once established in an ecosystem, NNS can spread to other areas within the geophysical 
boundaries illustrated by the explosive spread of some NNS on sub-Antarctic islands.3 Thus, to 
effectively address biosecurity threats within geophysical regions, international and transboundary 
cooperation is essential.4 The ATS embodies this spirit of cooperation with sovereign interests put 
aside in the collective management of peaceful and scientific activities in the area south of 60° south 
latitude (AT area).5 Moreover, the underlying principles of the ATS provide a powerful catalyst for a 
biosecurity regime. The commitment to comprehensive protection of the environment in PEPAT, 
including planning activities to avoid damage to biodiversity and habitats,6 implies the need to take 
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14 
precautions to avoid introducing NNS.7 However, the provisions and tools within PEPAT fail to 
provide anything approximating the consistency or comprehensiveness of an effective domestic 
biosecurity framework. Outside the ATS, the regional tourism industry body IAATO employs 
mandatory decontamination standards on all their vessels, although do not strategically address 
how their activities might impact the spread of NNS. The following chapter will assess the regional 
biosecurity framework through an analysis of the ATS’s provision for biosecurity and application to 
actors in the Antarctic area. Each of the tools available to AT Parties will be examined in a biosecurity 
context, appropriate to the three principal human actors on the continent; National Antarctic 
Programs, private tourist operators and the fishing industry.  
2.1.1 FOUNDATIONS OF ANTARCTIC BIOSECURITY: A REGIONAL TREATY SYSTEM 
Before addressing the adequacy of the ATS biosecurity framework, this section will introduce the 
ATS and evaluate its applicability to activities posing a biosecurity threat to the Antarctic 
environment. Essentially the ATS comprises a “…regime for governing human activities in the 
Antarctic.”8 It is defined in PEPAT as: “the AT, the measures in effect under that Treaty, its associated 
separate international instruments in force9 and the measures in effect under those instruments.”10 
Although this exhaustively lists the formal aspect of the ATS, a number of other regional bodies and 
instruments have direct and indirect impacts on activity in the Antarctic.11 The distinct parts of the 
ATS could be considered separate regimes, dealing with certain activities within a geographical area. 
However, it is the interrelation between all the components that gives the ATS its systemic nature.12  
For biosecurity measures to be effective, they must be consistently and comprehensively applied to 
the various vectors of human activity.13 Any legal regime relies on some form of authority to legislate 
                                                          
7
 B Mansfield and N Gilbert, ‘Availability and Applicability of Legal Tools for Managing Non-native species’ in M Rogan-
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 C C Joyner, Governing the frozen commons: the Antarctic regime and environmental protection (1998), 23.  
9
 CCAS, CCAMLR and PEPAT. 
10
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15 
and enforce rules, yet jurisdiction remains one of the unsolved problems of the ATS.14 In the 
Antarctic area, the close link between jurisdiction and territorial sovereignty limits the extent that AT 
Parties can legislate and enforce a biosecurity regime. The sovereign disputes over the Antarctic area 
remain “frozen” under Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and the measures of the AT are 
implemented on Parties on the basis of nationality.15 The rule of pacta tertiis excludes applying any 
biosecurity measures under the ATS on third parties without customary quality or erga omnes 
application.16 The application of any objective regime requires general acceptance of the 
international community of its objective application17 and there are continued opposition to the 
institutions of the ATS creating an objective regime.18 In addition, there are no signs that AT Parties 
wish to pursue this designation which implies nationality is the sole basis for jurisdiction in the AT 
area.19  
2.1.1.1 LEGAL STATUS OF THE ANTARCTIC TERRESTRIAL AREA 
The legal status of a geographic area establishes the boundaries for human interaction with the area 
and thus the biosecurity threat posed by human activities. Many sub-Antarctic areas are given 
natural reserve status that, in some examples, restricts entry to environmental managers and 
scientists examining human impact, thus significantly limiting exposure to NNS. Any interaction that 
is permitted is conditional on precautionary biosecurity measures.20 However, the State’s capacity to 
afford an area precautionary protection is dependent on their territorial sovereignty over the area. 
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In international law, several approaches have been developed to deal with the legal status of 
territory.21 The traditional approach identifies the owner of the land: either no one22 or everyone.23 
Each regulates exploitation of the space by restricting to the first lawful taker in the former, or 
everyone in the latter. The traditional view places the Antarctic continent in the former category.24 
Seven sovereign States made claim to Antarctica before 1961, 25 three of which overlap.26 Only five 
of the States mutually recognise each other’s claims,27 two claimants do not recognise any claims 
other than their own28 and two states reserve the right to make future claims.29 The cornerstone of 
the AT, Article IV, is designed to keep the status quo as of 1959.30 Most scholars are of the opinion 
that no national claim to sovereignty has a sufficient basis in international law to allow for any form 
of territorial jurisdiction, meaning no single sovereign state can provide the area precautionary 
protection.31  
If it is not owned by anyone, some argue it resembles a commons area similar to the high seas, open 
to exploitation by all.32 The extent to which this is an accurate description is questionable given the 
unresolved status of territorial claims.33 The legal implication of this designation is not positive for 
the management of biosecurity threats. The “tragedy of the commons” predicts that finite 
commons’ resources utilised by self interested actors tend towards collapse.34 If the Antarctic is left 
open to exploitation, the model predicts rational, self-interested actors will attempt to maximise 
returns from scientific, mineral, aesthetic and living resources until the resources are no longer 
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viable.35 Moreover, they may do so without taking precautions against biosecurity if it is likely that 
other operators will not take precautions and thus gain a competitive advantage.  A foil to the 
tragedy of the commons is contractual, collective management. Self-interested actors forming a 
collective arrangement, like the ATS, to mitigate against biosecurity threats in unison allows for a 
commons area to be sustainably exploited. In the domestic framework this is provided by the State.  
Biosecurity plays an essential role in the economy by preventing the spread of disease and pests that 
threaten key crops and livestock. Although individuals can benefit from the spread of NNS, the State, 
as a self interested actor, takes coordinated measures to prevent the spread of harmful NNS to 
protect its resources as a whole.36 For the tourist and research sector, the pristine environment is 
valuable and taking biosecurity measures collectively through the ATS is analogous to the State 
protecting its own resources. 
The most significant difficulty that sovereign states face in implementing an effective biosecurity 
framework is the fragmentation and inconsistency across agencies and institutions responsible for 
implementing biosecurity.37 With 28 Consultative Parties to the AT, a further 10 States with tourist 
vessels flying their flag in the Southern Ocean in the 2007/8 summer season and 4 further States 
with vessels listed on as illegal, unreported and unregulated under CCAMLR’s notification process, 
policy-makers in the Antarctic area face numerous biosecurity regimes that address or fail to address 
the same theme. The fragmented aspect of environmental management in the Antarctic area is a 
direct result of the approach of the ATS towards jurisdiction. The default jurisdictional approach of 
the AT focuses on nationality, without “prejudicing the respective positions of the Contracting 
Parties.”38 Article VIII of the AT lays out a limited formula: jurisdiction in the AT area stems from the 
individual’s nationality in the case of inspectors and scientific personnel “exchanged under *the 
Treaty+”.39 Expeditions, stations and landed tourists follow something analogous to flag state 
jurisdiction;40 claimant states agree to avoid enforcing territorial jurisdiction.41 The AT promotes a 
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pragmatic approach; any dispute met with immediate consultation “with view to reaching a mutually 
agreeable solution.”42 The ATCM also has the capacity to consider measures in respect of jurisdiction 
questions.43 In practice, management approaches focus on the Parties’ jurisdictional capacity to 
regulate their own nationals.44 Before the passage of PEPAT, permits under the 1964 Agreed 
Measures,45 for both the conservation of Antarctic marine living creatures and protected areas, were 
delegated to “an appropriate authority”46 defined as any person authorised by a Participating 
Government to issue permits under these Agreed Measures. The deliberate ambiguity in this 
statement left open the possibility of that authority being the State that asserted territorial 
jurisdiction.47 However, subsidiary measures highlight Treaty Parties’ national jurisdiction and no 
attempt at territorial jurisdiction has been enforced. Without exception, states are responsible via 
domestic legislation for implementing the regulations of the ATS on their own nationals in 
Antarctica.  
Nevertheless, developments in the concept of the commons since the negotiation of the AT have 
some relevance to the governance of the Antarctic.48 The common heritage of mankind principle 
dedicates certain areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction to peaceful purposes and scientific 
freedom.49 Exploration, exploitation and use of the non-living resources of the commons must also 
benefit future generations and be shared with all nations.50 The International Seabed Authority, 
created under UNCLOS, is an example of an international institution that provides the support in 
implementing the CHM principle.51 However, the focus of this concept has been an equitable sharing 
of exploitation, rather than retaining benefits for future generations.52 Biosecurity measures may be 
more consistently applied and enforced with a central law making authority, but a focus on global 
exploitation would increase NNS risks associated with increased human exposure and potentially 
weakened natural biodiversity. 
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A more useful construct was proposed by Australia and France when they argued for the Antarctic 
area to be put aside as a World Park and governed by a separate institution in the preliminary 
negotiations for PEPAT.53 The idea of a “public heritage of humankind”,54 where an institution 
restricts exploitation for the benefit of present and future generations, provides a useful basis for a 
biosecurity system.55 This approximates the protection afforded some sub-Antarctic areas. Human 
interaction with the area can be strictly controlled with the purpose of protecting the pristine quality 
of the continent for future generations.56 However, AT Parties did not embrace the concept: the 
natural reserve accepted in the final formulation of PEPAT retains jurisdiction based on nationality 
and rejected institutionalisation of the ATS.57 A substantive analysis of these concepts is outside the 
scope of this thesis.58 It is sufficient to note that scientific, aesthetic and wilderness values protected 
by the ATS, linked by institutionalised collective management, create a unique legal framework. 
PEPAT provides that exploitation for any purpose should involve no significant or lasting damage to 
the environment creating a firm foundation for an effective biosecurity framework. However, the 
implementation of these principles has varied59 and the “jurisdictional vacuum” that existed in the 
wake of the AT negotiations essentially remains unchanged.60 
2.1.1.2 LEGAL STATUS OF THE ANTARCTIC MARINE AREA 
UNCLOS contains the core international law regulating activities in the sea.61 Under UNCLOS, there 
are five general forms of maritime area, three of which allow states to regulate activity next to their 
territory.62 Despite the reservation of high seas freedoms in the AT,63 subsequent practice confirms 
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the AT’s application to the marine areas within the AT area.64 However, neither the ATS nor UNCLOS 
explicitly categorise the legal status of marine areas in the AT area.65 Wherever ships are, they are 
subject to their flag state’s jurisdiction.66 UNCLOS allows coastal states to directly protect their 
marine environments, rather than rely on the practise of foreign flag states. A liberal interpretation 
of Article IV(2), which is also invoked in CCAMLR, does not preclude states asserting sovereign rights 
over maritime zones. The Article only refers to prohibiting enlarged or new claims to “territorial” 
sovereignty and arguably, the extension of marine zones is automatic by the operation of 
international law, rather than an “enlargement” of a claim.67 Article VI of the AT reserving States 
rights under international law “with regard to the high seas within that area” does not necessarily 
exclude the existence of other maritime zones.68 However, for the 187 States that do not recognise 
any claims to Antarctica; there is no legitimate basis for maritime zones.69 Until undisputed 
territorial sovereignty is accepted, the flag state remains the only legitimate authority over the 
Antarctic marine environment.70 
Despite this, most claimant States assert jurisdiction over maritime areas, including the territorial 
sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (‘EEZ’) and the continental shelf extending from their 
claim.71 The territorial sea, contiguous zone, and continental shelf, extend automatically from a 
state’s territory and does not require any additional action.72 In contrast, UNCLOS requires a state to 
declare an EEZ before it is effective and register any extensions of the continental shelf beyond 200 
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nautical miles with the Commission on the Limits on the Continental Shelf (‘CLCS’).73 Article IV(2) of 
the AT arguably does not apply to Antarctic maritime zones as the Article only prevents new claims 
to “territorial sovereignty” and all the zones but the EEZ extend automatically from the previously 
asserted claims.74 However, the reservation of the freedom of the high seas may restrict the marine 
zones to those established before the AT came into force.75 This has not prevented the claimant 
states legislating for the marine areas, declaring EEZ and making claims to the CLCS under Article 
76(8) of UNCLOS.76 In addition, Australian courts have controversially confirmed the application of 
the Australian EEZ off the Australian Antarctic Territory (‘AAT’) in reference to Japanese whaling 
vessels.77 Although potentially permitting claimants to enforce biosecurity provisions within the AT 
area, the collective management of Antarctica relies on Article IV’s diffusion of the sovereignty 
disputes.78 The balance between claimant states retaining their claims and the spirit of cooperation 
that embodies the ATS is inconsistent with claimant states enforcing their claims. A biosecurity 
regime would benefit from a sovereign state enforcing quarantine provisions but the implications for 
future human activity in the area could increase the risks of NNS introduction in the long term, 
especially if the environmental principles of PEPAT were abandoned.79 However, the restriction 
certainly limits the application of any regional biosecurity regime to non-parties to the AT.  
Maritime jurisdiction is somewhat complicated by the sub-Antarctic islands that have marine areas 
intruding into the Antarctic area.80 As the sovereign authority over some of these areas is 
undisputed, the extension of maritime areas is uncontroversial.81 Consensus based decision making 
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allows for any affected State to veto any biosecurity measure or resource allocation that offends 
against its sovereignty. This characteristic is evoked by the Final Act of CCAMLR and expressly 
permits any sub-Antarctic State to adopt conservation measures which vary from those provided by 
CCAMLR in relation to their maritime zones.82 Although this statement does not have binding status, 
it has been respected by the Commission and reflects common practice in Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations (‘RFMO’) in relation to coastal states with maritime zones within or 
adjacent to their regulatory area.83 As there is no such compromise in PEPAT, the one declared 
continental shelf that extends into the AT area must conform with the ATS in relation to that area or 
amend or repeal its ratifying legislation.84 
2.1.1.3 SUMMARY 
A jurisdictional system that is based on nationality necessarily precludes the application of any 
biosecurity measures to third parties that exist outside of the ATS. The applicability of customary law 
through UNCLOS and other marine instruments will be examined in more detail in the context of 
instruments outside the ATS in Chapter 3. More significantly as most activity in the Antarctic is 
carried out by AT Parties; it leads to some significant discrepancies in the manner of 
implementation.85 Consistency is required for any effective response to a “messy, frustrating, 
depressing and unpredictable” subject like biosecurity.86 However, the ATS provides a significant 
network of measures to prevent, monitor for and respond to NNS, particularly in relation to the 
most intrusive human activity on the continent, the support of scientific activity.87 
2.1.2 ADEQUACY OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS 
Although the environmental and scientific values underlying the ATS invoke the consideration of 
NNS, there is minimal substantive provision for biosecurity in the associated instruments or 
measures to ensure compliance with the few measures that are present. Moreover, despite the legal 
framework for the system providing for the consideration of environmental issues, it does not 
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provide adequately for the cooperative management of cumulative impacts including the capacity to 
respond proactively or reactively to the introduction of NNS. 
2.1.2.1 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: THE ANTARCTIC TREATY AND MEETINGS OF THE PARTIES 
The AT provides a loose set of themes, norms and procedures for governing the AT area. Several 
aspects suit a biosecurity regime. The requirement to cooperate and exchange information is central 
to the ATS and necessary for reducing the environmental risks of any areas that are shared.88 The 
instrument also introduces an inspection process “to promote the objectives and ensure the 
observance of the provisions of the present treaty.”89 However, the focus of the instrument and 
inspection process is peaceful, scientific utility of the continent and not environmental protection. 
The AT defines the AT area as a demilitarilised “continent of science” that “shall be used for peaceful 
purposes only.”90 Although NNS could reduce the value of the continent for science, scientific 
freedom is not an appropriate basis for a biosecurity framework. Membership is open to all States, 
but participation in decision making is conditional on engaging in Antarctic research activity.91 The 
only mention of the environment or biodiversity in the text of the agreement is in relation to Parties 
meeting to decide on the “preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica”.92 The 
commitment to consensus-style decision making retains the sovereign discretion of State parties, 
requiring open cooperation. This promotes full consideration of the stakeholders involved but also 
limits the capacity of the ATS to introduce a comprehensive biosecurity framework and enforce the 
provisions that do exist. However, the instrument is also flexible93 with provision for amendment 
and adoption of subsidiary instruments.94  
Article IX of the Treaty requires ATPs to “meet...at suitable times and places,” for the purpose of 
“exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining to 
Antarctica” and, most importantly formulating, considering and recommending to their 
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governments, “measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the treaty."95 The 
limitations of the subsidiary instruments are significant in the context of biosecurity. The meetings 
include representatives of the consultative and non-consultative parties, observers,96 invited 
experts97 and guests.98 The measures only become effective when approved by all ATCP 
governments and can include any matter of common interest.99 Whether they have legally binding 
status, beyond the plain language interpretation of “recommend[ations] to their governments”100 in 
the text of the AT, is questionable.101 The uncertainty around legal status led to lengthy delays in 
some recommendations becoming effective and the proliferation of categories of recommendation, 
prompting AT Parties to rationalise the system in 1995.102 “Measures” are explicitly legally binding as 
reflecting the intentions of the original drafters of the AT,103 however two other categories of 
recommendation were introduced. “Decisions” concern internal organisational matters and become 
operative upon their adoption at an ATCM, although their status is legally uncertain with most 
ratifying legislation unfamiliar with the term.104 “Resolutions” are nonbinding, hortatory texts.  
In addition, Annex V of PEPAT introduced a fast track procedure for management plans, which 
although annexed to a measure, come into effect 90 days after being approved in an ATCM, unless 
the measure specifies otherwise.105 On balance the process of adopting measures has been sufficient 
to address the issues arising in the Antarctic area.106 However, the result is sometimes cumbersome 
with continuing inconsistencies in the methods of adopting and ensuring compliance with measures 
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and decisions.107 A consensus-based system, requiring universal acceptance and internal ratification 
of measures, limits the capacity for AT Parties to proactively provide for environmental issues. The 
Antarctic Secretariat partially addresses this gap allowing for intersessional information exchange, 
monitoring and organisation but does not have international authority or decision making power 
with respect to issuing regulatory acts.108 No procedure exists for intersessional adoption of a 
subsidiary instrument, hindering the capacity of States to respond to new and pressing issues.109 
2.1.2.2. A FOCUS ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
PEPAT supplements the AT110 by integrating the many disparate environmental measures 
throughout the Treaty system into an environmentally focussed framework for the regulation of 
human activity in the AT area.111 The instrument stops short of implementing the “World Park” 
concept discussed above but the environmental principles under Article 2 and 3 of PEPAT provide 
the ideological foundation for biosecurity in the area. Under PEPAT, AT Parties must consider the 
comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and its dependent and associated 
ecosystems, as well as the inherent aesthetic, wilderness and scientific values of the area. Invasive 
NNS have the potential to threaten the protected “Antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems” by definition112 and ecosystem based management is the most appropriate 
basis for biosecurity.113 The extent an NNS introduction affects the wilderness value of an area 
depends on the assessment of wilderness.114 Some authors expressly include the concept of “intact 
native ecosystems” in a wilderness value and consequentially, absence of NNS.115 However, the 
practical application of protecting wilderness values has been given very little attention at CEP 
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meetings or at ATCMs.116 Moreover, potentially impacts the “aesthetic value” of an area by changing 
the appearance of the natural environment.117 However, in some cases the presence of an NNS 
arguably benefits the aesthetic value complicating application.118 The application of a strict 
precautionary approach to activity related to mineral resources119 also eliminates the biosecurity 
threats posed by potential prospecting and extraction operations.120  Although the principles form a 
useful background to environmental protection, more substantive obligations are necessary to 
minimise risks associated with NNS.121 The article is excluded from the scope of the Arbitration 
Annex122 and some states have not given the principles any legal effect in their ratifying 
legislation.123 However, the adoption of environmental protection as a central principle underlying 
conduct indicates the capacity of the ATS to adapt to new priorities.124 The provisions certainly 
indicate biosecurity is within the scope of the ATS and Article 9 of PEPAT reinforces the flexibility of 
the ATS, allowing for the adoption or amendment Annexes with a fast track approval process. 
Amendment or modification of an Annex becomes effective one year after the close of the ATCM at 
which it was adopted.125   
One of the most important features introduced by PEPAT to ensure flexibility and proactive 
environmental management is the Committee for Environmental Protection (“CEP”). The CEP has 
the express mandate to advise on “the need for additional measures” under PEPAT and “means of 
minimising or mitigating environmental impacts of activities in the *AT+ area”.126 However, it is 
limited in its utility to a biosecurity regime. Initial proposals in the negotiations to assemble a 
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“Permanent Committee for the Protection of the Antarctic Environment,”127 similar to the regulatory 
committees created under CRAMRA, with extensive enforcement, inspection and monitoring 
responsibilities did not meet the approval of all of the Parties.128 The CEP is a purely advisory body 
charged with liaising with relevant organisations129, providing advice and formulating 
recommendations on a number of environmental issues relevant to PEPAT.130 By restricting the CEP, 
Parties overlooked the impact human activity has in the Antarctic area and limits the potential for 
effectively implemented environmental protection.131 While the advisory body can assess risks, 
evaluate and advocate potential biosecurity measures, it cannot legislate or enforce those measures 
without approval through the ATCM and implementation by State parties. Moreover, the 
composition of the body with delegates from each AT party limits its capacity to independently 
analyse environmental issues.132 The CEP has also been charged with a rolling review of the Annexes, 
although the difficulties in reaching a consensus, limit the capacity of the CEP to make any significant 
changes.133 Whether PEPAT in its current form can be effectively applied to a biosecurity regime 
requires a focus on the various tools and institutions PEPAT integrates to ensure environmental 
protection. 
2.1.3 SUMMARY 
Despite the environmental focus of PEPAT, the ATS is limited in its capacity to apply an effective 
biosecurity regime. Disputed sovereignty and rule by consensus both paralyse certain measures and 
empowers Treaty parties to independently govern Antarctic activities, complicating the application 
of environmental principles. The lack of an applicable jurisdictional formula or environmental 
institution with legal personality limits the capacity of AT Parties to enforce any measures. However, 
the underlying principles of the ATS, particularly Article 3 of PEPAT, implicitly provide for a 
biosecurity regime. The relevant provisions of PEPAT applicable to the major human activity on the 
continent are limited in their application to biosecurity. 
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2.2. NATIONAL ANTARCTIC PROGRAMS AND BIOSECURITY 
Chapter 1 of this thesis illustrates that scientific activity in the Antarctic poses a considerable 
biosecurity threat to the Antarctic environment. This section evaluates whether tools and 
mechanisms under the ATS address biosecurity risks by dissecting the provisions required by PEPAT 
to protect the Antarctic environment. PEPAT prescribes considering environmental impacts in the 
planning of activity, including requiring environmental impact assessments for new or changed 
activities, permits for introducing NNS and certain interactions with protected areas and indigenous 
species, regulating the disposal of waste and marine pollution and proactively planning for 
environmental emergencies. PEPAT’s compliance measures rely on information sharing and open 
cooperation. Impact assessments of activities deemed to have a “more than minor or transitory 
impact” are shared with other parties for consultation, national reports record the measures taken 
by AT Parties to implement PEPAT and an open inspection regime allows AT Parties to confirm 
compliance. To Although biosecurity is invoked sporadically through the system, there is a distinct 
lack of strategic management that limits the systems effectiveness at managing the risks posed by 
NNS. 
2.2.1 PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN THE ATS TO AVOID THE INTRODUCTION OF NNS 
PEPAT creates an express obligation to give careful consideration to threats to biodiversity and 
habitats in the planning of activities. Article 3 of PEPAT stipulates that activities in the AT area should 
be planned and conducted so to avoid: “detrimental changes in the distribution, abundance, and 
productivity of species and populations of species of fauna and flora134; further jeopardy to 
endangered and threatened species and populations of such species135; and degradation of, or 
substantial risk to, areas of biological, scientific, historic, aesthetic or wilderness significance.”136 As 
the introduction of NNS has been identified within the ATS as one of the greatest threats to 
biodiversity,137 the provision creates an obligation on Parties to assess the risks of their activities 
introducing NNS and take action to minimise or eliminate the risks.138 One of the difficulties with 
assessing the risks from NNS is the lack of baseline information and information on the potential 
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threats associated with NNS but PEPAT also provides for the gathering of information on the 
“cumulative impacts of an activity, both by itself and in combination with other activities in the AT 
area.”139 However, as the next sections will demonstrate, the elaborated planning processes 
prescribed by PEPAT have limited applicability for biosecurity. 
 
2.2.1.1. THE GATEWAY INTO ANTARCTICA: EIA  
Article 8 of PEPAT states that “...any activities undertaken in the AT area pursuant to scientific 
research programs, tourism and all other governmental and nongovernmental activities in the AT 
area for which advance notice is required under Article VII(5) of the AT...” are subject to assessment 
procedures set out in Annex I of PEPAT. The EIA is the “sole gatekeeper” to scientific and logistical 
activity in the Antarctic area and is the only express mechanism encouraging AT Parties to limit 
activity in the Antarctic area.140 EIA first emerged as a legislative tool in the United States141; the 
provisions require operators to assess the environmental impacts of activity before any decision is 
made to proceed with that activity.142 One of the main benefits of the EIA process is its wide utility. 
Since its inception, 200 systems for assessing environmental impacts have been introduced, making 
the EIA one of the most widely implemented tools for environmental monitoring.143 AT Parties can 
thus limit the scope of activity in the Antarctic in a reasonably consistent manner, as the structure of 
the system will be familiar.  Unfortunately, the manifestation of EIA under Annex I of PEPAT limits its 
capacity to address biosecurity threats in the planning of conduct. The purpose of PEPAT, Article 8 
and Annex I is to assess the potential impact of activities on the Antarctic environment and 
associated and dependent ecosystems the “planning and conduct” of all Antarctic activities.144 The 
process is designed for assessing changes in activity or new events, promoting the consideration of 
NNS in relation to projects that may have a high NNS risk. However, the threshold for engaging in 
more extensive analysis does not appropriately account for the variable nature of biosecurity threats 
                                                          
139
 PEPAT, Article 3(c)(ii). 
140
A D Hemmings and R Roura, ‘A square peg in a round hole: fitting impact assessment under the Antarctic Environmental 
Protocol to Antarctic tourism’ (2003) 21(1) Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 15, 21. 
141
 National Environmental Policy Act 1970 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (United States). 
142
 T Koivurova, Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic (2002), 132. 
143
 O D Harrop and A J Nixon, Environmental Assessment in Practice (1999), 2. 
144
 PEPAT, Article 3(1)(c). 
30 
and the provisions only include limited guidance on how to apply an EIA to decision making.145 
Indeed, there is no explicit mention of a need to consider specific threats, like NNS, in the Annex.  
The Guidelines for EIA in Antarctica (‘EIA Guidelines’) updated by the ATCM in 2005146 “fill [some of] 
the gaps”147 with NNS explicitly mentioned in the document but only outlines the process under 
which NNS should be considered.148 The EIA Guidelines are attached to a non-binding resolution and 
their informal nature is reinforced by the Resolution’s wording that recognises the primacy of pre-
existing national legislation and other obligations of AT Parties.149 However, the CEP specifically 
provides for discussion on the consistency of the CEP with the Guidelines. 150 Discussion in the CEP 
and state practice in preparing CEE’s suggests many of the provisions in the Guidelines, including 
considering NNS impacts, are considered essential.151 However, many of the biosecurity threats 
posed by scientific activity are ongoing and based on the cumulative exposure of the environment to 
risk.152 The lack of a strategic approach to planning activity in order to assess and address threats to 
the environment is a significant restriction in the regime’s stated purpose.153 Moreover, the 
provision for transparent discussion at the CEP and ATCM is a limited method of ensuring 
compliance.154 
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2.2.1.1.1. A MORE THAN MINOR OR TRANSITORY PROBLEM: INADEQUATE SCOPE 
Biosecurity risks are by their nature imprecise.155 The uncertainty as to biological baselines is 
compounded with uncertainty over specific species invasiveness and the impacts on biological 
diversity, highlighting the importance of precaution in the approach to NNS risks.156 Given any 
activity involves the introduction of NNS into Antarctica; a strict precautionary approach to 
environmental impacts could prohibit all activity. This is undesirable and inconsistent with the 
freedom of science and peaceful activity underpinning the ATS. Ideally, a planning process should 
expressly identify the risks associated with NNS and determine what level of risk is acceptable in 
regard to the various aspects of activities that constitute a biosecurity threat. The EIA process does 
not do this, instead providing for a preliminary assessment to determine whether an activity will 
cause a minor or transitory impact157 and if so, a initial environmental evaluation (IEE) to evaluate 
whether it will cause more than a minor or transitory impact, which invokes a comprehensive 
environmental evaluation (CEE). There is no elaboration on what a “minor or transitory impact” is, 
other than the environmental consequences that must be avoided.158 A number of WPs offer 
guidance159 but the EIA Guidelines expressly provides for interpretation on a case by case basis.160 
The EIA Guidelines instead invoke NNS as an “output” of activity indicating it will impact flora and 
fauna.161 The plain language interpretation implies the introduction of a transient NNS might not 
require any analysis or mitigation beyond a preliminary assessment of the risk. This is reflected in 
the United Kingdom’s CEE for Haley Research Station, identifying two levels of risk for persistent and 
transient NNS.162 By leaving the definition up to interpretation, the ATS expressly provides for 
inconsistent implementation which has led to the significant differences in the levels of EIA carried 
out by AT Parties.163 
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TABLE 2.1: PORTION OF IMPACT MATRIX FROM CEE: OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES AT HALLEY VI RELEVANT TO 
BIOSECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
164
 
Activity Output Predicted 
Output 
Probability Extent Duration Significance/ 
Severity 
Mitigating or Preventative 
Measure 
Shipping 
and cargo 
handling 
at ice 
edge 
Solid and 
liquid waste, 
including 
sewage 
Introduction 
of faecal 
bacteria 
Certain Area-
specific 
(ship 
route to 
Weddell 
sea) 
Short Very low All wastes to be managed in 
accordance with BAS Waste 
Management Handbook. 
Most waste stored on-board 
for 
discharge at Port Reception 
Facilities 
Food waste macerated 
before discharged to sea or 
incinerated 
Sewage treated aboard 
supply vessel and effluent 
discharged at sea. 
 Ballast 
water 
discharge 
Transfer of 
Invasive Alien 
Species 
Low Local Short (if 
species 
dies) 
Long (if it 
breeds) 
Very low (if 
no survivors) 
High (if 
breeds) 
Exchange of ballast water to 
be undertaken at deep sea 
locations only 
BAS Ballast Water 
Management Plan to be 
followed. 
 Introduction 
of alien 
species 
Transfer of 
NNS to 
Antarctica 
Low Local Short (if 
species 
dies) 
Long (if it 
breeds) 
Very low (if 
no survivors) 
High (if 
breeds) 
All vehicles and equipment 
to be cleaned before 
shipping to Antarctica 
 
The extensive provision for consideration of cumulative impacts165 in the EIA Guidelines166 should 
provide for an examination of whether the exposure of transient NNS might potentially result in a 
more persistent introduction. However, without a strategic consideration of impacts across activities 
and actors, the cumulative threats cannot be adequately quantified.167 The impact matrix provided 
by the United Kingdom for the Haley VI station is an example.168 Although the immediate risks 
associated with the change in activity are evaluated, the ongoing risks posed by the exposure of 
waste, expeditioneers and supplies to the Antarctic environment are not considered. Designing the 
station to ensure these aspects are minimised or taking into account the potential impact of other 
human activity in the area is not contemplated in the EIA. Plans and programs do not fall under the 
scope of the EIA provisions of PEPAT, although some states have implemented programmatic EIA for 
their individual programs.169 ASOC and a number of authors have proposed a move to strategic 
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environmental assessment or area based planning processes,170 “abandoning the national-based or 
project based...[EIAs] and moving towards joint EIAs covering large geographical areas, including all 
actors involved in that area.”171 Such a possibility will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
2.2.1.1.2 LIMITS IN THE PROCESS: APPLICATION AND CONSIDERATION 
At each stage of the EIA process, the procedure for analysis is elaborated more extensively in the 
text of Annex I.172 The minimum requirements of the analysis must fulfil the requirements of Article 
3(2)(c) of PEPAT but otherwise the PA is left to entirely appropriate national procedures without 
need to produce a formal document or account in any way for the decision making process.173 
Consistent consideration of biosecurity risks across programs is essential. However, as well as the 
threshold for further analysis, the process permits inconsistent application. The practical effect of 
subjective application is a lack of uniform application. States that put a high priority on 
environmental protection may conscientiously engage in the more prescriptive CEE processes174 but 
if for any reason, a State wishes to bypass the more stringent elements of the test, it may classify its 
action as an IEE or engage in a substandard analysis.175 Hemmings and Roura commented on both 
the general high quality, but low quantity of CEEs and great variability of IEEs, some close to CEE in 
comprehensiveness and some “simply atrocious”.176 While some states have been proactive, there is 
a real risk that under some jurisdictions the lack of mandatory and universal consideration of similar 
issues will make the EIA process nothing more than a rubber stamp required for Antarctic activity.177 
The EIA process is the only way to ensure national parties are taking adequate measures to prevent 
the invasion of NNS before engagement in activity. It is essential the EIA is comprehensive and 
applied consistently in the decision making process. 
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TABLE 2.2: COMPARISON OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE PEPAT EIA 
PROCESS 
 Article 3(2)(c) PA IEE CEE 
Threshold All activities. Less than 
minor or 
transitory 
impact. 
A minor or transitory 
impact on PA. 
More than a minor or 
transitory impact on 
PA or IEE. 
Components  Area, duration, 
intensity. 
Cumulative impacts. 
Mitigation. 
Monitoring. 
Response. 
Environmenta
l impacts. 
Purpose, location, 
duration, intensity. 
Alternatives. 
Impacts. 
Cumulative impacts. 
IEE Components. 
Baseline environment. 
Methods to determine 
impacts. 
Indirect impacts. 
Mitigation. 
Uncertainty. 
Consideration Informed judgments 
must take into 
account components. 
May proceed. May proceed with 
appropriate 
processes to verify 
impact. 
May proceed after 
consultation with 
other Parties, 
consideration at CEP. 
Decision to proceed 
based on CEE. 
 
Moreover, there is no requirement for a State to stop an activity on conclusion of an EIA. Although a 
State must take into account the possibility of not proceeding, even if a CEE indicates a high risk of 
NNS introduction, a State may choose to proceed.178 The EIA process puts the proponent of an 
activity in charge of interpreting the threshold for more advanced analysis, engaging in the analysis 
and deciding whether that analysis will influence a decision to proceed. With the unique and 
challenging conditions of Antarctic logistics, it is unlikely after the process is completed, a party will 
ever choose not to proceed.179 However, as with many elements of the ATS, the influence of 
informal diplomatic pressure and public awareness will play a role in decreasing the risk of any 
significant invasion being permitted.180 The international engagement with CEEs has certainly had a 
positive impact.181 Public scrutiny through the CEP and ATCM play a role in making the decision 
making process transparent and allowing for better understanding of the impacts.182 However, 
despite many AT Parties having concerns about certain activities, they have still gone ahead, which is 
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a significant limitation in the systems effectiveness.183 The effectiveness and limitations of the 
system in regards to biosecurity threats are illustrated by the controversy over the drilling of Lake 
Vostok by the Russian Federation.184 The sub-glacial lake is highly valued by scientists for its pristine 
quality.185 The CEE for the scientific drilling effort indicated considerable bacterial diversity in the 
Vostok borehole drilling fluid and the potential for the introduction of transient NNS into the lake 
water.186  The consultation resulted in considerable criticism over the contents of the CEE, 
particularly in its assessment of the methods of drilling and the potential worst case contamination 
of the environment.187 Although Russia suspended penetration, it continued drilling to build baseline 
information and indicated that despite the criticism, it had met the requirements of PEPAT and 
intended to proceed.188 Since then, alternative strategies have been designed by the scientific 
community189  and Russia has developed a clean mechanism to intrude into the area.190 However, it 
still has not addressed some of the issues posed in the discussion and arguably faces almost 
universal opposition to its approach.191  
2.2.1.1.3 SUMMARY 
Although proving difficult to universally implement, the EIA is one of the few front line 
environmental tools that most States had some awareness of in the negotiation of PEPAT.192 The 
compromise between political expediency and environmental protection has resulted in a 
reasonably robust system that requires States to analyse the impact proposed activities will have on 
the environment and where the impact is more than minor or transitory, consult with other nations 
over potential mitigation measures. It does not, however provide a mechanism for Parties to 
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collectively and strategically plan their activities in order to minimise environmental impacts which 
limits its utility for a biosecurity framework. Potential developments for the regime will be proposed 
in Chapter 5. 
2.2.1.2. BIOSECURITY PERMITS TO CONSERVE NATIVE FLORA AND FAUNA 
Annex II of PEPAT requires AT Parties to institute a permit based system to regulate the introduction 
of NNS.193 The primary focus is the regulation of intentional introductions, although the Annex 
introduces a duty to take preventative measures to exclude non-native microorganisms.194 The 
Annex was amended in 2009, concluding 6 years of debate in the CEP and ICG.195 The structure of 
the section is altered to better elaborate ambiguous provisions in the original and the scope of the 
section is expanded to include all NNS, rather than only Antarctic flora and fauna.196 However, 
despite considerable attention drawn to the issue of NNS, no further elaboration of biosecurity was 
undertaken. 
2.2.1.2.1. ATTACHING A SHORT LEASH: REGULATING INTENTIONAL INTRODUCTIONS 
The permit is a “formal permission in writing issued by an appropriate authority.”197 Article 13 of the 
Protocol198 and Article 4 of Annex 1199 impliedly require the EIA process to make reference to the 
permit system, and the permit effectively supplements the EIA to require additional planning 
processes when planning to interact with special areas or Antarctic flora and fauna.200 The operation 
of the permit is dependent on national procedures but usually either prohibits or limits conduct 
unless one has possession of a document that has required analysis and rationalisation of the 
conduct. The essential reliance on the proponents of activity and lack of a transparent consultation 
process invokes similar concerns as the EIA process.  
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The precautionary requirement for strictly regulated permits when introducing reflects an 
acknowledgment of the potential damage of NNS.201 Article 4 of Annex II prohibits the introduction 
of NNS or non-sterile soil without a permit and only permits introduction for controlled use in the 
case of hydroponics or controlled experimental use with a rationale justifying the introduction.202 
The NNS must be removed203 or disposed of by the end of the permit and precautions must be taken 
to prevent escape or contact with native flora or fauna.204 An exception is provided for food, as long 
as animal products are kept under carefully controlled conditions and disposed of in accordance with 
Annex III to the Protocol.205 In addition, avian products must be treated to ensure poultry or avian 
produces are free from contamination.206 Inspection reports indicate some AT Parties also permit 
pot plants for aesthetic purposes, although inspectors have concluded this might constitute a breach 
of PEPAT.207 The lack of any practical way to discern whether the introduction of pot plants is in 
conflict with PEPAT or enforce compliance, short of the dispute resolution process, is a significant 
limitation in the ATS. 
The Annex also provides for direct response to NNS introduction but without any guidance or 
framework to implement an effective response system. Annex II provides that when an unpermitted 
NNS is introduced, it must be “removed or disposed” of “whenever feasible”, unless the response 
measure would “result in a greater adverse environmental impact”. 208 The importance of taking a 
precautionary approach to response is demonstrated in the sub-Antarctic, where devastating 
ecosystem-wide impacts have been inflicted through an eradication of an NNS.209 In addition, the 
approach does not identify any harmful attribute of the NNS, requiring response wherever an 
introduction is identified. Arguably, this provision applies as much to unintentional introductions as 
intentional introductions. There is nothing to preclude its application, although the context of the 
Annex without any elaboration entails it is only likely to be implemented in relation to intentional 
introductions. The conditions are an entirely appropriate precaution for responding to an 
introduction, establishment or invasion.  
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However, the permit system does not adequately provide the potential cumulative impacts of 
intentional NNS introduction. The information sharing provisions of the Annex are not ideal in a 
biosecurity context. If a scientific body applies for a permit to introduce a NNS,210 Annex II only 
requires the information to be passed to other States at the end of the season.211 This does not allow 
the appropriate State body to make an informed judgment with knowledge of the quantity and 
quality of other activities in the area.212 In addition, the Annex expressly excludes the intentional 
translocation between Antarctic sites.213 Restricting the definition of NNS to intercontinental 
introductions fails to account for the significant genetic variation within Antarctic communities and 
the significant difference between geophysical regions in the Antarctic.214 The threats posed by 
other Antarctic NNS may in fact be more significant than alien NNS, as they are more likely to be 
adapted to the climate of the subject area.215 
2.2.1.2.3 INADEQUATE DEFINITIONS: REGULATING UNINTENTIONAL INTRODUCTIONS 
The only express mention of unintentional introductions is made in relation to microorganisms. 
Precautions must be taken to prevent the accidental introduction of non-sterile soil and micro-
organisms not present naturally in the ATA.216 Given little is known about the impacts of human 
microbes on the Antarctic environment,217 this is an appropriate precaution. In addition, the 
response measures mentioned above seem to contemplate NNS introduced intentionally or 
unintentionally. However, the lack of a more general obligation to take broad measures to prevent 
the unintentional introduction of NNS into the Antarctic environment is a significant gap in the ATS 
and leaves AT Parties without a firm rationale to implementing a biosecurity framework. The 
instrument does not expressly exclude unintentional introductions and some states refer to Article 4 
of Annex II as the rationale for their biosecurity policy.218 However, excluding all possible 
introductions without a permit is not a suitable basis for a biosecurity framework as almost all 
activity and aspects of activity pose a risk of introduction and would consequently be 
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administratively unworkable. A more strategic, area based management process is more 
appropriate. 
Since PEPAT came into effect, CEP has identified NNS as a significant issue.219 Initially focussed on 
the impact of disease, the “introduction of NNS” has grown in prominence and is now top priority on 
the five year plan of the CEP.220 The approach of the CEP to NNS has been divided into two phases. 
The early discussions focussed on wildlife disease. An Intersessional Contact Group (‘ICG’) set up by 
the CEP broadly addressed the issue, assessing the risks221 and then providing a draft report on 
practical measures to diminish risk.222 The report includes recommendations for an awareness 
program, prioritising research, exchanging information, quarantine measures for equipment and 
waste and coordinated response measures. However, noting the low risk identified in the report, the 
CEP did not forward the measures to the ATCM for adoption and only Australia has made reference 
to the measures recommended in consequent information papers describing national biosecurity 
processes.223 Since then, the Parties have addressed generic NNS issues in a more disparate manner. 
Several countries have provided guidance on specific tools; others describe their own programs 
approach to minimising risks. The table on the following page analyses the submissions:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
219
 Initially in relation to the introduction of disease to Antarctic wildlife ; Report of CEP 1, [34] ; see Australia, France and 
New Zealand, above n 1. 
220
 See Figure X; Report to CEP XI (2009), 457; see Section 2.2.2 below for more information. 
221
 Australia, Report on the open-ended [ICG] on Diseases of Antarctic Wildlife: Review and Risk Assessment ATCM XXIV 
WP 11 (2001). 
222
 Australia, Report on the open-ended ICG on Diseases of Antarctic Wildlife: Practical Measures to Diminish Risk (Draft), 
ATCM XXIV WP 11 (2001).  
223
 Australia, Draft Response Plan in the Event that Unusual Animal Deaths are Discovered, ATCM XXV IP 62 (2002). 
40 
TABLE 2.3: BIOSECURITY GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY CEP UNDER PEPAT, ANNEX II224 
Tool Annex II/CEP Submission225 Description and Comment 
Risk Analysis Annex II(1): Permits to introduce NNS. 
New Zealand (IP 36/CEP X; IP 36/CEP XII): A 
framework for analysing and managing NNS 
risks in Antarctica. 
PEPAT requirement to analyse the risks of any intentional introduction 
but no obligation to analyse the biosecurity risks involved with 
ongoing activities. 
New Zealand framework provides useful breakdown of risks for a 
scientific station supplied by ship and air.226 
Knowledge 
Base 
New Zealand (IP 37/CEP X), Australia (WP 
16/CEP XI): Antarctic Alien Species Database. 
Australia and SCAR (IP 49/CEP X): Alien’s in 
Antarctica. 
Uruguay [Spanish] (IP 33/CEP XI), Measures to 
Prevent the Introduction of Alien Species in 
Antarctica, in support of Annex II of the 
Protocol.227 
With capacity to search by species, geographical region or alien status, 
Antarctic Alien Species database provides an easily accessible way to 
identify and keep record of any alien organism. Uruguay proposes the 
retention of physical specimens of any NNS for genetic analysis.  
Results from Alien’s in Antarctica, an international series of studies 
focussed on NNS in Antarctica, should guide management action and 
inform future research. 
The work program encourages input of NNS into the Biodiversity 
database. 
Understandi
ng and 
Awareness 
United States (IP 93 rev. 1/CEP XI): “Don’t Pack 
a Pest When Travelling to Antarctica.” 
Australia (IP 44/CEP VII): Australia’s Antarctic 
Quarantine Practises. 
Uruguay Quarantine practises 
United States, Uruguay and Australian compulsory briefing for all 
personnel, aimed at minimising the spread of propagules attached to 
personal belongings. Australia and United States include informing 
suppliers that goods must not include NNS, with the limited 
exceptions under Annex II. 
Quarantine 
and Border 
Control 
Annex II (6,7,8,9): Precautions to avoid 
microorganisms and non sterile soil. 
Australian and Uruguayan Quarantine 
practises 
South Africa (WP 23/CEP XII); mitigating NNS 
associated with transport. 
Inspections and treatment of vessels and cargo, dedicated cargo 
facilities, dedicated clothing kept in the Antarctic, and reporting 
processes for breaches are included in useful description of national 
quarantine processes (Uruguay and Australia) and future 
recommendations (South Africa). 
Quarantine manual in development.228 
Control of 
High-Risk 
Goods 
Annex II (2,6,9): No dogs, non-sterile soil, 
living birds; (6, 8): manage animal and plant 
food, especially poultry. 
Australian and Uruguayan Quarantine 
practises 
Annex III: Disposal of high-risk goods. 
Prohibition of certain high-risk goods useful but no guidance on how 
to identify high-risk goods, other than listed in Annex II. 
Both Australian and Urugayan engage in treatment regimes, in 
addition the Australian program requires biosecurity measures of its 
suppliers. 
Dedicated discussion of high risk environment/areas/activities/species 
at CEP XIII (2000)229 
Quarantine 
Between 
Antarctic 
Sites 
Australian and Uruguayan Quarantine 
practises  
SCAR (IP 4/CEP XII), Environmental code of 
conduct for terrestrial scientific field research 
in Antarctica 
United Kingdom (IP 36/CEP XII); NNS 
associated with transport. 
United States (IP 110/CEP XI), Sub glacial 
Environments: Environmental and Scientific 
Stewardship 
Nothing directly applicable but useful descriptions of national 
procedures, including cleaning, inspection and reporting processes. 
United Kingdom and SCAR provide best practise guidelines advising 
full cleaning of equipment before and between sites, care with waste 
materials, selectivity with materials taken onto the field and 
inspection processes. 
Suggested mitigation measures to deal with microbial species 
introduced into sub-glacial environments through drilling; focus on 
future research. 
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A cohesive structure for recommendations and an overarching purpose is recommended in the 
Report of the 2006 Workshop on Non-Native Species230 and reaffirmed in a biosecurity work 
programme established for the CEP by Australia, France and New Zealand.231 As indicated in Table 2, 
SCAR has attempted to consolidate the recommendations relevant to field research into a Code of 
Conduct.232 However, the formation of a new ICG on biosecurity with terms of reference including 
the setting of key objectives and guiding principles sets the foundation for a strategic biosecurity 
framework, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
2.2.1.2.4 SUMMARY 
Annex II directly provides for a precautionary approach to the intentional introduction of NNS but 
stops short of a duty to take measures to prevent the unintentional introduction of NNS. The 
regulatory system has its limitations that reflect the greater issue of overall fragmented planning 
processes in the ATS. In particular, the information sharing provisions do not adequately provide for 
the consideration of potential cumulative impacts and the instrument does not provide for 
introductions between Antarctic sites. In addition, the CEP and SCAR offer methods of implementing 
the implicit requirement to consider the risks of NNS in planning activities, although only do so with 
relatively unstructured guidance. 
2.2.1.3 LINES IN THE SNOW: PROTECTING AREAS FROM NNS 
The lack of political barriers but variety of indigenous populations in Antarctica means managing 
biosecurity risk requires separate geographical areas being collectively accorded special 
protection.233 The distinct lack of mandated strategic planning processes or comprehensive 
biosecurity measures compounds the potential biosecurity threats of a number of states operating 
in the same areas and governing their own activities. The permit system set up by Annex V of PEPAT 
mitigates the problem by allowing AT Parties to limit access and conditional entrance on certain 
geographic areas. Protecting areas is one of the oldest international environmental mechanisms of 
protection234 and are a key component for any biosecurity regime, providing regularly monitored 
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and pristine control areas and more stringent biosecurity measures where a particular area has a 
greater risk of NNS introduction because of cumulative impacts.235 In the context of a biosecurity 
framework, it is important that protected areas cover representative biological communities across 
the Antarctic area in the terrestrial and marine environment, and implement effective, consistent 
biosecurity measures to ensure the biological integrity of the areas.236 Strategic protection is 
necessary to effectively exclude biosecurity threats given the considerable diversity within the 
Antarctic area and the considerable movement between habitats and niches.237 Given the 
considerable profilteration of standards at an international level,238 it is also important the 
biosecurity measures are sufficiently comprehensive for consistent implementation across domestic 
frameworks.  
2.2.1.3.1  IDENTIFYING AREAS BEFORE THE ALIENS INVADE 
For a protected area system to be relevant to biosecurity, the process for identifying an area should 
identify variables that correlate positively with biosecurity threats. Both areas subjected to regular 
NNS exposure and pristine areas with vulnerable indigenous biological communities require specific 
biosecurity provision. Annex V of PEPAT provides for both areas of risk with two forms of area 
protection: Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPA) and Antarctic Specially Managed Areas 
(ASMA). The ASPA provides the opportunity to establish representative control areas and protection 
to areas sensitive to invasion. The designation is in order “to protect outstanding environmental, 
scientific, historic, aesthetic or wilderness values, any combination of those values, or ongoing or 
planned scientific research.”239 Areas relevant to NNS can include; representative examples of major 
terrestrial ecosystems and marine ecosystems240; areas with important or unusual assemblages of 
species, including major colonies of breeding native birds or mammals;241 or the type locality or only 
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known habitat of any species.242 Guidelines adopted by the ATCM to establish ASPA areas implicitly 
identify areas that are ecologically sensitive to invasion.243  
Moreover, ASPA’s must be identified according to a “systematic environmental-geographical 
framework”244 which could provide for the strategic limitation of NNS risks. As each species is 
indigenous to an ecosystem, managing areas allows planning processes to incorporate inter-area 
transfer of species, as well as applying additional biosecurity protection to biologically sensitive 
areas. The CEP interpreted this concept based on an environmental domains analysis.245 The 
framework involves the classification of environmental and geological characteristics into 21 distinct 
geographical regions, based on the most readily available climate, slope, land cover and geological 
data.246 The contemplated application of the framework includes “assessing risks from *NNS+.”247 The 
domains analysis allows the Parties, CEP and SCAR to identify those habitats and environments 
which are the most fragile and representative and apply strict precautionary biosecurity measures to 
those areas, including limiting access.248  
Also useful in a biosecurity framework, the ASMA regulates “areas where activities pose risks of 
mutual interference or cumulative environmental impacts…”249 The purpose of the ASMA is to 
create a fluid tool to be used in areas of less importance but more frequent visitation, so cumulative 
environmental impacts and risks, including those arising from increased exposure to NNS can be 
better managed.250 The tool has been utilised to identify an area of particular NNS risk in the 
Larseman Hills and propose potential mitigation measures.251 Routes between stations and areas of 
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first entry between biogeographic zones are potentially subject to higher risks,252 but the 
development of strategic biogeographic ASPA protection may also assist with the further designation 
of ASMAs.253  
One significant gap in geographic coverage is the marine environment. Around 15% of Antarctic’s 
ice-free ground is protected but less than 1% of the Antarctic marine environment has any form of 
protection under Annex V.254 Establishing protected areas in the marine environment has proved 
difficult, even though scientific and support activity utilises the marine environment extensively and 
constitute a significant biosecurity threat. At CEP VI, the first entirely marine ASPA’s entered into 
force and since, two other areas have been established.255 There is a reluctance of AT States to make 
explicit reference to the marine environment, partially as a result of a perceived jurisdictional 
overlap with CCAMLR.256 CCAMLR must approve any ASPA or ASMA with a marine component where 
there is actual harvesting or potential for harvesting or the draft management plan might restrict 
CCAMLR activities.257 One of the major issues with protecting areas in the marine environment is the 
significant traffic from non-party states; this will be discussed in more detail in relation to CCAMLR’s 
response and the international response to MPAs in Chapter 3.258 
2.2.1.3.2 MAINTAINING A CONTAINMENT FIELD: MANAGING PROTECTED AREAS 
The relevance of the protected area regime to a biosecurity framework relies on the management 
process effectively excluding the impacts of NNS. While the ASPA process provides a mechanism to 
limit access with a permit and binding conditions on permits through a management plan,259 ASMAs 
expressly exclude limiting access.260 Any Party to the AT, SCAR or CCAMLR may propose an area for 
protection under Annex V by submitting a draft management plan to the CEP.261 However, unlike the 
non-CEE aspects of the EIA process and Conservation Permits under Annex II which place a 
considerable onus of consistent implementation on the proponent of activity, protected area 
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management plans are subject to an international adoption process. Management plans must be 
approved by the ATCM and are then fast tracked into implementation, allowing for AT Parties to 
collectively implement area protection without waiting for lengthy domestic ratification 
processes.262 To ensure the management plans remain consistent and address the appropriate 
issues, the designation includes a consultation process, where AT Parties, SCAR and CCAMLR’s 
comments are considered.263 Annex V expressly requires consideration of the importation of NNS in 
the preparation of a management plan.264 No analogous provision exists for the ASMA, but as well as 
providing “a statement of the aims and objectives of the Management plan”, the Annex indirectly 
provides for biosecurity by requiring all protected areas’ management plans to describe access and 
movement in the area, activities permitted in the area, and the disposal of waste.265 There is clear 
scope to provide for precautionary biosecurity coverage, by restricting biosensitive waste disposal, 
restricting entry to that justified for management purposes and providing for decontamination 
procedures before entering the area. However, the ASMA’s capacity to address cumulative risks like 
NNS is limited by the lack of a legally binding aspect.266 
Parties have established guidance that reinforces the necessity to address NNS.267 Although non-
binding, the Management Plan Guidelines are referred to in the procedures for the CEP’s 
consideration of management plans.268 However, there has been virtually no discussion of the 
biosecurity components of management plans in the CEP. Addressing the considerable workload 
posed by the analysis, the subsidiary group on management plans (SGMP) has been formed to 
review the proposed guidelines. Although the SGMP has indicated AT Parties should continue to 
propose specific biosecurity provisions for areas,269 both it and the Biosecurity ICG are working 
towards guidance on NNS inclusion in management plans.270  
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The effectiveness of the provision for biosecurity is reflected in 98% of ASPA management plans 
containing measures minimising the possibility of introducing NNS.271 The limitations are illustrated 
in the quality of the provisions. A small number of ASPAs have developed site-specific biosecurity 
procedures, providing a useful model for all ASPAs.272 However, only 67% of the management plans 
have an explicit aim to minimise the possibility of introducing NNS273 and the restrictions are 
generally limited to requiring decontamination of footwear and equipment and prohibiting poultry 
products.274 The proximity of most ASPAs to other ice-free ground introduces additional biosecurity 
risks; particularly if cleaning footwear, clothing and equipment is advised by a management plan. 
NNS do not respect territorial boundaries and cleaning outside the boundary could result in 
unintentional contamination.275 A consistent approach modelled on the SCAR Code of Conduct is 
more appropriate. In most cases, ASMA management plans also include biosecurity measures, 
limited to cleaning of scientific between sampling locations and cleaning clothes and equipment.276 
The States operating in the Larsemann Hills ASMA have established a 13-point list of generic 
biosecurity measures applicable to the area, but provide no information on how the measures are to 
be put into practice.277 In addition, measures to minimise biosecurity risks to the marine 
environment from bio fouling, ballast water and fishing related issues are completely excluded from 
the management plans relevant to the marine environment.278  
2.2.1.2.3 SUMMARY 
The Protected Area system provides a robust consideration of biosecurity issues in the context of 
high use and pristine areas. AT Parties have been diligent in protecting ecologically sensitive areas 
and are moving towards an integrated and systematic model of area protection.279 The limitations of 
many of the practical biosecurity measures found within ASPA management plans is a symptom of 
the general lack of biosecurity provisions in the Antarctic. Area protection should complement and 
not supplement a holistic biosecurity framework. In consequence, decontamination procedures 
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should be universal, rather than limited to ASPAs.280 The role of the protected area regime should be 
for two purposes that easily fit within the current formulation. ASPA’s should exclude any exposure 
to specific areas by limiting access to management and scientific endeavour that cannot be carried 
out elsewhere and ASMA’s should provide for consistent and comprehensive monitoring and 
contingency plans for those areas that are subjected to significant human exposure. To some extent, 
these goals are recognised but a strategic focus on implementing protected areas for the purposes 
of biosecurity is lacking. In addition, despite the clear provision in the text of Annex V, designating 
effective marine areas in the marine environment remains problematic.281 
2.2.1.4. “THERE IS SOMETHING ALIVE IN THERE”: MANAGING NNS IN WASTE 
A significant vector of alien species is related to waste generated by station and ship operations. 
Wastes such as food and sewage can contain pathogens and microorganisms and disposal in the 
Antarctic environment can lead to inadvertent introduction.282 Moreover, NNS travelling on man-
made debris may provide opportunities for transfer of terrestrial and marine NNS.283 Scientific 
operations and support activities produce a significant proportion of the waste and vessel activity in 
the Antarctic area.284 Parties either dispose waste within the Antarctic area or remove waste from 
the Antarctic area but adequately treating the wastes can sufficiently reduce the biosecurity risk.285  
PEPAT addresses the management of waste but without a strategic focus on the biosecurity threats 
posed by the vectors.286 Annex III lays out a comprehensive regime to deal with all waste originating 
from the terrestrial Antarctic, supported by specific biosecurity measures contained in Annex II.287 
The emphasis is on waste storage, disposal and removal from the AT area288 and the reduction of 
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environmental and other impacts of the waste.289 However, the considerable qualifiers in the text of 
the Annex make it difficult to hold operators accountable for actions that produce marine 
pollution.290 Annex IV addresses vessel sourced pollution in the AT area and is specifically linked to 
the global regulations on the subject.291 Reflecting the approach of MARPOL 73/78, the Annex 
focuses on limiting ship discharges including food wastes and sewage. However, consistent with the 
customary international law principle, government ships on non-commercial service are exempt 
from the provisions.292 Although the section introduces a reporting measure to help support 
compliance, the vast majority of ships supporting science are government owned and through the 
immunity a considerable scope of biosecurity risk is left unaddressed.293 Whether the more general 
provisions of PEPAT apply to vessel sourced pollution divides AT Parties. While United States, Japan, 
Norway and New Zealand only apply MARPOL and Annex IV, Australia and the United Kingdom 
adopt a broader interpretation, whereby if a subject is not addressed in the scope of MARPOL or 
PEPAT addresses the issue expressly, PEPAT as the regional regime, applies.294 Although MARPOL 
73/78 is appropriate for addressing the broader scope of activity in the Antarctic marine 
environment outside AT Parties, prioritising PEPAT allows AT Parties to collectively enact more strict 
standards on their own activities. The approach of MARPOL 73/78 will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3.295 
The practicalities of Antarctic logistics limit a precautionary approach to waste management.296 
Treatments that completely exclude the introduction of NNS are limited.297 The removal of all wastes 
from the Antarctic area could exclude NNS introduction to a certain extent but the practical costs 
associated with transport are prohibitive.298 Mechanical, biological and physiochemical treatment 
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systems are more cost effective and significantly reduce the risks associated with NNS in waste.299 
However, certain wastes must be completely removed from the AT area.300 Annex III specifically 
provides for removing or destroying waste that poses a biosecurity threat. Any “(a) residues of 
carcasses of imported animals; (b) laboratory culture of micro-organisms and plant pathogens; and 
(c) introduced avian products,” must be removed unless “incinerated, autoclaved, or otherwise 
treated to make sterile.”301 Parties must review and attempt to reduce the impacts of ongoing waste 
sources,302 and also clean up existing waste sites.303 Annex II also provides for specific waste 
management measures, particularly providing that any avian product wastes should be removed, 
disposed of by incineration or “equivalent means that eliminates the risks of introduction of micro-
organisms ‘e.g. viruses, bacteria, yeasts, fungi.’”304  
However, the Annex also provides for the disposal of biosecurity threats into the environment. 
Sewage and liquid wastes must be removed “to the maximum extent practicable”305 but may be 
discharged into the sea or deposited in deep ice pits, where such disposal is the only practicable 
option. 306 The consequence of qualifying such obligations is demonstrated in the 37% of permanent 
stations and 69% of summer only stations directly exposing the environment to NNS risks.307 
Moreover, the required treatment does little to address the biosecurity threat of sewage. In stations 
occupied by over 30 individuals, waste must be “treated” by maceration.308 Maceration or grinding is 
designed to reduce the “settleable” content of the waste but has no impact on the pathogens that 
may be present.309 Moreover, although Annex IV requires ships to disperse310 sewage outside 12 
nautical miles of land or ice shelves, ships certified to carry less than 10 persons are not restricted by 
this provision.311 The potential cumulative impact of smaller ship’s waste disposal is not considered. 
Most ASPAs provide that sewage should not be disposed of within the protected area but otherwise 
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AT Parties either dispose directly into the sea or into “sewage bulbs” in the ice beneath stations.312 
Some AT Parties, in line with the PEPAT Article 3 principles, adopt a more precautionary approach 
and either incinerate or treat biological wastes.313 However, allowing the disposal of waste in the 
environment arguably creates a discrepancy with the reviewed Annex II, Article 4(1) which prohibits 
intentional introductions without a permit.314 Untreated sewage contains non-native 
microorganisms and without a permit, disposing directly in the Antarctic Environment is indirectly in 
breach of PEPAT. 
While covering a wide scope of waste, the effectiveness of Annex III is compromised in practice as 
many of the requirements are only operative “to the maximum extent possible” and Annex IV’s 
sovereign immunity provision practically limits its application to government vessels supporting 
science. Moreover, the lack of a strategic focus on biosecurity means many AT Parties’ have not 
assessed the risks of exposing NNS to the Antarctic environment through their waste management 
practises.315 When the CEP comes to review Annex III and as the ICG examines a biosecurity 
regime,316 the systematic biosecurity risks that waste management practices expose to the 
environment should be addressed. SCAR should also play a role in identifying the potential for waste 
to carry NNS out of Antarctica, which is currently given no consideration in the ATS. Waste and 
pollution management in the marine environment should be a focus of cooperation with the IMO 
and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
2.2.1.5 OUTLAWING MARINE HITCHHIKERS: BIO FOULING AND BALLAST WATER 
PEPAT does not address two of the most prominent vectors of marine NNS. Stowaway NNS taken on 
board in ballast and discharged into new environments and sessile and vagile NNS found on the hulls 
and surfaces of ships have resulted in some of the most significant NNS invasions in other parts of 
the world.317 The lack of regulations governing the latter remains a conspicuous absence in both the 
international law of the sea and the ATS. Article 9 of PEPAT, Annex IV requires vessels of AT Parties 
operating in the treaty area to retain “all sludge, dirty ballast, tank washing water and other oily 
residues and mixtures [and]...garbage,” and dispose of the wastes at an appropriate reception 
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facility, but does not address non-oily ballast water where NNS are likely to inhabit. Given the strong 
causal links between untreated ballast water and NNS introduction,318 discharging untreated ballast 
water in the Antarctic without a permit is arguably contrary to Annex II. The ATCM passed guidelines 
in 2006 addressing the gap and in response to the adoption of the IMO’s Ballast Water 
Convention.319 Although comprehensively addressing the risks of ballast water, the Ballast Water 
Convention is not yet widely accepted and has considerable limitations in its application to the AT 
area.320 The Ballast Water Management Guidelines in the AT Area are designed to put into operation 
some of the principles of the Convention and its predecessor Guidelines to limit the potential impact 
of marine NNS in the Antarctic area.321 The Guidelines require Antarctic operators to prepare BWM 
plans322, keep a record of ballast water operations323 and follow precise guidelines with regards to 
the exchange of ballast water. It urges exchange before the Antarctic Convergence,324 200 metres 
deep and 200 nautical miles away from land.325 The cleaning of ballast tanks and consequent release 
of sediment should not happen in the Antarctic, and vessels that have spent “considerable” time in 
the Arctic are urged to clean their tanks before they enter the Antarctic area.326  
However, the guidance is limited by the qualifications evident throughout the text327 and the 
inadequacy of ballast water exchange as an effective method of mitigating the biosecurity threat of 
ballast water.328 Although the provisions are informal they are distributed to all operators by the 
IMO after the Practical Guidelines were adopted by the Marine Environmental Protection 
Committee (MEPC) of the IMO in 2007.329 This extends the ambit of the Guidelines to most 
operators that engage in activity in the Antarctic area. Prior to the implementation of the guidelines, 
COMNAP and IAATO performed an analysis of the Ballast Water practices of both tourist and NAP 
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operators.330 Out of the 72 ships active in Antarctica, 40 were surveyed and all reported compliance 
with the Ballast Water Management Guidelines.331 However these reports are not verified by 
independent observations. Without mandatory obligations to decontaminate ballast water and 
vessel surfaces and effective compliance mechanisms to ensure the measures are consistently 
implemented, marine activity will constitute a significant biosecurity threat to the Antarctic 
continent. 
2.2.1.6 RED ALERT: PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCIES 
Once an introduction, establishment or invasion is detected, fast and efficient response can have the 
effect of limiting impacts on native ecosystems.332 Annex II of PEPAT creates a broad duty to 
“remove or dispose” of any species introduced without a permit.333 However, it does not provide any 
specific provision for contingency planning in anticipation of inevitable introduction or for the 
consequences of causing an invasive introduction. Legal obstacles to control are often an issue at the 
domestic level, with legislation not adequately providing for eradication or rapid response.334 Annex 
II prohibits the harmful interference with native flora and fauna without a permit but makes no 
provision for emergency eradication, containment or control measures in response to a pathogenic 
or parasitic introduction.335 The ATS does not provide for any further elaboration of the requirement 
to take response measures to NNS. 
However, PEPAT puts an onus on Parties to cooperate in the preparation of coordinated response 
action in response to environmental emergencies in the ATA336 and once in force Annex VI will 
elaborate the obligation. Whether a NNS introduction should or could be considered an 
environmental emergency is unclear on the wording of the Annex. The regime should only 
complement a holistic biosecurity framework, as the manifestation of an invasion is often 
cumulative and would fail to meet the reasonably exacting standards of an environmental 
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emergency under the Annex. However, Annex VI also partially implements337 the commitment in 
PEPAT to “elaborate rules and procedures relating to liability for damage arising from activities 
taking place in the Antarctic Treaty area and covered by this Protocol.”338 The provision for 
restitution from a polluter for the cost of responding to an invasion is potentially problematic but 
where the damage is clearly quantifiable, an entirely appropriate method of enforcing response 
action to an NNS invasion.339 
2.2.1.6.1  NNS INVASION AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY 
The first test to determine whether the scope of liability applies in a biosecurity framework is the 
extent an introduction of NNS to the Antarctic environment is classified an environmental 
emergency under the Annex.340 Scientific activity and its associated support activities are explicitly 
included in the ambit of the environmental emergency.341 An environmental emergency is defined as 
“any accidental event that has occurred, having taken place after the event into force of this Annex, 
and that results in, or immediately threatens to result in, any significant and harmful impact on the 
Antarctic Environment.”342 This identifies two significant factors: the proximity of threat and the 
nature of the damage.  
The damage is restricted to the consequences of a sudden accident or incident343 which excludes a 
species or pathogen introduced into an environment that gradually establishes and causes 
cumulative damage to biodiversity.344 This does not, however, exclude NNS invasion completely. 
Globally, the introduction of NNS, especially pathogens, have the potential to inflict damage on 
biodiversity in a very short period and could meet the test of “a sudden accident or incident” under 
the Annex. The damage must also be “significant and harmful,”345 which has been criticised as too 
high and departing from the terminology of “more than minor or transitory” implemented by the 
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EIA.346 However, ‘significant’ is used by the International Law Commission in its draft Liability 
Annex,347 and ‘harmful’ only implies that some damage has been done.348 This does not appear to 
exclude biodiversity loss that might result from NNS invasion. However it might exclude other 
impacts, such as habitat displacement, translocation of populations or wilderness disturbance. The 
ambiguous nature of the definition certainly leaves some room for uncertainty. However, where an 
accidental incident involving invasive species is involved, and it can be demonstrated that there is a 
clear risk of damaging native populations, this should trigger the requirement of response action and 
failing that, liability. Moreover, the terminology shifts from “environmental emergencies” to 
“incidents with potential adverse impacts”349 in respect of establishing contingency plans. An 
introduction of NNS clearly constitutes a “potential adverse impact”, although it is not clear whether 
this can apply to something that is not an environmental emergency, given the Annex expressly 
limits its scope to environmental emergencies.  
2.2.1.6.2  BATTLE STATIONS: CONTINGENCY PLANS AND RESPONSE ACTION 
Given Annex VI has some application to NNS introductions, the question is to what extent, once it 
comes into force, it will complement the biosecurity framework. Parties must take “reasonable”350 
preventative measures to reduce the risk of environmental emergencies and their potential adverse 
impact which is arguably the broadest statement of the need to take preventative biosecurity 
measures in PEPAT. The methods prescribed include specialised equipment, procedures and 
training351 all of which could be employed effectively to exclude biosecurity risks. Moreover, the 
requirement to establish cooperative contingency plans includes a list of components that should be 
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part of the plan “when appropriate”.352 Although only providing for the response to a potential 
pathogen invasion, the “Draft Response Plan in the Event that Unusual Animal Deaths are 
Recovered” submitted by Australia in the aftermath of the Disease ICG addresses the components of 
the Annex and the Australian NAP employs specialist equipment, training and procedures to ensure 
it is carried out effectively.353 The Annex obliges AT Parties to develop comprehensive contingency 
plans for response to potential invasion. Thus, the preventative aspects of the Annex lay out a useful 
set of requirements to take preventative measures to prevent potentially invasive introductions. 
In contrast, Annex VI is limited in its provision for response beyond the provision of Annex II.354 The 
requirement to respond is phrased to allow for liability and so, its final formulation is compromised. 
There is an obligation for an operator to respond to environmental emergencies arising from the 
activities of the operator but only “encouragement” for the Party or other Parties to take response 
action.355 The lag in time between an introduction and an invasion makes a determination of 
causation difficult. Even where there is a proximal relationship, the provision for liability may make 
operators unwilling to respond and acknowledge fault. The provision for eradication, containment 
and control is also inadequate. Response action is defined as “reasonable356 measures taken after an 
environmental emergency has occurred to avoid, minimise or contain the impact of that 
environmental emergency, which to that end may include clean up in appropriate circumstances, 
and includes determining the extent of the emergency.”357 Although the provision provides for 
containment, the extent a Party should eradicate or institute longer term control measures is 
unclear. Some Parties favoured including a requirement to “restore the environment”,358 which 
could imply eradication or control but the other parties resisted the provision arguing that since 
there is no obligation in PEPAT to restore the environment, the Annex should not overstep its 
bounds.359 Even the requirement under the definition of response action, to “clean up in appropriate 
circumstances”, is controversial.360 Nowhere in Annex VI does it stipulate what Party decides the 
appropriate circumstances or whether they are “reasonable”. Moreover, there is no indication as to 
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whether clean up could constitute eradication. The limitations and ambiguity in the provision for 
response greatly reduces the utility of the provisions for an invasion of NNS, but also indicate 
systematic problems with the Annex that should be addressed in the broader adoption of liability 
measures under Article 17 of PEPAT. 
2.2.6.4.3  LOCKING LEGAL TORPEDOES: LIABILITY 
Liability can operate as a “back up system” for international environmental law to assist with the 
implementation of the concept of “polluter pays” and as an economic incentive for compliance.361 
For liability to operate effectively in a biosecurity context, it must provide an effective deterrent for 
operators engaging in activities that have a particular risk of introducing NNS and an incentive to 
respond to an identified introduction, irrespective of the origin.362 The difficulties of applying 
traditional liability regimes and the polluter pays concept to NNS are evident in the difficulty of 
proving causation and the self-propagating nature of an invasion that makes the liability of an 
introducer limitless.363 Moreover, there is not much evidence for the preventative or incentive 
function of liability in international environmental law. Within certain limits, liability regimes have 
been effective at the domestic level in providing a deterrent for breaching biosecurity rules. For the 
Antarctic, if any States do take response measures, liability also provides a method of cost recovery. 
While the response measures only “encourage” other Parties to take action, the provision for 
liability permits Parties to recover the costs of their action from the responsible operator who did 
not take prompt response measures which creates an incentive to take action.364 The provision for 
strict liability avoids the necessity to prove fault and unequivocally holds operators liable for damage 
caused,365 with certain exceptions.366 Where no action or action that is not prompt or effective is 
taken, State operators will still be liable for the action which should have been taken.367 The 
application to non-State operators allows AT Parties more discretion in providing for their nationals 
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and only provides for being liable to pay an amount of money “that reflects as much as possible” the 
cost of response that should have been taken.368 The hypothetical response cost will be paid into 
“The Fund” to be used to provide for the reimbursement of reasonable and justified costs incurred 
taking response action pursuant to Article 5(2). The provision of a fund, with the capacity to cover 
future costs of NNS response where there is no discernible responsible agent and for voluntary 
payments, provides a further incentive to take response action and reflects a movement towards a 
more collective form of responsibility envisioned in the reservation of the Antarctic area as a natural 
reserve. All states must ensure their courts possess the necessary jurisdiction to pursue under both 
headings of liability for non state operators, 369 but state liability may only be resolved in accordance 
with the enquiry procedure under PEPAT, 370 and as applicable, the Schedule to PEPAT on 
arbitration.371 Critically, the sovereign immunity of all ships on government non-commercial service 
is reiterated in Article 6, excluding any application to scientific support vessels. Applicability in a 
biosecurity context will require clear guidelines on how to respond to a NNS emergency and what 
actions should be taken, although the scope of the Annex does not appear to completely preclude 
the recovery of response costs in circumstances where the cause of an invasion can be ascertained.  
2.2.6.7 SUMMARY 
The duty to provide a response to environmental emergency may not have clear utility for the issue 
of NNS but a liability regime could have significant repercussions for biosecurity in Antarctica. The 
liability regimes’ scope, especially in regards to risks associated with invasive species damage is 
severely limited. It provides substance to emergency response provision under Article 15 of the 
PEPAT but does not fulfil the requirements of a comprehensive liability regime under Article 16. It is 
a significant development, likely to increase best practice in operators, but consideration of more 
appropriate compliance methods will be necessary for the area of biosecurity. Taking measures to 
prevent introductions of NNS that could be environmental emergencies is not an effective 
biosecurity strategy. Although certainly having a place in a comprehensive system, it is not adequate 
to address the biosecurity in the context of Annex VI. The “no tolerance” approach is the most 
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appropriate and necessary to all NNS introductions, rather than just invasions.372 However, in regard 
to liability for failing to respond to an emergency, Annex VI is useful for biosecurity. 
2.2.2 COMPLIANCE WITH BOTH EYES OPEN: SURVEILLANCE AND INSPECTIONS 
Beyond the limited provision for liability, there are few mechanisms within the ATS that provide for 
ensuring NAPs comply with PEPAT’s primary obligations. However, an effective biosecurity 
framework in an area where nationals are responsible for their own activities relies on AT Parties 
employing effective measures to ensure their nationals do not breach PEPAT implementing 
legislation.373 The AT and PEPAT provide for AT Parties to take appropriate measures to ensure 
compliance.374 However, other than requiring “regular and effective monitoring” to assess the 
impacts of ongoing activities and “facilitate early detection of unforeseen effects of activities,” the 
instrument does not provide for how this compliance should be implemented. The role of informal 
mechanisms, particularly the provision for education and “developing attitudes” is a traditional 
strength of the ATS and is an important attribute to a biosecurity regime.375 However, inspections 
and legal sanctions for breaches are also essential for the purposes of ensuring rules on biosecurity 
are complied with.376 Where AT Parties “dispute the implementation or application” of the mining 
prohibition, EIA process, emergency response, or any of the provisions of the Annexes, PEPAT 
employs compulsory notification and dispute resolution procedures in the place of any rigid 
sanctions.377 To allow AT Parties to identify potential breaches, the AT and PEPAT employ an open 
inspection regime and PEPAT requires AT Parties to report on the steps they have taken to 
implement of PEPAT. 378 As the concept of an independent inspectorate body was rejected in the 
negotiation of PEPAT, 379 other AT Parties play an important role in supervising activity in the 
Antarctic area.  
                                                          
372
 Australia, France and New Zealand, above n 1, 2. 
373
 K Bastmeijer, above n 71, 366. 
374
 AT, Article X; PEPAT, Article 13. 
375
 W M Bush, ‘Means and Methods of Implementation of Antarctic Environmental Regimes and national Environmental 
Instruments: An Exercise in Comparison’ in J Verhoeven, P Sands and M Bruce (eds.) The Antarctic Environment and 
International Law (2000), 38; see USA, NNS Awareness Campaign: “Don’t Pack a Pest” When Travelling to Antarctica, ATCM 
XXXI IP 93 rev. 1 (2008). 
376
 Shine, above n 4, 81. 
377
 PEPAT, Article 13(3-4); Article 19, 20; Schedule to the Protocol, Arbitration. 
378
 PEPAT, Article 17. 
379
 Vicuña, above n 39, 52; C.f. The CRAMRA system allowed designation of inspectors by the Commission itself, or by the 
relevant Regulatory Committees promising a more independent and consistent system of inspection; CRAMRA, Article 
12(1)(b). 
59 
2.2.2.1 SELF DIAGNOSIS: MONITOR AND REPORT 
Whether the reporting regime permits AT Parties to identify breaches in NAPs procedures depends 
on whether the NAPs monitor for biosecurity threats and NNS presence. PEPAT requires broad, 
targeted monitoring for activities within an AT Parties control.380 The importance of regular 
monitoring for biosecurity is well established. The faster a biosecurity threat is identified, the less 
NNS risk is exposed. Moreover, the longer an NNS remains undetected, the higher possibility it will 
establish and potentially become invasive.381 Although identifying the presence of NNS or biosecurity 
threats is not expressly invoked in the text of the instrument, the Guidelines on Implementing 
Monitoring Regimes expressly identifies NNS as a potential indicator of biodiversity damage, with 
“species, distribution, and population size” as the relevant parameters.382 However, in an example 
incorporating NNS risks, the guidelines do not distinguish between transient and persistent 
organisms and the likelihood, consequences and “impact rating” of NNS are rated low.383 
Nevertheless, as PEPAT creates a duty for states to monitor the impacts of their activities and 
“report annually on the steps taken to implement *PEPAT+”,384 AT Parties are given the opportunity 
to identify areas of weakness in other AT Parties biosecurity approaches. The provision for 
“consideration” at the ATCM promotes a robust discussion of AT Parties approaches to 
biosecurity.385 However, the reports vary significantly and consequentially have never been 
comprehensively “considered” at the ATCM.386 The AT Secretariat has taken steps to rectify this 
issue by providing a consistent format and wide availability through the Electronic Information 
Exchange System (EIES) but has yet to comprehensively analyse the information gathered.387 
Potential methods of developing the reporting requirement for the biosecurity framework will be 
evaluated in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
2.2.2.2 EYES ON THE OTHER: INSPECTION UNDER PEPAT 
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The most important provision for supervising the implementation of the ATS is the inspection 
regime. While enforcement is more difficult in an area without a sovereign authority, a strong, 
strategic inspection regime informed by biosecurity provisions has the advantage of independent 
supervision of governmental activity. Moreover, an inspection regime can serve a dual purpose for a 
biosecurity framework: ensuring compliance and providing for independent surveillance. Both 
purposes rely on the regime strategically identifying biosecurity threats and NNS presence 
throughout human activity in the Antarctic area. However, there is no requirement to engage in 
inspections and certainly no strategic approach to the inspections. Not all Parties engage in 
inspections and not all stations are inspected on a regular basis.388 The geographic scope of the 
inspection regime is also limited; inspectors or designated “observers”389 have the freedom to go 
anywhere in the Antarctic continent 390 under the jurisdiction of their State but ships and aircraft 
inspections are limited to ‘points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica’.391 
The scope has been criticised as only provides for the inspection of AT Parties vessels and only in a 
very specific operational and geographic area, although non-Party flagged vessels have been 
inspected with the permission of the ship’s masters.392 Although vessels supporting science can be 
inspected under the provision, since PEPAT came into force only 2 vessels supporting science have 
been inspected.393 The difficulty enforcing and carrying out inspections in the Antarctic area 
highlights the need to identify alternate locations for inspection. The port that vessels and planes 
depart from before arriving in Antarctica is a useful gateway for AT Parties to implement inspections 
focussed on biosecurity. Although PEPAT and the AT restrict inspection provisions to the Antarctic 
area,394 the broad requirement to take measures to ensure compliance under Article 13 of PEPAT 
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could be construed as to justify inspection at gateway ports.395 The suitability of the port as a 
gateway will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
Another useful attribute for an inspection regime, common at a domestic level, is identifying 
relevant breaches in legislation and pursuing legal sanctions. Under PEPAT, observers can only send 
a report to Parties that after incorporating comments are forwarded to the all the Parties, CEP and 
ATCM for consideration.396 There is no evidence in the reports of any observers considering the 
relevant domestic legislation and identifying potential breaches. AT Parties might, for instance, be 
under an obligation to take certain biosecurity measures under a national framework that goes 
beyond the requirements of PEPAT. The Guidelines adopted by the ATCM to support inspections do 
not recommend identifying the domestic Antarctic legislation, the only relevant provisions providing 
an assessment of “understanding *the+ provisions of the *AT+ and related agreements,” and the 
“availability of AT documentation on station.”397 Moreover, despite covering possible vectors of NNS 
and additional Guidelines assisting the inspection of protected areas that are potentially vulnerable 
to invasion,398 the Guidelines stop short of providing a requirement to monitor biosecurity threats 
and NNS. Of the inspections carried out by AT Parties since PEPAT, only a few have identified 
biosecurity threats and the consequent potential breach of PEPAT and no subsequent discussion in 
the CEP or ATCM indicated these risks were resolved.399 Every inspection report treats the issue 
separately, all address the generic biosecurity threats of sewage discharge and waste disposal but 
not all identifying the potential for introducing NNS, others note the presence of NNS near or on the 
station but none comprehensively examine the potential vectors for introduction. Subsequent 
inspections of Bellinghausen and Great Wall station indicate despite observers noting pot plants may 
breach PEPAT rules; no attempts to remove the potplants were undertaken.  The reports can 
certainly have a political impact but clear primary obligations, an analogous strategic inspection 
process and incorporation of results into the decision making process is required before the 
instrument can be used adequately for biosecurity purposes.400  
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2.2.2.3 COMPLIANCE WITH BOTH EYES OPEN: SUMMARY 
Supervising and enforcing PEPAT biosecurity is challenging in an area without a sovereign authority. 
The ATS relies on States monitoring their own activities and implementation of PEPAT and other 
States implementation of PEPAT and then reporting that in a sufficiently consistent form to analyse 
the results collectively. The problem with leaving an issue like monitoring to state diligence is the 
tendency for states to minimise the application of the law. Without clearly defined goals in the 
inspection, monitoring and reporting process; a tick box reading “Presence of NNS in vicinity of base 
or field camp or on hull,” even a diligent national operator will not engage in serious analysis of the 
local situation as the prioritised elements of the surveillance and inspection will take precedence.401 
Movement towards a more systematic and strategic form of reporting and inspection is a possible 
solution to these problems and could address the risk of NNS establishing effectively.402  
2.2.7 NATIONAL ANTARCTIC PROGRAMS AND BIOSECURITY: CONCLUSION 
NAP activity is in many ways, a manifestation of the freedom of science that underlies the ATS and 
has maintained peaceful cooperation in the Antarctic since the 1950s. However, treaties are living 
instruments and the commitment to comprehensive environmental protection in PEPAT does not 
exclude application to scientific activity. Article 3 of PEPAT implicitly provides for a proactive 
approach to the prevention, surveillance and response to NNS. Scientists and their support networks 
must take this into account in the planning and engaging of all activities. Annex II in particular 
provides for prevention and surveillance of NNS, prohibiting introduction without a permit and 
providing that Parties should take certain specified measures to avoid unintentional introductions of 
micro-organisms. However, most of the provisions only deal with the issue implicitly and do not 
create binding obligations for the Treaty parties.403 Diligence is required in the ATCM and CEP to 
ensure the issue is dealt with more comprehensively. 
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2.3. ANTARCTIC TOURISM AND BIOSECURITY 
Regulating the specific biosecurity threats associated with tourist activities poses a significant 
challenge to AT Parties. The particular aspects of tourism which increase biosecurity threats, 
discussed in Chapter 1, include the intensity of the activity at certain areas and the widening scope 
of the industry.404 There is a distinct lack of information on the spatial pattern of tourist marine 
traffic in relation to landings, passengers ashore and passenger activities compounding the limited 
knowledge of specific biosecurity threats posed by tourist activity.405 However, although expressly 
prioritising scientific activity over other forms of activity in the Antarctic,406 AT Parties have not 
applied a precautionary approach to tourist activity.407 In fact, the regulation of the specific 
environmental issues associated with tourism by AT Parties has been largely reactive and 
unstructured.408 AT Parties jurisdiction is limited as many of the companies are incorporated in, and 
their vessels flagged to, countries not party to the AT.409 Thus, IAATO plays an important role in the 
regulation of tourism providing mandatory biosecurity measures and a compliance regime for all its 
members. While non-party flagged operators are not obliged to abide by the ATS,410 IAATO is 
committed to “to operat*ing+ within the parameters of the *ATS+”.411 The proactive focus of the 
organisation on ecologically sustainable tourism is partially responsible for the limited ATS 
regulation.412 One category of tourists that are not addressed by the ATS or the tourist industry are 
small yachts which, without the industry organisation’s compliance processes or necessarily AT Party 
regulation, could pose a significant biosecurity threat, despite their small size. This section will 
discuss the relevant parts of the ATS and IAATO that target specific biosecurity threats arising from 
tourism, and briefly establish the importance of the mandatory ATS regulation in developing a 
biosecurity framework. 
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2.3.1 WITHIN THE ATS: REGIONAL REGULATION OF TOURISM 
The ATS only directly regulates the specific biosecurity threats of tourism through education but 
indirectly provides for limiting biosecurity through required planning processes and site 
management. The only explicit identification of the threats posed by NNS is found in educational 
guidelines adopted by the ATCM. The general guidelines prepared for tourist operators urge 
compliance with PEPAT and the Antarctic Visitor Guidelines advise tourists to “…not bring non-native 
plants or animals into the Antarctic (e.g. live poultry, pet dogs and cats, house plants).”413 The 
application of PEPAT planning processes permit the restriction of the increasing scope of the 
industry to a certain extent and site guidelines and limits on numbers at a site at any given time 
target the intensity of the industry. The lack of strategy behind the regulation of tourism is partially 
addressed in the “General Principles of Antarctic Tourism” to “inform and guide further work in 
managing Antarctic tourist activities.”414 One point that invokes biosecurity provision is that “tourism 
should not be allowed to contribute to the long term-degradation of the Antarctic environment and 
its dependent and associated ecosystems, or the intrinsic natural wilderness...”415 The principles 
urge a precautionary, pragmatic approach in response to uncertain risks and “an evaluation of 
risks.”416 If the guiding provision is to be taken to imply anything for implementing tourist regulation, 
it is to promote a careful risk assessment of approved tourist activity, particularly evaluating how it 
might introduce NNS. The adoption of such an approach to biosecurity threats will assist the 
development of tourist regulation and will be discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
2.3.1.1 LIMITING THE SCOPE OF IMPACTS: PLANNING PROCESSES 
Although the relevant tools of PEPAT apply to tourist activity, the application is not entirely 
appropriate. The relevant planning considerations under Article 3 of PEPAT certainly apply to 
tourism. States are obliged to plan and conduct tourist activity to limit adverse impacts, including 
the introduction of NNS.417 A strategic process should identify the risks associated with tourist 
activity and attempt to mitigate those risks with a precautionary approach, including potentially 
limiting the geographic range and type of tourist activities carried out.418 Certainly the PEPAT 
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prescribed procedures for waste management and ship borne pollution are relevant in limiting the 
biosecurity risks of activities. Moreover, the IMO ban on heavy fuel oil will indirectly decrease the 
risks posed by the industry by eliminating a number of the larger tour vessels from the Antarctic 
market.419 However, the prescribed process for engaging in activity is the EIA and the limitations of 
the PEPAT EIA process are compounded for tourist activity.420 Permanent land-based tourist 
activities and a broader range of activities could significantly increase the potential for NNS 
introduction421 and are adequately addressed by a consistently implemented EIA process. The risk of 
cumulative impacts, particularly the “gradual establishment of new microbial or plant communities 
through incidental introductions over time” is less efficiently targeted by an EIA process that focuses 
on discrete operators and activities.422 A more strategic and holistic impact analysis is necessary but 
the ATS does not require strategic analysis across tourist activity.423 Moreover, inconsistencies with 
respect to the implementation of EIA procedures complicate its application and impact on decision 
making. Some AT Parties require prior environmental approval, with regulatory bodies issuing 
conditional permits for activity after the submission of an EIA.424 Arguably this at least permits a 
consideration of the strategic impact of tourism and incorporation of the consideration into decision 
making. However, a significant proportion of operators are based in the United States which does 
not require a permit and is satisfied with the overall EIA submitted by IAATO.425 There is also very 
little consistency amongst the biosecurity content of EIA submissions.426 The amount of EIA 
submissions also remains relatively low given the quantity of tourist operations.427 The problem is 
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further illustrated in the inspection process. Inspections are carried out on non-AT Party flagged 
ships with the approval of the Master but only certain biosecurity threats are generated by 
stationary tourist vessels and no analysis of the fouling of hulls has been reported by any 
observer.428 There is no requirement to include biosecurity conditions on environmental approvals 
and no compliance measure to ensure those conditions are being implemented effectively. The 
ATME on Ship Borne Tourism recommends the development of a specific checklist for inspections of 
tourist operations and the implementation of existing port state measures on tourist vessels but in 
the absence of adequate port state control provisions for biosecurity,429 compliance is still a 
considerable gap in the system. 
Another limitation of the ATS regulation of tourism is in the absence of express provision for 
surveillance, preparation and response to introductions. The generic PEPAT requirement to provide 
for regular and effective monitoring in the planning of activities430 is supported by an adopted ATCM 
resolution provides a template for reporting of ships activity.431 However, without any provision on 
the template for the identification of “key environmental parameters and ecosystem 
components,”432 AT Parties are not required to provide for strategic biosecurity monitoring. The 
provision for contingency plans, response and failing response, liability is also restricted. Although 
tourist activities are explicitly included in the ambit of Annex VI, the application of the Annex to non-
State actors is limited.433 Non-AT Party flagged vessels are contemplated in the formulation,434 but 
several significant differences between the triggers of State and non-State operators’ liability 
collectively permit States to adopt a less rigorous liability regime for tourist vessels under their 
jurisdiction.435 Moreover, the organisers of the tourist expedition are the targeted group under the 
ambit of Emergency Liability, not the captain of the vessel, nor the crew or the tourists themselves, 
which limits the deterrent effect of the provisions on the individuals in the AT area.436 There are no 
specific contingency or response measures for dealing with an emergency NNS incident caused by a 
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tourist vessel, although a more rigid system of environmental response measures is in the process of 
development.437  
2.3.1.2 TARGETING INTENSITY: LIMITING ACTIVITY AT CERTAIN SITES 
The most proactive aspect of tourist regulation within the ATS, relevant to biosecurity, is the 
provision of site-specific guidelines and adoption of the IAATO standard limitations on landings.438 
Tourist activity tends to focus on specific areas of aesthetic interest where biosecurity risks are 
acute.439 The higher intensity the activity in an area, both in terms of different ships visiting an area 
and numbers of visitors ashore, increases the risk of inadvertent introduction of NNS.440 The 
measure, yet to come into effect, recommends States prohibit any ship with over 500 passengers 
from making landings and limit any landing location to one ship and 100 passengers at a time with a 
1 to 20 guide to passenger ratio.441 Although States that require environmental approval can issue 
permits with the conditions of the measure, States that do not issue permits might have more 
difficulty implementing this measure. However, the provision is complemented with site specific 
protection through the protected area process and specific site guidelines. 
AT Parties have an obligation to protect “aesthetically valuable” areas under PEPAT and an area 
specific focus to tourist management can do something to mitigate the potential impacts of 
intensive visitation.442 Areas of Special Tourist Interest were created to limit tourism to certain sites 
and monitor the impacts of intense tourism443 but were not used and “lapsed into obscurity” after 
the negotiation of PEPAT.444 Certainly, protected area provisions are as relevant to tour operators 
and tourists as scientists and their support staff, although if operators are not registered to AT 
Parties, the practical impact of the provisions is lessened. As indicated above, the designation of an 
ASPA potentially provides for the most robust biosecurity consideration in the ATS, with certain 
limitations. ASPAs requiring permits conditional on biosecurity could mitigate the issues with the EIA 
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process. Some ASPAs include specific tourism zones,445 and the introduction of “educational values” 
into ASPAs demonstrates that AT Parties recognise the need to protect the value certain areas have 
to tourist operations.446 However, AT Parties rejected large ASPAs in tourist areas as too restrictive 
for tourist activities.447 Although the value of the ASMA system for regulating tourism has been 
stressed,448 without requiring a permit for entry, the system does not adequately compensate for 
the limitations of the EIA process.449  
 
FIGURE 2.1: RESPONSIVENESS OF THE ATS TO LARGE SCALE TOURIST ACTIVITY THROUGH SITE 
GUIDELINES450 
To complement the protected area provisions, the ATCM has developed site specific guidelines 
giving “practical guidance *to tourist operators+ on how they should conduct their activities within” 
certain sites of high tourist visitation.451 In practise this has supplanted consideration of formal area 
protection and does not provide for a legally rigorous requirement to take into account biosecurity 
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threats in decision making or operations. Guidelines pose different restrictions depending on the 
nature of the area and are updated to “reflect readily changing environmental circumstances” 
through the CEP.452 If site specific guidelines inform visitors about specific characteristics of an area 
and the NNS risks associated with certain types of activities, they can be useful in a biosecurity 
context. They also provide another opportunity for AT Parties to identify comprehensive biosecurity 
requirements for interaction with specific populations. The site guidelines model is an organic and 
flexible framework that is supported by the industry.453 As Figure X demonstrates, the site guidelines 
have allowed AT Parties to progressively address intensively utilised sites without the lengthy 
negotiation required for ASPA or ASMA designation. IAATO reported almost universal 
implementation of the guidelines in the 2007-8 seasons; although IAATO and station personnel have 
noted breaches.454  
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FIGURE 2.2: IMPACT OF SITE GUIDELINES ON SITE RECRUITMENT 
The effectiveness of a protected areas system outside the process of Annex V has certain limitations. 
Firstly, the strategy behind the site specific guidelines process is flawed. Rather than proactively 
identifying suitable sites for certain activities and developing sustainable guidelines, Parties have 
strategically settled on reactive management. However, the nature of the Lindblad model of tourism 
promotes the exploration for new sites of interest.455 With larger vessels likely to phase out with the 
ban on heavy fuel oil, the focus of the industry is likely to shift back to the traditional exploration 
model.456 If the identification of new sites and establishment of regular visitation areas exceeds the 
development of site-specific guidelines, it is likely that a considerable amount of NNS risk will go 
unaddressed. The above graph demonstrates that the growth in tourism over the last six years has 
not been matched by management processes.457 The growth in total number of sites utilised, as well 
as visitors and sites with over 1000 visitors, demonstrate the trend described above: a consistent 
rate of new sites being established and an increase in the number of visitors to each site.458 
Managing the intensity of tourism appears to be having the impact of spreading the scope of the 
biosecurity risk. 
TABLE 2.4: ANALYSIS OF IAATO TOURIST TRENDS FROM 2003-2009459 
Season 2008-9 2007-8 2006-7 2005-6 2004-5 2003-4 
Total visits to all sites
460
 340634 379626 326331 237412 174355 223166 
Total sites 202 186 193 181 175 151 
Sites with over 1000 visitors 62 56 52 46 47 38 
Guidelines adopted by the 
acceding ATCM (Sites Remaining) 
7 (177) 4 (168) 2 (179) 8 (169) 4 (175) 0 (151) 
Average visitors per site 271 308 274 233 210 234 
 
Moreover, the presence of site guidelines does not appear to have a significant impact on the 
quantity of tourists visiting sites, with some becoming more popular after being protected461 and 
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others decreasing in popularity.462 Overall, there is a slight increase in the average number of visitors 
per year after a site is protected with guidelines.463 It is appropriate that site guidelines remain 
flexible to respond to changing circumstances “such as increased tourist pressure or demonstrable 
environmental impact”464 but the approach currently substitutes more comprehensive protection. 
Antarctic-wide biosecurity measures are necessary, rather than site specific guidelines identifying 
NNS issues in isolation. Tourism area protection needs to be managed in a strategic way to decrease 
the spread of activity to areas that may pose significant risks to indigenous species. Nevertheless, 
site specific guidelines remain a powerful tool to reduce the impact of tourist groups on high 
intensity areas. The site guidelines should complement comprehensive biosecurity measures and 
ASPA and ASMA designations in proactively identifying and conserving ecologically sensitive areas. 
Moreover, AT Parties should consider revisiting the concept of Sites of Special Tourist Interest 
restricting tourist activity to managed sites where regular monitoring can be undertaken and 
compliance with biosecurity provisions can be supervised.  
2.3.2 DECONTAMINATION OF AN INDUSTRY: IAATO’S APPROACH TO BIOSECURITY 
IAATO complements the ATS through a fractured set of linked procedures that must be complied 
with to be a member of the organisation.465 IAATO is important within the regulatory framework of 
Antarctic tourism as AT Parties rely heavily on the self-policing and enforcement procedures of the 
organisation.466 The mandatory Decontamination Guidelines identify awareness raising measures 
and cleaning procedures to attempt to reduce the risks of tourist activities introducing NNS.467 In 
addition, further procedures provide for notifying the nearest station after finding dead wildlife.468 
The mandatory nature of the processes and comprehensive cleaning and awareness routines 
exceeds anything provided for by AT Parties and the hortatory standards prescribed by SCAR. IAATO 
also voluntarily extends the MARPOL guidelines for ballast water to the limits of the Convergence 
and the joint COMNAP-IAATO study demonstrates general compliance with ballast water 
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requirements.469 However, the system relies on updating disparate provisions as new risks are 
identified and although providing an inspection regime for new members,470 does little to ensure 
compliance in established operations other than requiring post visit reports and post season reports 
including information on “any unusual incidents affecting people or the environment.”471  
The risks associated with new and developing tourist activities are not addressed by IAATO.472 IAATO 
submits an annual Programmatic EIA to the Environmental Protection Agency in place of a number 
of individual tourist operators.473 A strategic focus on limiting environmental impacts is appropriate 
but should not substitute specific EIAs for new activity in the region. As indicated above, not all AT 
Parties provide for EIA processes and some operators exist outside of the ATS.. In addition, while 
some non AT Party States do not require operators to provide EIA to visit the Antarctic, IAATO 
requires “equivalent required documentation” to be submitted to the IAATO secretariat.474 No 
particular guidance is provided as to the format of this documentation or what elements of the 
activity should be encompassed. While opposed to permanent structures as operators are 
committed to a “less than a minor or transitory impact” on the Antarctic environment, 475 IAATO 
supports land based tourism. 476 On the risks associated with land-based tourism, IAATO comments 
that “the spread of non-native biota and disease to inland sites is less likely because few life forms 
can withstand the harsh conditions,” although also identified that a land based operator had carried 
out cleaning procedures.477 Risk analysis needs to be carried out before any form of activity is ruled 
as “less likely” as the potential risks require a precautionary approach. Nevertheless, IAATO’s 
approach to biosecurity is an important aspect of the Antarctic biosecurity framework and the 
proactive approach of the industry should be incorporated into future biosecurity developments. 
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2.3.3. SUMMARY OF BIOSECURITY FOR ANTARCTIC TOURISTS 
The regional approach to specific biosecurity threats posed by tourist activity is subject to the same 
limitation as the regulatory regime for scientific activity, a lack of strategy behind regulation. 
Although PEPAT’s environmental planning principles apply to tourist activity, some of the measures, 
particularly the EIA process are not adequate for addressing the unique problems posed by the 
growing industry. Area specific regulation limits the intensity of tourist activity but does so without 
providing for compliance or addressing the more systematic problems of the tourist approach in the 
Antarctic area. The provision for the issue in IAATO, including the comprehensive and mandatory 
decontamination guidelines, wildlife watching guidelines and response measures, considerably 
decrease the risk of the industry introducing NNS. However, IAATO is not the most appropriate body 
to provide the principal biosecurity measures in the Antarctic. The involvement of the industry is 
essential in ensuring compliance with any regime and effecting adaptive management techniques, 
but a biosecurity regime must be strategically addressed by AT Parties. Although the IAATO 
Decontamination Guidelines address terrestrial movements and small boat fouling, nothing within 
either the ATS or IAATO addresses the considerable biosecurity threat posed by tourist vessels 
visiting a number of locations and potentially shifting marine species attached to ship surfaces.478 
Rather than the negligence of IAATO and the ATS, this represents a general lack of understanding of 
marine vessel movements and the potential impacts of tourism on the Antarctic marine 
environment which should be a focus of future research efforts.479 The extent global instruments 
address these issues will be evaluated in Chapter 3. 
2.4. VECTOR 3: FISHERIES 
Fishing activity in Antarctica invokes three distinct categories of biosecurity threats, direct threats 
from legitimate activity, illegitimate activity and the indirect impact of fishing breaking down the 
natural barriers of ecosystems. There is insufficient data to analyze the specific threats posed by 
fishing vessels, particularly through bio fouling of ship surfaces and fishing equipment and NNS used 
as bait. New Zealand studies indicate the maintenance patterns of commercial fisheries vessels are 
not sufficient to reduce the risks of NNS introduction but no studies into the movements of fishing 
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vessels or viability of fouling organisms have established clear risks of introduction.480 Moreover, in 
contrast to the PEPAT EIA process, the conservation measures (‘CM’) providing for the consideration 
of environmental impacts before engaging in activity only identify a few specific environmental risks 
in relation to the harvesting activity. CCAMLR requires members to engage in harvesting activities 
consistent with the “...prevention of changes or minimisation of the risk of changes in the marine 
ecosystem which are not potentially reversible over two or three decades including…the effect of 
the introduction of alien species.”481 However the issue has not been addressed by CCAMLR and a 
review of the Commissions performance highlighted the provision as a gap in implementation.482  
Legitimate fishing activity thus poses an uncertain threat of introducing NNS but a considerable 
amount of the activity in the Antarctic is carried out by IUU fishing vessels that are not even bound 
by the ecosystem based management regime of CCAMLR.483 Although no studies have demonstrated 
the fouling extent or ballast water practices of IUU vessels, extensive use of gillnets confirms the 
vessels do not conform with the CMs set by CCAMLR.484 The final area that will not be discussed in 
depth in this thesis is the indirect impact of fisheries on indigenous populations. Any fisheries activity 
interrupts local ecosystem processes and with the presence of a ship, provides an opportunity for 
invasive marine species to potentially fill any niches left behind. However, the purpose of this thesis 
is not to explore the legitimacy of fisheries activity in the Antarctic or explore the sustainability of 
the fishing efforts, although both factors have a significant impact on biosecurity threats. The AT 
explicitly preserves high seas freedoms, including the right to fish485 and AT Parties have expressly 
agreed that conservation of Antarctic marine living resources includes the “rational use” of the 
resource.486 This section will analyze the obligations and mechanisms available to CCAMLR members 
to regulate biosecurity threats arising from fisheries activity. In addition, the compliance measures 
used to limit IUU fishing vessels exposing the environment to unregulated biosecurity threats and 
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ensure legitimate fishing vessels implement the ecosystem based management regime will be briefly 
analysed. 
The Joint SC-CAMLR and CEP workshop specifically addressed the potential duplication of 
environmental protection through the PEPAT and CCAMLR systems, recommending a more 
integrated approach.487 Any introduction of a fishing species for the purpose of mariculture or 
harvesting in the AT area should require a permit through Annex II of PEPAT, although this has not 
been addressed by AT or CCAMLR parties.488 The extent to which the planning principles of PEPAT 
complement fishing management is limited, although it has clear application where fisheries vessels 
are involved in non-fishing activities.489 All CCAMLR members are Parties to the AT and PEPAT490 but 
fishing activities are explicitly excluded from several significant tools of PEPAT.491 The Final Act of 
PEPAT negotiations reserve the party’s rights and obligations under CCAMLR and exempts fishing 
activities from the EIA process.492 The designation of a marine ASPA or ASMA requires prior approval 
by CCAMLR493 and the liability annex, although leaving room open for CCAMLR to adopt the 
provisions, excludes fishing vessels from its ambit.494  However, Article 5 of PEPAT requires 
consultation and cooperation with Contracting Parties of the other instruments under the ATS to 
ensure the fulfillment of its objectives. CCAMLR members, even if not party to the treaty, are obliged 
to observe the measures adopted by the AT Parties “in fulfillment of their responsibility for the 
protection of the Antarctic environment.”495 CCAMLR and its Scientific Committee must “cooperate 
with the AT Consultative Parties on matters falling within the competence of the latter”496 and must 
take into account any relevant measures or recommendations from the ATCM.497 The Joint 
Workshop between SC-CAMLR and the CEP recommended the CEP take the lead in addressing NNS 
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in the marine environment and develop a notification procedure for marine related measures to 
permit CCAMLR’s input. 498 The CEP addressing the generic issues with marine vectors avoids 
duplication but given CCAMLR’s mandate, it is more appropriate for the fisheries organisation to 
address the specific issues with fisheries vessels and operations. 
2.4.1 PREVENTING NNS THROUGH ECOSYSTEM BASED MANAGEMENT 
The negotiation of CCAMLR sets an adequate foundation for biosecurity measures through 
establishing ecosystem based management, with express identification of the risks posed by NNS. 
Fear of the ecosystem effects of the unregulated harvest of krill prompted the negotiation of a new 
agreement for bringing marine resources under the ATS.499 To manage fisheries the Commission set 
up by CCAMLR is responsible for “compiling data on the status and changes in populations of 
Antarctic marine living resources including factors affecting their distribution, abundance and 
productivity”500 and formulating, adopting and revising conservation measures (CM).501 CM are a 
more streamlined management tool than the measure, binding upon nations after 180 days except 
in the event of a state objecting.502 Similar to the other main institutions of the ATS, membership to 
the decision making commission set up by CCAMLR is contingent on engaging in research and 
harvesting activities in the Southern Ocean.503 That proponents of the industry set the legal 
mechanisms for exploitation is not ideal and results in compromises for environmental protection.504 
Certainly, CCAMLR has not elaborated the requirement to consider the potential introduction of 
NNS, although certain aspects of its management regime have relevance to the reduction of 
biosecurity threats from fishing. 
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2.4.1.1 NNS IN THE NETS: PLANNING PROCESSES 
Fisheries’ activities are not subject to EIA but CCAMLR has developed other regulations that urge 
consideration of environmental impacts.505 CCAMLR requires the Commission to facilitate scientific 
research on the Antarctic marine ecosystem and engage in monitoring activity.506 The CCAMLR 
Ecosystem Monitoring Program (CEMP), established in 1985, aims to “detect and record significant 
changes in critical components of the ecosystem, [and] to serve as the basis for the conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources.”507 It not only collects information about harvested species’ 
abundance,508 but also biological information such as the age composition of harvested animals, the 
speed they grow, breeding patterns and natural mortality, and data on dependent species.509 Sites 
are now independently monitored and include extensive analysis of other variables, like 
environmental conditions and pollution, and the presence of NNS.510 Moreover, the requirement for 
new and exploratory fisheries before full fisheries are permitted and the limitation of fishing to 
seasons, areas and total allowable catch leads to less exposure to NNS.  
Aspects of the various Annexes of PEPAT find partial manifestation in CM 26-01, identified by the 
CCAMLR Review Panel as the main measure promoted by CCAMLR to avoid the introduction of 
NNS.511 In particular, the CM prohibits the movement of live poultry into the area south of 60 
degrees latitude and requires the removal of any poultry remains.512 Garbage must be removed from 
the area and food wastes, offal and sewage must be macerated and not disposed within 12 miles of 
land or ice shelves or at a speed of less than 4 knots. In addition, the CCAMLR Review highlights the 
“need to be alert to discussions within the ATCM and the IMO on such issues as the control of ballast 
water discharge and the Polar Shipping Code, with a possible view to extending such provisions to 
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fishing vessels.”513 Not all measures are implemented by fishing vessels and very little information is 
available on the non-fishing activity of fishing vessels in the Southern Ocean.514  
2.4.1.2 LINES IN THE WATER: PROTECTING AREAS FROM FISHERIES THREATS 
The same rationale for limiting access to terrestrial sites applies to marine sites, certain sensitive 
ecosystems require a precautionary approach to biosecurity and high use areas should be monitored 
more frequently. CCAMLR provides for three forms of area protection: CEMP sites, marine protected 
areas (MPAs) and limiting bottom trawling in vulnerable marine ecosystems.515 All are useful for 
biosecurity framework. Initially, the only provision for area specific protection in CCAMLR was part 
of the CEMP as all provide for the limitation of interaction with parts of the marine environment.516 
However, in order to extend the protection to provide for conservation of biological protection 
under CCAMLR and PEPAT, the SC-CAMLR and CEP coordinate the designation of MPAs in the 
Southern Ocean. MPAs are not a single management tool but a catalyst for the employment of a 
range of tools aimed at facilitating conservation of marine biodiversity.517 Any AT Party can request 
the approval of CCAMLR for the designation of a marine protected area. CCAMLR members will 
agree on a “case-by-case basis”, in the context of a representative network of MPAs based on a 
bioregionalisation process, whether to approve the site.518 In practice, the conflict between AT 
Parties promoting “rational use” and conservation of Antarctic marine living resources has 
compromised the ecological values of the designation.519 In addition, the United Nations encourages 
active protection for seamounts and hydrothermal vents, although has not expressly addressed the 
potential risks of NNS introduction.520 CCAMLR provides for the protection of vulnerable benthic 
habitats from bottom trawling,521 although has not addressed the potential introduction of NNS in its 
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deliberations.522 Establishing mechanisms to protect specific areas in the high seas is a global 
challenge that is addressed in Chapter 3. 
TABLE 2.5: MECHANISMS OF PROTECTING AREAS IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT UNDER CCAMLR 
AND ATS 
Area Type CEMP Sites
523
 MPAs
524
 Vulnerable Marine 
Ecosystems
525
 
Reasons for Designation Areas contribution to 
CEMP 
Monitoring stock levels 
and ecosystem effects. 
Protect scientific 
investigations 
Representativeness 
Protection of areas 
vulnerable to human 
activities 
Science 
Protection of ecosystem 
function 
Habitats and taxonomical 
groups vulnerability to 
bottom fishing gear 
 
Methods to Protect ASPA designation 
Restricts access except for 
purposes authorized in 
management plan 
ASPA designation 
Conservation Zones 
Fisheries Closed Areas 
Restrictions on bottom 
trawling 
 
The utility of the protected area processes to biosecurity is the extent they limit interaction with the 
areas and provide for more precautionary biosecurity conditions on entry. CEMP sites and MPAs 
both can utilize ASPA processes, which allows for requiring a permit to entry and extension of 
protection to non-fishing AT Parties.526 Moreover, entry to CEMP sites is prohibited for purposes 
other than those authorized the management plan.527 Although consideration of limiting ballast 
discharge is not explicitly included in the provision, the limitation of access restricts exposure to 
NNS.528 Despite the significant consideration of MPAs in SC-CAMLR, there has been no attempt to 
incorporate the consideration of biosecurity into the discussion of MPAs.529 The only MPA sets aside 
the South Orkney Island southern shelf to contribute towards the “conservation of marine 
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 See SC-CAMLR, Report of the Workshop on Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems, Report of the XXVIII SC-CAMLR Meeting 
(2009), Annex 10; SC-CAMLR, Report of the Working Group on Ecosystem Monitoring and Management Report of the 
CCAMLR XXVIII (2009), Annex 4 [5.1-5.14]. 
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 CCAMLR, Procedure for according protection to CEMP sites CM 91-01 (2004). 
524
 SC-CAMLR, Report of the CCAMLR Workshop on Marine Protected Areas SC-CAMLR Report XXIV Annex 7 (2005), 614, 
Table 1. 
525
 SC-CAMLR, Report of the CCAMLR Workshop on Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems SC-CAMLR Report XXVIII Annex 7/ 
(2009), 514. 
526
 CM 91-01, above n 523. 
527
 CM 91-01 [10]; L Goldsworthy and A D Hemmings, ‘The Antarctic Protected Areas Approach’ in S Hart (ed.) Shared 
Resources: Issues of Governance, (2008) IUCN Environmental Law and Policy Paper No.72, 123. 
528
 CM 91-01, above n 523. 
529
 CCAMLR, Report of the XXVIII CCAMLR Meeting (2009), Item 7; CCAMLR, Report of the XXVII CCAMLR Meeting (2008), 
Item 7; CCAMLR, Report of the XXVI CCAMLR Meeting (2007), Item 6; CCAMLR, Report of the XXV CCAMLR Meeting (2006), 
Item 6. 
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biodiversity in Subarea 48.2”.530 The CM prohibits fishing activities,531 discharges, or dumping of any 
form of waste in the area.532 Moreover, fishing vessels planning travel through the area are 
“encouraged” to inform CCAMLR of their intended transit route, permitting comprehensive 
monitoring. By restricting fishing activity and discharges, the MPA designation reduces the risk of 
introducing NNS into the area, although CCAMLR members have clearly indicated the approach is 
not a template for future MPAs.533 Reducing impacts to benthic communities does not always 
require rerouting vessel traffic as limiting fishing activity can be sufficient to limit the interaction 
with the environment and potential for NNS introduction. The practical implementation of these 
provisions depends on whether under the international law of the sea such protection is 
enforceable, which will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
2.4.2 OBSERVING AND INSPECTING: FISHING COMPLIANCE 
CCAMLR provides a comprehensive system of observation and inspection to verify compliance with 
the measures of the Convention.534 The SC-CAMLR has highlighted the importance of taking into 
account the impact of conservation measures that target biosecurity threats when developing 
systems to evaluate compliance measures.535 Since 1989, CCAMLR has allowed inspectors of one 
nation to board and inspect others within the Convention Area536. Two inspection manuals and a 
reporting template are available to provide inspectors with all the relevant information necessary to 
undertake their duties.537 However, as there are limited primary biosecurity responsibilities, there is 
only limited potential for compliance. There are no requirements to inspect ship surfaces or 
equipment for fouling, ballast water or potentially invasive bait,538 but waste disposal including 
poultry products, organic waste and inorganic waste will be examined to ensure compliance with CM 
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 CCAMLR, Protection of the South Orkney Islands south shelf CM 91-03 (2009), [1]. 
531
 Apart from those done by scientific fishing research activities agreed by the Commission for monitoring or other 
purposes: Ibid [1].  
532
 Ibid [3]. 
533
 CCAMLR, Report of the XXVIII CCAMLR Meeting (2009), [7.19]. 
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 CCAMLR, Article XXIV. 
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 CCAMLR, ‘Report of the Workshop for the Development of a Compliance Evaluation Procedure’ in Report of the XXVIII 
CCAMLR Meeting, Annex 6, 22.  
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 Vicuña, above n 39, 51-53. 
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 CCAMLR, CCAMLR Inspection Manual (2009) < http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/e-inspectors.pdf> 10 January 2000, 
(‘CCAMLR Inspection Manual’) v; CCAMLR, Scientific Observers Manual (2009) < 
http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/om/obsman.pdf> at 10 January 2010 (‘CCAMLR Scientific Observers Manual’), 10; 
CCAMLR, CCAMLR Scientific Observer Cruise Report (2010) <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/sc/obs/current-forms/e-cr-
rep.doc> at 12 January 2010 (CCAMLR Observer Template). 
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 The species of bait used, as well as baiting efficiency and bait ratio must be identified. CCAMLR Observer Template [4.1]. 
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26-01.539 Members are also encouraged to record and report any IUU fishing vessels and CCAMLR 
coordinates diplomatic action to attempt to encourage compliance.540 Several other innovative 
mechanisms promoting better compliance with CMs have been developed by CCAMLR. A specific 
policy is designed to enhance cooperation between CCAMLR and non-CCAMLR members and 
involves direct interactions between the Chairman of CCAMLR and states that authorise IUU fishing 
in the area.541 The Vessel Monitoring Scheme that requires non-krill harvesting vessels to install 
satellite-tracking devices542 on board fishing vessels could be utilized to ensure MPAs and CEMP 
areas are avoided. The Catch Documentation System (‘CDS’) creates a paper trail to enable CCAMLR 
to monitor the flow of toothfish in markets, 543 and incorporating contents of ballast water plans 
could promote compliance. However, the occurrence of mislabeling, falsifying, reusing and 
tampering of catch documents has impeded the CDS.544  
In the overlap between coastal states and the higher latitude CCAMLR subareas, coastal states in the 
sub-Antarctic have some scope to supervise and enforce measures on non-party vessels. The 
correlation between the decline in the number of sightings of IUU fishing vessels in the CCAMLR area 
and increase in fines in sub-Antarctic EEZ fisheries is evidence of the effectiveness of this 
approach.545 However, the most appropriate approach focuses on the port of entry. CCAMLR 
Member Port States must inspect all vessels licensed by CCAMLR members and to prohibit landings 
of IUU catches.546 The Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators (‘COLTO’) and ASOC also urged the 
tightening of port state controls to constrict the capacity of IUU vessels to access markets.547 
Developments in the international law of fisheries have developed port state capacity considerably 
and provide the mechanics for more effective enforcement of CMs.548 However, CCAMLR can better 
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 CCAMLR Inspection Manual, [vii]; Scientific Observers Manual, [10]. 
540
 CCAMLR, Combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the Convention Area by the flag vessels of non-
Contracting Parties, CCAMLR Resolution 25/XXV.  
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 Ibid. 
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 CCAMLR, Automated satellite-linked Vessel Monitoring Systems CM 10-04 (2007). 
543
 CCAMLR, Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp. CM 10-05 (2008); also supported by the AT; ATCM , 
Support for the Catch Documentation Scheme; ATCM XXIV Resolution 2 (2001), Support for the Catch Documentation 
Scheme SATCM XII Resolution 2 (2000). 
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Miller, above n 504, 319. 
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 D J Agnew, ‘The illegal and unregulated fishery for toothfish in the Southern Ocean and the CCAMLR catch 
documentation scheme’ (2000) 24 Marine Policy 366; The Monte Confurco (Seychelles v France) (2000), International 
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, Case No.6, Dissenting Judgment of Judge Anderson, [3]. 
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 CCAMLR, Port inspections of vessels carrying toothfish CM 10-03 (2009). 
547
 ASOC, The use of Port State measures to improve fisheries compliance at the international level: Issues and instruments 
– the CCAMLR case CCAMLR XXV/BG/29 (2006); Report of XXV CCAMLR Meeting (2006) [16.9] (ASOC), [16.14] (COLTO). 
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 See below, Chapter 3, Section 4.1. 
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address vessels that breach CMs and cut down on the biosecurity threats from legitimate fisheries, 
once effective biosecurity provision is enacted for all vessels in the AT area. 
2.4.3 FISHING SUMMARY 
The fishing industry poses considerable biosecurity threats to the Antarctic environment. Compared 
to the comprehensive approach of IAATO, industry organisations in CCAMLR have done nothing to 
address the risks posed by NNS. Moreover, AT Parties have taken a conservative approach to the 
ecosystems approach to fisheries management and have not examined the specific biosecurity 
threats risks posed by fisheries activity. The CCAMLR directly addresses these concerns and yet few 
practical steps have been taken at the institutional level. Parties have committed to developing a 
bioregional framework of MPAs and a comprehensive set of MPAs and CM 26-01 applies some of 
the relevant waste management mechanisms of PEPAT. However, the lack of consideration in 
CCAMLR is evident in the failure to address bio fouling or alien bait concerns, only addressing ballast 
water after prompting by the CEP. The CEP should drive the consideration of the generic ship based 
aspects as identified by the joint SC-CAMLR and CEP workshop, although CCAMLR and SC-CAMLR 
needs to prioritize assessing and managing risks specific to fisheries.  
2.5. CONCLUSION 
The ATS has adopted a fractured and limited framework for managing the biosecurity threats to the 
Antarctic environment posed by human activity. Developments in the CEP confirm AT Parties are 
committed to providing a biosecurity regime with preventative, surveillance and response measures. 
However, the institutional and legal mechanics supporting implementation are not adequate for a 
comprehensive biosecurity framework. Taken as a whole, the ATS provides a reasonably robust 
requirement to consider environmental impacts in planning activity. The planning principles under 
Article 3 of PEPAT and EIA process imply some consideration of biosecurity in the planning of 
activities, although gaps in implementation remain significant and not very well understood. 
Moreover, the protection of specific areas, regulation of waste and marine pollution and provision 
for contingency and liability have some relevance to a biosecurity framework but are not 
strategically aligned with the prevention of biosecurity threats. IAATO’s Decontamination 
Procedures and Mandatory Compliance Regime complement PEPAT’s framework. However, some 
CCAMLR members have detracted from the protection offered by PEPAT, especially in the attempts 
to form effective bioregional protection for marine areas. The threats of an NNS invasion are rising 
and a strategic focus, with tools that are adapted to adequately address biosecurity threats, is 
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necessary. Few tools adequately address the risks associated with biosecurity and those that do are 
not necessary implemented consistently across AT Parties. The main route of compliance is the 
diligence of other States in considering the EIA, ASPA and ASMA management plans, national and 
inspection reports submitted to the CEP and ASPA. Without some form of consistency across reports 
and integration with domestic legislative implementing provisions, a biosecurity framework cannot 
be supervised or enforced adequately. A comprehensive understanding of the issue must take into 
account the instruments outside of the ATS that apply to the introduction of NNS in the AT Area and 
domestic implementation of biosecurity measures. These issues will be considered in the next two 
chapters of the thesis. 
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3 
APPLYING GLOBAL BIOSECURITY TO THE ANTARCTIC AREA 
 
“…Antarctic Treaty parties have actively sought to keep Antarctic affairs off international agendas of non-ATS 
fora…[and] there are overlaps, and the potential certainly does exist for engagement among the legal regimes 
that  may not be in harmony with what each is attempting to achieve.”
1
 
“We have entered an era...in which international law subserves not only the interests of individual States but 
looks beyond them and their parochial concerns to the greater interest of humanity and planetary 
welfare...International environmental law will need to proceed beyond weighing...rights and 
obligations...within a closed compartment of State self interest, unrelated to the global concerns of humanity 
as a whole.”
2
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Two of this thesis explains the limitations of the biosecurity framework set out by the ATS. 
Despite implying a precautionary approach to the unintentional introduction of NNS, PEPAT does not 
provide States with the tools to address the issue, or mechanisms to ensure that non-Parties comply 
with the few relevant measures. Only 46 of the 196 UN Members are AT Parties, and almost half of 
all tourist and fishing activity in the Antarctic is conducted by operators flagged to States that are not 
AT Parties.3 As the rule of pacta tertiis excludes applying any biosecurity measures under the ATS to 
                                                          
1
 D R Rothwell, ‘Relationship between the Environmental Protocol and UNEP Instruments’ in D Vidas, Implementing the 
Environmental Protection Regime for the Antarctic (2000), 241. 
2
 Case Concerning the Gabcinovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] International Court of Justice Reports 7, 
separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramentry, aC(c). 
3
 See P J Beck, ‘Twenty years on: the UN and the ‘Question of Antarctica’ 1983-2003’ (2004) 40(3) Polar Record 205; see 
Appendix 8: Treaty Matrix.  
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third parties,4 a significant proportion of biosecurity risk cannot be addressed directly by AT Parties. 
However, the ATS does not exist in isolation; a number of instruments that directly and indirectly 
address the control of NNS have applicability in the Antarctic area. Although more than 50 
international and regional instruments address the issue of NNS,5  the shortcomings of the 
international biosecurity regime are well established.6 However, many instruments with biosecurity 
measures applicable to the terrestrial and marine environment have the potential to complement 
the measures of the ATS.  Moreover, the norm creating character of the more global conventions 
can to some extent be inherited by the ATS, where there is sufficient mutual connection between 
the regimes.7 
AT Parties have traditionally sought to avoid the application of institutions and legal regimes in the 
AT area.8 The presence of disputed territorial claims distinguishes the Antarctic from other commons 
and transboundary areas complicating the application of international regimes.9 The texts of the ATS 
instruments do make minimal but significant reference to external regimes. The AT places itself 
within the context of the “purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the UN,” as well as 
encouraging interaction with specialised UN agencies.10 In contrast, PEPAT was negotiated in the 
context of a number of globally applicable conventions under the UN Environmental Program 
(‘UNEP’), yet only addresses interaction with other international instruments in force within the 
ATS.11 The CBD applies to Members’ activity in the Antarctic12 and expressly provides that Parties 
should “*prevent+ the introduction of, control or eradicate” NNS where they “threaten ecosystems, 
habitats or species,”13 arguably requiring a more precautionary approach to NNS than PEPAT.14 
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 See above, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1.1. 
5
 C Shine, N Williams and G Gündling, A Guide to Designing Legal and Institutional Frameworks on Alien Invasive Species, 
IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 20 (2000), 32-3. 
6
 S Riley, ‘Invasive Alien Species and the Protection of Biodiversity: the Role of Quarantine Laws in Resolving Inadequacies 
in the International Legal Regime,’ (2005) 17 Journal of International Law 3, 334-337; L Glowka and C de Klemm, 
‘International Instrument: Processes and Non-indigenous Species Introduction – Is a protocol Necessary?’ (1999) 26(6) 
Environmental Policy and Law.  
7
 P Vigni, ‘The Interrelation between the Antarctic Treaty System and the Other Relevant Conventions Applicable to the 
Antarctic Area’ in J A Frowein and R Wolfrum (eds.) Max Planck Yearbook of International Law (2000), 541-542, 
8
 D R Rothwell, ‘UNEP and the Antarctic Treaty System,’ (1999) 29(1) Environmental Policy and Law 17, 18. 
9
 I Zovko, ‘Vessel-sourced pollution in the Southern Ocean: benefits and shortcomings of regional regulation’ in G Triggs, 
and A Riddell, Antarctica: legal and environmental challenges for the future (2007), 203. 
10
 AT, Article III(2), X. 
11
 PEPAT, Article 4(2; Rothwell, above n 2, 233. 
12
 CBD, Article 4(b). 
13
 CBD, Article 8(h). 
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Although negotiated after PEPAT, Parties have failed to integrate the global biosecurity protection 
found in the CBD into the general provisions of PEPAT.  
A number of factors contribute to the greater acceptance of external regimes in the marine rather 
than the terrestrial environment. Given the uncertainty over territorial jurisdictional in the Antarctic 
area and putting aside the position of claimant AT Parties, the Southern Ocean is effectively a high 
seas regime under the ambit of Part VII of UNCLOS.15 The AT explicitly reserves the customary high 
seas freedoms16 and PEPAT invokes the vessel sourced pollution discharge restrictions of MARPOL 
73/78 in Annex IV. The IMO, a functional organisation of the UN responsible for creating standards 
for marine environmental protection, is playing an increasingly important role in regulating shipping 
activity in the Antarctic area.17 The IMO first established the Antarctic Treaty Area as a special area 
on AT Parties request under Annexes I, II and V of MARPOL 73/78 after the negotiation of the PEPAT 
and affirmed specific Antarctic Ballast Water Management Guidelines in 2007.18 The IMO has 
advantages over the ATS with technical expertise in shipping and application to all IMO Member 
States.19 AT Parties have increasingly acknowledged the need for mandatory requirements for ships 
in the Antarctic area and identified the IMO as the most appropriate body to provide such 
requirements. 20 The Special Area provisions are limited to the ambit of the AT area, as opposed to 
the Circumference found in CCAMLR but AT Parties have asked the views of CCAMLR in requesting 
the IMO to extend its Antarctic Special Area provisions to the limits of the Circumference to better 
protect the Antarctic environment.21  
This chapter evaluates the extent to which other international instruments complement biosecurity 
measures under the ATS. In addition, the law of the sea relevant to biosecurity is analysed in the 
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 Rothwell, above n 2, 235. 
15
T Scovazzi, ‘Towards Guidelines for Antarctic Shipping: A Basis for Cooperation between the Antarctic Consultative Parties 
and the IMO,’ in D Vidas, Implementing the Environmental Protection Regime for the Antarctic (2000), 256-8. 
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 AT, Article VI. 
17
 Scovazzi, above n 16, 258.  
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 ATCM, Ballast Water Exchange – Referral to IMO ATCM XXIX Decision 2 (2006); MEPC, Guidelines for Ballast Water 
Exchange in the Antarctic Treaty Area Resolution MEPC.163(56) (2007). 
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 Ibid. 
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 Compare the ATME, Guidelines for Antarctic Shipping and Related Activities 17-19 April 2000, (2000) recommending 
guidelines in the form of a non-mandatory handbook (Recommendation 1) with ATCM, Shipping Code ATCM XXXII 
Resolution 8 (2009): “expressing the desire” of AT Parties that the IMO commences work on mandatory requirements for 
ships operating in the Antarctic area; see also United Kingdom, Polar Shipping Code ATCM XXIII WP 40 (1999). 
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 ATCM, Enhancement of Environmental Protection up to the Antarctic Convergence, ATCM XXXII Resolution 1 (2009). 
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context of the Antarctic area as well as the potential for either regime to apply to the specific 
biosecurity threats from non-Party tourist and fishing activity.  
3.2. NATIONAL ANTARCTIC PROGRAMS AND INTERNATIONAL BIOSECURITY 
The nature of biosecurity threats arising from scientific activity in the Antarctic engages two main 
sources of law outside the ATS. International biodiversity law provides overarching duties on States 
that apply to all activities under their control. In addition, most States that have developed Antarctic 
biosecurity policy have done so in collaboration with domestic biosecurity experts who are 
responsible for implementing international policy.22 The extent the relevant biosecurity conventions 
complement the relevant ATS provisions have a direct bearing on the obligations of AT Parties in the 
Antarctic area. Moreover, scientific activity in the Antarctic area relies on support from aeroplanes 
and ships ferrying cargo and personnel. The law of the sea provides for the mitigation of some risks, 
although significant gaps remain in the provision and implementation of marine biosecurity. 
3.2.1 BIOSECURITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY 
There are a number of conventions that address the threat NNS pose to biosecurity. 23 Most, 
however, focus on the potential economic consequences of NNS introduction and do not promote 
application outside domestic territory. 24 In contrast, the CBD provides a global, binding but 
qualified25 obligation for States to address biosecurity, arguably beyond the limited formulation 
found in PEPAT.26 Article 8(h) requires States to take preventative and response action whether 
addressing the intentional or unintentional introduction and explicitly provides for preventative and 
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 See for example: Australia, Australian Antarctic Quarantine Practises, ATCM XXVII IP 71(2004), 1. 
23
 A full list of relevant provisions can be found in Shine, above n 5, 87-114. 
24
 A list of all the Conventions with potential application to the Antarctic outside the ATS can be found in B Mansfield and N 
Gilbert, ‘Availability and Applicability of Legal Tools for Managing *NNS+’, in M Rogan-Finnemore (ed), Non-Native Species in 
the Antarctic Proceedings (2008), 159-163. 
25
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responsible for the limited proportion of States implementing the substantive aspects of the agreement. D M McGraw, 
‘The CBD – Key Characteristics and Implications for Implementation,’ (2002) 11 Review of European Community and 
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 CBD, Article 8(h).  
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response measures across all biological taxa and ecosystems.27 However, applying this provision to 
AT Party activity in the Antarctic area depends on the measures being consistent with or 
complementary to ATS provisions.28 Conflict between treaty regimes produces legal uncertainty that 
could result in a breakdown of the consensus required for the ATS to operate effectively.29 The VCLT 
provides that a later treaty will only prevail if Parties intend the treaty to prevail or the provisions of 
the later treaty are “so far incompatible” with the earlier treaty, the two treaties cannot be applied 
at the same time.30 Moreover, if a treaty identifies possible overlap and indicates it is to be 
compatible with that treaty, the earlier treaty prevails.31 The CBD is broadly accepted by the 
international community, with 193 Parties, including most known Antarctic authorizing States who 
have not signed the AT.32 All but one Consultative Party to the AT are parties to the CBD, and the 
general acceptance of the conservation aspects of the CBD is evidence that it has developed into 
customary international law.33 However, the potential impact of the CBD on intellectual property 
rights over access and benefit-sharing of genetic resources has caused considerable controversy that 
has been invoked in the ATS.34 Consequentially, the CBD’s relationship with PEPAT remains unclear.35 
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 CBD, Article 2 defines “ecosystem” as “a dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their 
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 Rothwell, above n 2, 230. 
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 Ibid, 231; G Binder, ‘The Dialectic of Duplicity: Treaty Conflict and Political Contradiction’, (1985) 34(2) Buffalo Law 
Review 329, 340.  
30
 VCLT, Article 59. 
31
 VCLT, Article 30. 
32
 See Appendix 8: Antarctic Actors Treaty Matrix. 
33
The one non-party, the United States domestic policies reflect CBD Principles; United States, Executive Order Number 
13112 on Invasive Alien Species pronounced by President Clinton, (1999); A E Segarra and S R Fletcher, ‘Biosafety Protocol 
for Genetically Modified Organisms: Overview,’ S Elderidge (ed.), Food Biotechnology: Current Issues and Perspectives 
(2003), 95-96; Rothwell, above n 2, 231. 
34
 CBD articles on technology transfer (CBD, Article 16) and distribution of biotechnology (CBD, Article 19); K T Kate and S A 
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Canterbury, 2005), 92. 
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 P Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2003), 523; Compare a withdrawn ATCM working paper by SCAR 
commenting that “it would now appear that the Antarctic is now the only part of the world, excluding the High Seas, to 
which the CBD does not apply.” SCAR, Convention on Biological Diversity for ATCM – Antarctic biodiversity, XXV ATCM WP 
24 [withdrawn] (2002) with the acceptance of CBD application found in two ATCM working papers submitted in the mid 
1990s: United Kingdom, The Relationship between the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty and 
Other International Agreements of a Global or Regional Scope, ATCM XX WP 10 (1996); and Chile, Relation between the 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty and Other International Agreements of A Global and Regional 
Scope, ATCM XIX WP 20 (1995). 
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The CBD expressly prioritise existing international agreements “except where the exercise of those 
rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity.”36 The broad 
definition of biological diversity found in the CBD arguably sets a low standard for the engagement 
of this provision, particularly in the sensitive Antarctic continent where regular station activities 
could significantly impact species variability.37 Nevertheless, CBD Parties have clearly indicated the 
precedence of regional biodiversity instruments by prioritising the application of PEPAT over the 
CBD.38  
In the context of the broad ecosystem-focus of both the CBD and PEPAT, the instruments appear to 
complement each other, even with the minimal interaction between regimes.39 The “natural 
reserve” instituted by PEPAT fits within the CBD requirement to “establish a system of protected 
areas or areas where special measures need to be taken to conserve biodiversity”40; and under 
PEPAT, Parties must provide for activities not having detrimental effects on species or populations of 
fauna and flora, evoking the “suite of measures” to conserve biodiversity in-situ under Article 8 of 
the CBD.41 The close proximity of the two framework conventions indicates that Article 8(h) of the 
CBD does not conflict with PEPAT’s biosecurity provisions under Annex II, but elaborates the broad 
environmental protection promoted under Article 3 of PEPAT. That is, although Annex II of PEPAT 
does not explicitly lay out a broad duty to prevent the introduction of NNS, Article 8(h) of the CBD 
confirms and codifies the implicit duty under Article 3 of PEPAT. Certainly some AT Parties have 
interpreted PEPAT and the CBD as interconnected regimes.42 In addition, many of the more 
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 CBD, Article 22. 
37
 CBD, Article 2, “...the variability among living organisms from all sources, including inter alia, terrestrial, marine and 
other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part: this includes diversity within species, 
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 National Reports under CBD, Article 14; Japan, Third 
National Report on the Implementation of the CBD (2005), 96; Germany, Third National Report on the Implementation of 
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substantive provisions found in Article 3 and Annex III manifest the obligation under Article 5 of the 
CBD to “cooperate with other Contracting Parties... where appropriate, through competent 
international organisations, in respect of areas beyond national jurisdiction... for the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity.”43 
3.2.1.1 COMPLEMENTARY TOOLS: STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT, GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND REPORTING 
This interpretation has limited practical implications for scientific operations in Antarctica. The CBD 
is a framework convention44 and as such, does not provide any substantive binding obligations on 
members beyond a qualified obligation to implement a framework of tools to conserve biodiversity 
and the potential to elaborate obligations through subsidiary instruments.45 Many of the provisions 
duplicate PEPAT’s mechanisms but some go beyond the tools available to address biosecurity in the 
ATS. In particular, the CBD provides for the integration of biodiversity issues into strategic planning 
processes46 and for the environmental assessment of plans, policies and programs that might have a 
significant impact on biodiversity.47 Impact assessment has been addressed as a cross-cutting issue 
by the CBD Council of Parties, and specific guidance has been developed for integrating strategic 
impact assessment into domestic processes that addresses the risks from biodiversity.48 Every AT 
Party has submitted a national biodiversity strategy and all make reference to the implementation of 
Article 8(h). Parties are not obliged to apply the measures to their Antarctic activities due to the 
qualifiers in the text of the CBD and potential inconsistency with the requirement under Annex I of 
PEPAT. However, the established benefits of strategic impact assessment and planning for NAP and 
tourist activity suggest that the provision complements the environmental principles and assessment 
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46
 CBD, Article 6(b). 
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 CBD, Article 14. 
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provided by PEPAT.49 Although few AT Parties have reported on their Antarctic activities to the CBD 
Executive Secretary, Germany identifies PEPAT’s Annex I EIA process as a partial manifestation of 
Article 14 of the CBD.50 Moreover, domestic implementation is not widespread. Only Chile reported 
in the Third National Reports to the CBD incorporating biosecurity risk assessments into EIA and SEA 
processes on a domestic level.51 A rigid application of the requirements of Article 14 of the CBD to 
the AT area would mandate strategic consideration of NNS issues throughout their domestic 
programs.52 
In addition, to elaborate the general provision, the CBD COP established Guiding Principles for the 
implementation of Article 8(h) providing for a hierarchical approach to NNS management: 
prevention first, followed by eradication and control, with support from monitoring activity.53 AT 
Parties are not obliged to apply the principles to their Antarctic operations but in the decision 
annexing the principles the Council of Parties requests Parties to “review, in the light of the Guiding 
Principles, relevant policies, legislation and institutions to identify gaps, inconsistencies and conflicts, 
and as appropriate, adjust or develop policies legislation and institutions”.54 Although not specifically 
invoking the provision, the CEP Working Plan on NNS proposes an identical approach, with the ATS 
developing guiding principles and integrating NNS concerns into existing provisions.55 Certainly, the 
precautionary and ecosystem approach, focus on cooperation and information sharing between 
states and hierarchical approach to NNS management is broadly consistent with the principles of the 
ATS56 and complements the approach of the CEP. Direct application in the Antarctic, however, relies 
on consistency with domestic processes and the Guiding Principles have not been widely 
implemented by AT Parties.57 Nevertheless, they offer a useful model for meeting the terms of 
reference of the Biosecurity ICG.58 Beyond the Guiding Principles, the CBD Secretariat has assembled 
                                                          
49
 See above Section 2.2.1.1. 
50
 Germany, above n 42, 207. 
51
 See Appendix 5: Analysis of Implementation of Biosecurity Measures in the CBD by AT Consultative Parties and CCAMLR 
Members Based on National Reports submitted under Article 26 of the CBD, submitted 2001-2009 
52
 See below, Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2.1. 
53
 CBD COP 6, Guiding Principles for the Implementation of Article 8(h) Decision VI/23 (2002) (‘CBD Guiding Principles’) CBD 
Review, [19]; Riley, above n 6, 332. 
54
 CBD Guiding Principles, [10].  
55
 Australia, France and New Zealand, A Work Program for CEP Action on NNS ATCM XXXII WP 5 (2009). 
56
 See Chapter 5, Figure X. 
57
 See Appendix 5: Analysis of Implementation of Biosecurity Measures in the CBD by AT Consultative Parties and CCAMLR 
Members Based on National Reports submitted under Article 26 of the CBD, submitted 2001-2009. 
58
 See below, Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2.1 and Appendix 2: Biosecurity Work Plan for the CEP. 
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a number of key tools and guidance relevant to individual pathways in Antarctica, including civil air 
transport,59 marine and aquatic pathways,60 and military and scientific research.61 Many of the 
guidelines reference specific AT Party activity, highlighting the expertise already existing in AT Party 
operations and the potential for similar information sharing in the Antarctic context.62 
                                                          
59
 The Convention on International Civil Aviation 1944, opened for signature 7 December 1944. 15 United Nations Treaty 
Series (entered into force  4 April 1947) permits States to implement “customs and immigration procedures” and 
addressed the issue of disinsectation through resolutions of the International Civil Aviation Organization (‘ICAO’), ICAO, 
Non-chemical disinsection of the aircraft cabin and flight deck for international flights Resolution A36-24 (2007); GISP is in 
the process of raising funds to analyse the results of an international survey on disinsection methods and develop 
guidelines for invasive species prevention in air transport, Economic Commission of ICAO, Implementation of Resolution 
A35-19: Preventing the Introduction of Invasive Alien Species, Resolution A36-WP/19 EC/4 (2007); CBD Review [84]. 
60
 Specifically, technical guidelines suggest a treatment option for hull fouling: T Munk and Propulsion Dynamics Inc, Fuel 
Conservation through Managing Hull Resistance (2006) Motorship BIMCO Propulsion Conference, Copenhagen, 27 May 
2009.  
61
 See CBD Secretariat, Invasive Alien Species Portal/Guidance and Tools (April 2009), 
<http://www.cbd.int/invasive/tools.shtml> at 10 April 2010. 
62
 The military section refers to United States and Australian Guidelines, e.g. C Westbrook and K Ramos, Under Siege: 
Invasive Species on Military Bases, National Wildlife Federation Report (2005) and Australian National Practices (Australian 
Quarantine Inspection Service (‘AQIS’), Cleaning Instructions – Personal Equipment (2004), AQIS, Foreign Military 
Equipment and Personnel; Guidelines for Offshore Inspection, (2006); scientific guidelines refer to SCAR, SCAR’s 
Environmental Code of Conduct for Terrestrial Field Research in Antarctica, ATCM XXXII IP 04 (2009). 
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FIGURE 3.1: SELF REPORTED LEVEL OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 8(H) OF THE CBD BY CONSULTATIVE 
PARTIES TO THE AT
63
 
Another element of the CBD system that has relevance to the Antarctic area is the national reporting 
system that provides for assessing the extent States comply with Article 8(h), the associated 
Decisions of the CBD COP and the CBD Guiding Principles.64 The Third National Report to the CBD 
Executive Secretary contained 12 questions on Article 8(h), focussing on the development and 
implementation of national invasive species strategies and action plans and the guiding principles.65 
In addition to encouraging compliance, the questions effectively elaborate what is needed to 
implement the provisions of the Convention.66 However, approximately 55% of the measures are 
                                                          
63
 Appendix 5: Analysis of Implementation of Biosecurity Measures in the CBD by AT Consultative Parties and CCAMLR 
Members Based on National Reports submitted under Article 26 of the CBD, submitted 2001-2009. 
64
 Sands, above n 54, 180-182. 
65
 See below, Table 3.1; CBD Review, Annex I, (1). 
66
 CBD, Article 26; Executive Secretary of CBD, Reporting Mechanisms under the Convention and Other Conventions, (2005) 
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implemented by AT Parties, indicating the content of the questions do not create any form of 
customary norms. The provision of similar questions in the reporting process under Article 17 of 
PEPAT will not necessarily assist compliance. The reports permit the more comprehensive analysis of 
the effectiveness of the CBD’s approach, indicating that NNS issues are not adequately addressed by 
Parties to the Convention, particularly in regards to the marine environment.67 Although the 
provision of guidelines has assisted the implementation of the broad Article 8(h) obligation, the 
report demonstrates that most States are not equipped with the institutional support, knowledge 
base or comprehensive ATS strategy that is necessary for an effective biosecurity system.68 This 
suggests that much more needs to be done within the ATS and in the CBD to ensure biosecurity 
obligations exist and that Parties have the technical capacity to address the risks of NNS, particularly 
to vulnerable and valued environments like the Antarctic continent.  
  
                                                          
67
 See Appendix 5: Analysis of Implementation of Biosecurity Measures in the CBD by AT Consultative Parties and CCAMLR 
Members Based on National Reports submitted under Article 26 of the CBD, submitted 2001-2009; The CBD Review listed 
the reasons for low levels of implementation as: insufficient human, technical, institutional and logistical capacity; Limited 
institutional coordination...; Lack of political will [and]...policies; Limited public awareness of the seriousness of the 
situation; inadequate policy and legal frameworks; and lack or limited financial resources....”; CBD Review, 5, [12]. 
68
 Ibid, Annex 1: [29]. 
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TABLE 3.1: ELABORATION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 8(H) THROUGH THIRD NATIONAL REPORT 
QUESTIONS AND SYNTHESIS OF AT PARTY RESPONSES 
Questions under Third National Reports to the Executive Secretary of the CBD % AT Party 
Compliance 
1. Prioritisation of Article 8(h). 65% 
45. Identification and tracking systems for NNS. 50% 
46. Risk assessment carried out. 62% 
47. Measures to prevent the introduction of, control or eradicate NNS. 56% 
48. International cooperation including the exchange of best practices for purpose of reducing risks of 
NNS. 
74% 
49. Ecosystem, Biogeographic and Precautionary approach to NNS 73% 
50. National needs and priorities for implementing CBD Guiding Principles 12% 
51. Coordinate national programs to apply the Guiding Principles. 8% 
52. Review relevant policies, legislation and institutions in the light of the Guiding Principles and adjust 
or develop policies, legislation and institutions. 
33% 
53. Enhance cooperation between various sectors in order to improve prevention, early detection, 
eradication and/or control of invasive species. 
27% 
54. Collaborate with trading partners and neighbouring countries to address threats of invasive alien 
species to biodiversity in ecosystems that cross international boundaries. 
27% 
55. Use risk assessment to address threats of invasive alien species to biodiversity and incorporate 
such methodologies in environmental impact assessment (‘EIA’) and strategic environmental 
assessment (‘SEA’). 
35% 
160. Mechanisms to control potential invasions from ballast water, hull fouling, aquaculture and 
accidental releases, such as aquarium releases, put into place.  
69% (Ballast) 
4% (Hull) 
54% (Aqua) 
0% (Acci) 
 
3.2.1.2 ANTARCTICA AS A PROTECTED AREA:  INTERNATIONAL ELABORATION AND GUIDANCE 
Another tool mandated by the CBD to protect “in-situ” conservation is the establishment and 
management of protected areas,69 defined broadly as “a geographically defined area which is 
designated or regulated and managed to achieve specific conservation objectives.”70 As indicated 
above, the designation of Antarctica as a “natural reserve” under PEPAT is consistent with the CBD 
definition of a protected area. The consequences of being a protected area under the CBD for 
biosecurity are not immediately evident, other than harmonising the approach of the international 
community and AT Parties. The obligations created by Article 8 of the CBD do not complement 
PEPAT by expressly addressing NNS or create additional tools to benefit AT Parties.71 In addition, 
although the CBD COP has established a program of work that identifies NNS as a key threat to 
                                                          
69
 CBD, Articles 8(a)-(e). 
70
 CBD, Article 2. 
71
 CBD, Articles 8(b)(c)(d).  
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protected areas, it does not expressly provide for NNS consideration in screening or scoping 
processes.72  
The CBD COP is instrumental in encouraging other area protection regimes to address NNS threats.73 
The Ramsar Convention already actively address the management of NNS risks in the designated 
areas74 and the World Heritage Convention requires reporting of generic threats to the values 
protected in the area.75 The World Heritage Convention has been specifically evoked to encourage 
NNS control action in the sub-Antarctic environment.76 There is significant utility in designating areas 
under these Conventions due the broad implementation of protected area processes in AT Parties 
and non-AT Parties’ domestic processes.77 The designation of a protected area engages certain legal 
processes under the ratifying instrument of the protected area regime. Where NNS are addressed by 
the regime, NNS threats will be addressed.78 However, designating Antarctica or biologically 
sensitive areas of Antarctica as a protected area in other regimes is outside the scope of most area 
                                                          
72
 CBD COP, Protected areas (Articles 8(a) to (e)) Decision VII/28 (2004), Goal 1.5.3, “To take measures to control risks 
associated with invasive alien species in protected areas.” 
73
 The CBD invites: “...the [Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, opened 
for signature 21 December 1975. 996 United Nations Treaty Series 245 (entered into force 21 December 1975) (‘Ramsar 
Convention’)]...the [Convention for the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage, opened for signature 9 March 
1977, 1037 United Nations Treaty Series 151 (entered into force 17 December 1975) (‘World Heritage Convention’)+ and 
the Man and the Biosphere Programme of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(‘UNESCO’)...to promote further the implementation of Article 8(h) within their mandates through, inter alia, the 
development of guidance, best practices, and pilot projects that address the threats of invasive alien species to particular 
sites or habitats...” CBD COP, Alien species that threaten ecosystems, habitats or species Decision VI/23 (2002), [16]. 
74
 Ramsar Convention COP, Invasive Species and Wetlands Resolution VII.14 (1999); Ramsar Handbook 3: Laws and 
Institutions, (3
rd
 ed, 2007), 29. 
75
 World Heritage Convention, Section 29; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (‘UNESCO’), 
Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention, Annex II, WHC, 81/01, (2008), [48-56]. 
76
 Macquarie Island is designated a World Heritage space, primarily due to its unique geological features rather than its 
biological features; UNESCO, Report of the 21
st
 Session of the World Heritage Committee, WHC-97/CONF.208/17 (1998), 
n(i)(iii) but the World Heritage Committee nevertheless encourages action on the NNS problems and requests Australia 
invite a World Heritage Centre/IUCN monitoring mission to assess conservation of the property; UNESCO, Report of the 31
st
 
Session of the World Heritage Committee, WHC-07/31.COM/7B.14 (2007). 
77
 Eighteen of the 22 Consultative Parties to the AT who submitted Third National Reports to the CBD established “suitable 
time bound and measurable national-level protected area targets and indicators” under the programme of work, Appendix 
5: Analysis of Implementation of Biosecurity Measures in the CBD by AT Consultative Parties and CCAMLR Members Based 
on National Reports submitted under Article 26 of the CBD, submitted 2001-2009. 
78
 For example: see Argentina, Law no 22.351 (1980) (prohibiting introduction, transportation and propagation of alien 
species in all protected areas). 
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protection regimes beyond the ATS.79 The areas can, however, be categorised in a consistent 
manner, which can promote implementation and legitimacy.80 The CBD COP promotes the value of a 
single international classification system through the six IUCN categories.81 Several states utilise the 
categories in their domestic legislation82 and the designation of Antarctic areas under the IUCN 
offers a consistent terminology to encourage third parties to adopt a precautionary approach to the 
areas. The UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre (‘WCMC’) and IUCN prepared a list of all 
protected areas in 2002 and despite not all protected area agencies assigning IUCN categories, over 
67% of the total number and 81% of the area utilised the category system.83 Sub-Antarctic islands 
and marine areas are predominantly protected as Strict Nature Reserves under the categories 
limiting access to scientific endeavours.84 The IUCN 2003 List notes the Protocol’s protection on the 
Antarctic and comments, “the world’s protected areas estate has increased considerably as a result 
of this Protocol.”85 Although the ATS has not specifically allocated the areas under the AT to any 
particular IUCN category, the entire area arguably fits into the concept of a Category V: Multiple Use 
Area; protected landscapes or seascapes “managed mainly for conservation and recreational 
purposes.”86 Certainly, consistent allocation of IUCN categories across area protection regimes 
increases clarity in international area protection regimes.87 In addition, if aligned with a strategic 
focus on biosecurity across protected area categories, it could allow for consistency of biosecurity 
protection across areas protected for their natural values. 
                                                          
79
 For example: although all AT Parties have ratified Ramsar and the World Heritage Convention, Contracting Parties can 
only designate suitable wetlands or heritage places within their own territories; Ramsar Convention, Article 2.1; World 
Heritage Convention, Article 3. 
80
 A Gillespie, ‘Defining Internationally Protected Areas’ (2009) 12  Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 229, 247. 
81
 CBD COP, Protected areas (Articles 8(a) to (e)) Decision VII/28 [31]; CBD COP, Protected Areas Decision IX/18 (2006) (9); 
detailed descriptions of the categories can be found in the IUCN, Guidelines for Protected Areas Management Categories 
(1994), <http://www.unep-wcmc.org/protected_areas/categories/eng/index.html> at 13 March 2009. Although the 
categories refer to government levels of coordination, the Guidelines make specific reference to the Antarctic in accepting 
that such unified ownership is not always necessary.  
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 See for example: EPBC Act (Australia), Section 347-348; World Commission on Protected Areas (‘WCPA’), Application of 
IUCN Protected Area Management Categories: Draft Australian Handbook (2000), <http://www.unep-
wcmc.org/protected_areas/categories/australia.pdf> at 4 March 2010. 
83
 S Chape, et al, 2003 United Nations List of Protected Areas, IUCN and UNEP-WCMC (2003), <http://www.unep-
wcmc.org/wdpa/unlist/2003_UN_LIST.pdf> at 10 June 2010. 
84
 Ibid, Table 5, 30. 
85
 Ibid. 
86
 A Phillips, Management Guidelines for IUCN Category V Protected Areas: Protected Landscapes/Seascapes, Best Practice 
Protected Areas Guidelines Series No. 9 (2002), 8. 
87
 See: Gillespie, above n 78, 246-247. 
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3.2.1.3. DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT OF INTRODUCER PAYS: LIABILITY IN THE CBD 
Although the issues with applying liability to biosecurity have not been rectified at the international 
level, the application of liability as a deterrent has been given some attention. Specifically, the 
requirement that a person responsible for pollution should bear the costs has not achieved the 
status of a generally applicable rule of customary international law, but the issue has been 
addressed in a number of treaty regimes.88 In 2001 the ILC confirmed as matter of customary 
international law the independent duty to cease a wrongful act and make reparation when a State 
breaches an international obligation.89 The ILC contemplated damage to biodiversity, noting it is “as 
a matter of principle, no less real and compensatable than damage, though [it] may be more difficult 
to quantify.”90 CBD Parties left the question of liability open in the negotiation of the CBD,91 and 
since then seven decisions of the CBD COP address the issue, establishing parameters through the 
Executive Secretary and urging parties to develop liability regimes for the prevention of damage to 
biological diversity.92 Fourteen out of the 22 Consultative Parties to the AT that have submitted Third 
National Reports to the CBD report putting into place national legislative, administrative or policy 
measures regarding liability and redress for damage to biological diversity.93 These include some 
measures relevant to NNS.94 The IUCN Guidelines identify the particular difficulty in applying liability 
regimes to the unintentional introduction of NNS, although proposes potential options in mandatory 
insurance,95 deposit/performance bonds and fees and levies to generate funds for rapid response.96 
At CBD COP 10, Parties intend to set out a multi-year work program for liability and redress, the 
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 P Sands, above n 34, 281, e.g. European Community, Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, 
(2004) Official Journal L 143, 56: framework regulations governing liability for biodiversity damage: If environmental 
damage has occurred to species or habitats of the Habitats Directive, or if there is a danger of such damage, this requires 
the responsible party to take the necessary measures to avert danger and to minimise and remedy damage. 
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 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, (2001), 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 43, 
N Doc. A/56/10 <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/9.htm> at 9 February 2009. 
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 J Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries 
(2002), 118. 
91
 CBD, Article 14(2). 
92
 CBD, Liability and Redress, Decision IX/23 (2008), 3 (also lists other relevant Decisions). 
93
 European Community nations under the AT are now obliged by Directive 2004/35/CE (above n 88) to address biodiversity 
damage through liability measures. 
94
 Shine, above n 5, 81-82 (Australia, France, Hungary, and Poland).  
95
 Argentina’s draft Biosecurity Strategy suggests mandatory insurance to cover the risk of escapes, damage to third parties 
and the limited cost of eradication measures; Ibid, 83. 
96
 Ibid. 
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results of which could have significant utility to AT Parties and the application of Annex VI to PEPAT 
to a biosecurity framework. 
3.2.1.4 SUMMARY OF BIOSECURITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY 
The global biodiversity law applicable to NAPs in Antarctica is limited since the values associated 
with Antarctica are quite different to the values associated with other areas of the world. The 
international law surrounding biosecurity has developed to focus primarily on the risks to industry 
and biodiversity.97 PEPAT concepts of scientific utility, wilderness and aesthetic values are not as 
prevalent in the international system. The precautionary baseline acceptable for risks associated 
with NNS differs if the goal is comprehensive protection of the environment and the related 
scientific utility of the area, or conservation of biodiversity including sustainable use. Thus, the ATS 
remains the primary source of relevant biosecurity obligations.  
However, the CBD provides for strategic planning and impact assessment, a categorised reporting 
process, harmonisation of area protection processes and a discussion of liability which benefit 
consideration in an Antarctic context. More fundamentally, a biosecurity framework relies on 
stakeholder involvement and whether claimant States accept the legitimacy of other States or not, 
the greater international community has an interest in the conservation of Antarctic biodiversity.98 
The CBD is the ideal forum to address the interests of the wider world community and allow for 
better integration and harmonisation of global biosecurity development with Antarctic biosecurity. 
Domestic biosecurity processes are subject to the obligations of the CBD and aligning the 
international and regional approach permits more consistent implementation across NAPs.  
Methods to achieve these goals will be addressed in Chapter Five.  
3.2.2 BIOSECURITY AND THE LAW FOR THE SOUTHERN OCEAN 
Due to the balance between Article IV and territorial sovereignty, the relationship between UNCLOS 
and Antarctic marine areas remains complex and unsettled.99 Without clear delineation of maritime 
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 Ibid, 13-14. 
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 Indicated by the UN remaining seized on the “Antarctic issue”, despite the outstanding matter of mineral exploitation, 
South African involvement and inclusivity being resolved (the latter is disputable); P J Beck, ‘The United Nations and 
Antarctica, 2005: the end of the ‘Question of Antarctica’?’ (2006) 42(3) Polar Record 217, 226.  
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 See above, Chapter 2, section 2.1.1.2. 
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zones, the high seas regime has particular relevance in the Southern Ocean.100 However, domestic 
biosecurity arrangements traditionally address risks to maritime zones and domestic economic value 
and do not contemplate risks to areas outside national jurisdiction. 101  However, the CBD’s 
programme of work on the conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biodiversity 
expressly applies to high seas outside national jurisdiction and identifies invasive species as a key 
theme in the programme of work.102 There is also some provision for high seas biosecurity in the 
international law of the oceans,103 particularly in UNCLOS, MARPOL 73/78 and the yet to enter force 
Ballast Water Convention. In particular, UNCLOS codifies and confirms a number of customary law 
norms,104 including a requirement for States to “take all measures necessary to prevent, reduce and 
control the intentional or accidental introduction of species, alien or new, to a particular part of the 
marine environment which may cause significant and harmful changes thereto.”105  
In addition, the active role of the IMO in regulating ships operating in the Antarctic area is an 
important element in any regulation of ocean activity.106 However, UNCLOS expressly permits 
marine scientific research in “the water column beyond the limits of the exclusive economic 
zone”107, arguably creating a duty to promote and facilitate marine scientific research and create 
favourable conditions for such research.108 The considerable gaps in international law relevant to 
biosecurity in marine areas109 and the customary immunity conferred on government-operated non-
commercial ships,110 which make up the vast majority of marine activity in the Antarctic area related 
to science and its support, significantly limit the scope of preventative measures under the law of 
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 C C Joyner, Antarctica and the law of the sea (1992), 185. 
101
 Shine, above n 5, 12. 
102
 CBD COP, Conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity Decision II/10 (1995), Annex II, elaborated in 
CBD COP, Conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biological diversity, including a programme of work 
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 All States and competent international organizations; UNCLOS Article 87(1)(f); Article 257.  
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 UNCLOS, Articles 239, 242-243; Allen, above all 103, 640.  
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 I Meliane and C Hewitt, Gaps and Priorities in Addressing Marine Invasive Species, IUCN Information Document (2005). 
110
 See for example: UNCLOS; Article 32, Article 95-6; Ballast Water Convention, Article 3(e); PEPAT, Annex IV, Article 11 (1). 
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the sea.111 The following section will examine the gaps in the international law of the sea relevant to 
biosecurity and the extent to which the law applies to the Antarctic marine area. 
3.2.2.1. ALIENS UNDER UNCLOS: POLLUTION OR PESTS  
UNCLOS requires flag States to prevent vessel-sourced pollution in areas beyond their jurisdiction 
through the adoption of relevant rules and standards112 and port States with the means to impose 
those rules on third party States113 but Article 196(2) explicitly excludes the requirement to take 
measures to reduce harmful impacts of NNS from the ambit of general pollution.114 However, the 
definition of pollution in UNCLOS is broad and includes the “introduction by man, directly or 
indirectly of substances or energy into the marine environment... which results or is likely to result 
in... harm to living resources and marine life...”.115  
Whether ballast water or NNS generally could be considered pollution under the definition is 
debatable.116 The treaty should be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose”.117 A substance refers to “a particular kind of matter with uniform properties,”118 which 
Firestone and Corbett argue fits comfortably with ballast water.119 However, living organisms are not 
contemplated in the drafting of the definition120 and including NNS increases the definition of 
substance too broadly.121 Arguably anything could be a substance, as long as it is harmful. Including, 
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 K R Wood, ‘The Uncertain Fate of the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty in the Maritime Area,’ (2003) 34 Ocean 
Development and International Law 139, 142. 
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 UNCLOS, Article 211(2). 
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 Ibid, Article 25(2); Article 211(3). 
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 Ibid, Article 194(2); Article 211(2); J Firestone and J Corbett, ‘Coastal and Port Environments: International legal and 
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 VCLT, Article 31(1). 
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 Firestone and Corbett, above n 114, n 134. 
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 L S Johnson, Coastal State Regulation of International Shipping (2004), n 390, 111-112. 
121
 C.f. the evolution of “energy” in the definition to include noise; K Scott, ‘International Regulation of Undersea Noise’, 
(2004) 53 International Comparative Law Quarterly, 287, 293-294. 
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for example, the introduction of fishing vessels or humans into the Antarctic, is a useful but absurd 
consequence of broadening the definition. Living biotic matter is an extremely complex collection of 
molecules that does not seem appropriate to address in the same manner as other forms of 
operational discharge. The context of Article 196(1) supports this interpretation, defining the harm 
from invasive species as distinct from “pollution of the marine environment resulting from the use of 
technologies under their jurisdiction and control”. In addition, the Ballast Water Convention 
distinguishes between “uptake and discharge of Ballast Water and Sediments” and “pollution 
incidents from the ship,”122 and although IMO delegates considered annexing the Ballast Water 
Convention to MARPOL 73/78, 123 they did not.124 Thus, the substantive provisions of Part XII of 
UNCLOS are not applicable to NNS, other than those conveyed through other forms of pollution, 
including sewage and oily ballast discharge.125 
3.2.2.2. “DO NOT SWIM NEAR THIS PIPE”: LAND BASED POLLUTION 
Although a significant proportion of AT Parties have adopted treatment systems consistent with the 
protection of the Antarctic environment, the considerable biosecurity risks posed by the discharge 
from stations of macerated sewage into the Antarctic environment is not addressed expressly in the 
texts of PEPAT or its Annexes.126 UNCLOS provides that States should adopt laws and regulations to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution from land based sources.127 All AT Parties have adopted the 
non-binding Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land 
Based Activities128 (‘GPA’) which elaborates the requirements in UNCLOS, committing States to 
developing comprehensive treatment systems for the discharge of untreated sewage into the 
marine environment.129  
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 Ballast Water Convention, Regulation A-3.3. 
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 Firestone and Corbett, above n 113, 294. 
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 Ibid, 295. 
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Although UNCLOS does not expressly include activities outside national jurisdiction, the GPA 
encourages States to develop regional approaches where transboundary harm is threatened. 
UNCLOS’s focus on national based jurisdiction in the high seas implies a similar extension to land 
based activities outside the scope of territorial jurisdiction.130 The GPA does not create a binding 
obligation but it puts an onus on AT Parties to develop a comprehensive waste water strategy to 
address potential biosecurity threats through targets for sources and treatment. In addition, UNEP 
and GPA have produced guidelines on developing appropriate approaches to regional waste water 
management and highlight the importance of regional agreements.131 The development of global 
waste water practices has already indirectly impacted on Antarctic activities.132 One of the factors 
contributing to the decision to install a new treatment plant at New Zealand’s Scott Base was to 
achieve consistency with national standards, in turn based on compliance with the GPA.133 AT Parties 
should ensure their Antarctic operations meet or exceed the domestic targets for implementing the 
GPA’s recommendations. 
3.2.2.3. NNS UNDER MARPOL 73/78: VESSEL SOURCED DISCHARGE 
A number of AT Parties apply MARPOL 73/78 on their vessels to the exclusion of the more 
substantive elements of PEPAT.134 Vessels have two options for the disposal of biosecurity threats 
generated as part of ship processes: discharge into the sea or into port reception facilities.135 In the 
case of biosecurity threats from sewage and garbage, the international regulatory framework 
favours the former. The preferred method is treating the discharge or discharging at sufficient 
distance from shore to minimise the impacts of pollution. Unlike land-sourced pollution, binding 
international regulations under the IMO govern vessel-sourced pollution. The “relevant rules and 
standards” that flag States must comply with to avoid vessel-sourced pollution under UNCLOS136 are 
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interpreted to imply the rules found in MARPOL 73/78.137 Although MARPOL 73/78 also refers 
broadly to reducing the risks of introducing “harmful substances”, the instrument focuses on six 
specific substantive Annexes, explicitly including the biosecurity threats associated with sewage and 
garbage but excluding ballast water.138 Annex IV of PEPAT directly invokes MARPOL 73/78 and the 
AT area is defined as a “Special Area” under Annex I, II and V, instituting more stringent 
requirements on vessels discharging in the Antarctic area. Annex IV prohibits ships 139  from 
discharging sewage into the sea within 12 nautical miles of land, unless the ship has an approved 
sewage treatment plant or is discharging comminuted and disinfected sewage. Requiring the 
treatment of sewage implicitly addresses the biosecurity risk posed by sewage and a performance 
standard is introduced to ensure treatment systems do not expose the environment to unacceptably 
high risks of introduction.140  
Implementation by AT Parties is supported by the explicit evocation of MARPOL 73/78 in Annex IV of 
PEPAT and the higher standard, although only applies where the measures do not “unduly impair 
Antarctic operations.”141 New Zealand has not adopted Annex IV of MARPOL 73/78 but still applies 
the provision to ships visiting the Antarctic area.142 However, the focus of the instrument is primarily 
on designing and certifying ships to reduce discharge; the biosecurity threat posed by the sewage is 
not identified. No measures are imposed to evaluate the effectiveness of the measures on marine 
biodiversity or monitor the impacts of exposing the marine environment to NNS. Moreover, the 
Special Area provisions of Annex V do not contain any explicit biosecurity requirements. Although 
the Annex prohibits ships143 disposing food wastes within 12 nautical miles from land, neither the 
instrument nor its accompanying guidelines make any reference to the risks associated with NNS.144 
This creates a significant discrepancy between the rules applied to AT Parties through Annex IV and 
those on non-Parties to the AT area. In addition, apart from requiring port states to provide 
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discharge facilities, 145  MARPOL 73/78 does not elaborate any further areas of port state 
responsibility.146 The weakness of the instrument is in its onus on flag states protecting against 
marine pollution, rather than identifying the reduction of marine pollution as a means to an end for 
the protection of the environment, and consequentially the reduction of biosecurity threats.  
3.2.2.4. NNS UNDER THE BALLAST WATER CONVENTION: MANAGING THE ALIEN WITHIN 
In contrast to MARPOL 73/78, the environmental focus of the Ballast Water Convention reflects 
PEPAT’s principles of environmental protection and creates an explicit scope for port state 
responsibility.147 Once it is in force,148 the Ballast Water Convention will provide a set of binding 
international regulations reducing the biosecurity threat of ballast water internationally. Domestic 
biosecurity arrangements have traditionally focussed on excluding introductions in the domestic 
environment.149 In contrast, the Ballast Water Convention provides mechanisms to eliminate the 
risks internationally, including requiring port states to identify areas of high risk uptake and 
providing for more effective departure state jurisdiction.150 The central objective is “to prevent, 
minimise and ultimately eliminate the transfer of harmful aquatic organisms and pathogens through 
the control and management of ships’ ballast water and sediments.”151 Similar to sewage and 
garbage, limiting the biosecurity threat involves either treating discharge or requiring discharge at 
port state facilities. The instrument creates two levels of obligations to manage ballast and sediment 
for flag states and coastal and port state. Parties must ensure that vessels flying their flag plan to 
avoid unnecessary discharge and the uptake of harmful NNS, 152 keep a ballast water record book153 
and manage ballast water and sediment uptake and discharge by meeting a performance standard 
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by 2012.154 In the interim, a ballast water exchange standard must be met recommending discharge 
200 nautical miles from land but permitting discharge within 50 nautical miles of land.155  In addition, 
port states may designate areas suitable for ballast water exchange,156 prepare for reception of 
sediments157 and warn ships away from areas with increased risk.158 Unusually for an international 
treaty,159 the Ballast Water Convention permits Parties to “require ships to meet *additional+ 
specified standard*s+ or requirement*s+” to achieve the objective of the Convention. 160  The 
regulations governing the additional measures are designated “Special Requirements in Certain 
Areas” implying the measures are likely to apply to certain geographic areas rather than broad 
environmental strategies?161 Marine protected areas will be addressed later in this Chapter.162  
Although the Ballast Water Convention explicitly provides for Parties to cooperate to “address 
threats and risks to sensitive, vulnerable or threatened ecosystems in areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction”,163 the instrument is limited in its capacity to address biosecurity threats, 
including ballast water discharge in the Antarctic area.164 The Ballast Water Review Group of MEPC 
identified the considerable time, technology and cost to design modifications as significant 
limitations to implementing the Ballast Water Convention.165 The performance standard itself is 
limited in scope and may not sufficiently exclude the risk of NNS introduction.166 Before the 
performance standard comes into effect, considerable issues associated with open water ballast 
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water exchange, including safety issues, time delays and the possibility of increased survival rate of 
individual organisms remaining in the tank, are exacerbated by limitations in the prescribed 
procedure.167 Predictably and consistent with other oceans law, the instrument does not apply to all 
government ships on non-commercial service.168 It does provide that such ships should “so far as it is 
reasonable and practicable” act consistently with the Convention but the exclusion of the significant 
proportion of ships supporting Antarctic science is a significant weakness. In addition, the Ballast 
Water Convention provides a “bewildering and diverse”169 range of exemptions and exclusions that 
cover ship safety,170 pollution minimisation171  and damage to ship’s equipment,172  as well as 
operational location, 173  prototype testing 174  and risk assessment processes. With particular 
relevance to the Antarctic area, the Article has no application where a vessel operates exclusively 
within the waters of a party (including the flag state) and the high seas.175 Where a vessel is 
exclusively employed between Antarctica or sub-Antarctic territories and a gateway flag state, 
ballast water regulations need not apply and there is no obligation to consider the potential impacts 
on the Antarctic environment.176 This is clearly inadequate for the environmental principles of 
PEPAT. Arguably the application of PEPAT precludes any untreated disposal that may lead to NNS 
introduction but as a number of AT Parties apply the international ocean regime to the exclusion of 
PEPAT, the limitation under the Ballast Water Convention applies. However, COMNAP’s survey of 
ballast water practices indicate that most States adopt a precautionary approach to ballast water 
management, and 17 of the 21 AT Consultative Parties that submitted Third National Reports to the 
CBD reported implementing mechanisms to reduce the biosecurity threat of ballast water discharge, 
although only one reported addressing hull fouling. Only five AT Parties have ratified the Ballast 
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Water Convention, although at least two others are in the process of implementation.177 The Ballast 
Water Convention is a useful addition to the regulatory regime of the oceans but far from a panacea 
to NNS issues and AT Parties should continue to proactively address ballast water management 
issues at the regional level.  
3.2.2.5. BEATING THE BARNACLES: MANAGING BIO FOULING  
The only internationally binding instrument that identifies the threat of hull fouling, rather than 
targeting the biosecurity threat, addresses the negative environmental impacts of hull fouling by 
prohibiting the use of harmful organotins in anti-fouling paints used on ships and prevents the future 
use of other harmful substances in anti-fouling systems. 178 However, Parties also “undertake the 
continued development of anti-fouling systems that are effective and environmentally safe.”179 No 
specific instruments exist to manage the biosecurity threat posed by bio-fouling.180 In 2004 the CBD 
COP identified the issue of bio-fouling as a specific gap in the international regulatory framework 
and requested that the IMO develop guidelines to deal with the issue.181 The 57th session of the 
MEPC approved the inclusion of the issue as a high-priority item in the sub-Committee on Bulk 
Liquids and Gases (‘SC-BLG’) work program.182 The SC-BLG established a correspondence group to 
develop Guidelines for the control and management of ships’ bio-fouling to minimise the transfer of 
invasive aquatic species in 2009, modelled on the Guidelines developed for Ballast Water 
Management.183 
Despite this, several limitations impede the development of international rules to address biofouling 
in the Antarctic area. Unlike other biosecurity threats that are the result of discharge, a fouled 
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surface poses a biosecurity threat wherever the vessel is in contact with the water column.184 
Roberts and Tsamenyi argue that the Ballast Water Convention or the AFS Convention could be 
amended to address the risks associated with biofouling.185 The latter, although providing a 
certification system, is a very specific convention focussed on reducing the harmful effects of a 
mitigation measure; the former is a highly technical convention that focusses on a particular 
biosecurity threat. Neither fit comfortably with the management of bio fouling. To address the 
biosecurity threat of biofouling, IMO members must adopt new rules. 
Creating international regulations for the management of biofouling is a challenging endeavour. 
Evidence shows that reducing the risks associated with bio fouling through cleaning is costly and 
requires significant infrastructure to avoid exposing the environment to higher risks.186 MARPOL 
73/78187 and the Ballast Water Convention188 require coastal states to ensure the provision of waste 
reception and treatment facilities for marine pollution and ballast water, but taking into account the 
obligation not to unduly delay or detain vessels,189 ensuring material removed is adequately treated 
might prove onerous for coastal states.190 However, the development of adequate technologies 
through the Ballast Water Convention process highlights the value of adopting ambitious targets. 
Adopting the model of ballast water management would involve interim Guidelines followed by the 
negotiation of a comprehensive instrument. Although managing ballast water and bio fouling involve 
considerably different issues, the commonality is the ambitious technical requirements and 
management developments required before any target standards can be put into effect. The 
increasing ratification of the Ballast Water Convention and growth of treatment technologies 
indicates it is a successful model, although entirely consistent implementation has yet to be 
achieved in the Antarctic area.191 Arguably, a more appropriate intermediary solution is Gateway 
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ports providing a buffer for the Antarctic, contingent on the development of efficient, cost effective 
and timely treatment systems. However, regulating the movement of vessels that do not meet 
requirements will continue to be difficult.192  
3.2.2.6. MANAGING NNS IN SPECIAL MARINE AREAS  
There is little scope outside the ATS for AT Parties to develop biosecurity protection for specific 
marine areas outside national jurisdiction.193 The challenge for the Antarctic area is providing 
biosecurity protection for marine areas close to shore where biosecurity threats are the highest but 
would usually come under the ambit of domestic laws and processes.194 Although coastal states have 
considerable authority to control the entry of vessels into their internal waters or ports,195 the 
customary freedom of navigation and science of the high seas is confirmed in UNCLOS and, by 
extension, the Antarctic area.196 However, the freedom is limited by the requirement to preserve 
and protect the environment, particularly taking measures to protect and preserve rare or fragile 
ecosystems and the habitat of “depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of 
marine life”,197 legitimating and obliging Parties to provide for high seas area protection in the stated 
circumstances.198 The importance of marine protected areas is confirmed in numerous multilateral 
treaties199  and the international community has committed to establishing a representative network 
of MPAs by 2012.200 The CBD in particular addresses the protection of marine and coastal areas as a 
thematic issue and promotes marine and coastal protected areas as an essential tool to help 
conserve and sustain biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.201 The guidelines developed 
to help scope appropriate areas for protection have particular relevance in the Antarctic area, 
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including specifically identifying ice covered areas.202 Moreover, the CBD programme of work on 
marine and coastal protection addresses the risk of NNS introduction as a specific threat.203 
However, the open working group set up to address the issue through the UN General Assembly has 
yet to determine how MPAs can be established and managed in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction.204 
 
FIGURE 3.2: CBD GUIDANCE ON ESTABLISHING NETWORKS OF MPAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 
RELEVANT TO THE ANTARCTIC AREA
205
 
There are few mechanisms that provide for applying practical biosecurity measures to designated 
MPAs beyond national jurisdiction. As discussed in Chapter Two, the UN provides for the 
identification of vulnerable marine ecosystems in the benthic environment that can be protected by 
limiting interaction with the areas through bottom trawling.206 However, protecting coastal and 
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open water areas from biosecurity threats requires limiting discharge and ship traffic in the area. 
Both MARPOL 73/78 and the Ballast Water Convention allow Parties to apply special protection to 
special areas by effectively limiting discharge. However, there are no Special Area provisions for 
Annex IV of MARPOL 73/78 and as indicated above, Annex V does not target biosecurity threats.207 
Article 211(6) of UNCLOS permits a coastal state to adopt special measures relating to vessel-source 
pollution within “clearly defined areas of their EEZ”, subject to the approval of the IMO but Article 
211(6) of UNCLOS does not apply to ballast water208 and requires jurisdiction stemming from 
territorial jurisdiction over the area protected. In addition, although there is nothing prohibiting the 
extension of additional measures to the Antarctic area through Article 2(3) of the Ballast Water 
Convention, there is no specific provision or mechanisms to provide for areas beyond national 
jurisdiction.209 The additional measures must be consistent with international law,210 take into 
account IMO guidelines211 be adopted after consultant with other affected States, communicated to 
the IMO212 and, “to the extent required by customary international law as reflected in *UNCLOS+, as 
appropriate, obtain the approval of the Organisation”.213 The extent this permits AT Parties to take 
unilateral action to provide more stringent ballast water standards in regards to the Southern Ocean 
is unclear. The guidelines do not offer much further elaboration, stating Parties must provide a “legal 
determination” for the standard.214 The only reference to IMO approval in UNCLOS permits a coastal 
state to adopt special rules and standards relating to vessel-source pollution in respect of a clearly 
defined area of their EEZ, in circumstances where the international standards are inadequate due to 
special oceanographic or ecological conditions existing therein.215 As ballast water is arguably not 
“pollution” under UNCLOS,216 there no provision exists for Parties to seek IMO approval in respect of 
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these additional requirements.217 On one hand, AT Parties are in an ideal position to provide for 
additional and more stringent measures in the area. PEPAT’s implicit duty to take into account the 
introduction of NNS in the AT area provides AT Parties with the legal determination adopt a more 
stringent standard.218 However, the limited acceptance of the ATS means AT Parties are unlikely to 
have the legal competence to provide for the protection of the Antarctic high seas outside the 
ATS.219 The IMO is the more appropriate route for special measures, although the Ballast Water 
Convention does not create any procedure for providing additional discharge standards in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction through the IMO.  
The IMO provides guidelines for designating areas as “Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas” (‘PSSA’) 
within and beyond the limits of the territorial sea that offer the potential for invoking additional 
measures under Article 2(3) of the Ballast Water Convention. 220 The designation of a PSSA allows the 
IMO to “narrowly tailor” area protection measures to target identified vulnerabilities. However, 
despite the scope within the guidelines for designating PSSAs in high sea areas,221 the guidelines do 
not provide any procedure to do so. Governments with “a common interest” may issue a joint 
submission of PSSA proposals but “the proposal should contain integrated measures and procedures 
for cooperation between the jurisdictions of the proposing member governments” implying an area 
is within the jurisdiction of two or more states, not outside national jurisdiction.222  Nevertheless the 
criteria for designating a PSSA share commonalities with a number of ATS documents in evoking the 
conditions of the Antarctic area.223  
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Marine Protected Areas’ ATCM XXX IP 53 (2007), 3-4; CBD COP, Scientific Criteria for Identifying Ecologically or Biologically 
Significant Marine Areas in Need of Protection in Open-Ocean Waters and Deep-Sea Habitats, Annex to Decision IX/20 
(2008); ATCM, Guidelines for the implementation of the framework of protected areas set forth in Article 3, Annex V of the 
Environmental Protocol ATCM XXII  Resolution 1 (2000); The work of CCAMLR on MPA ATCM XXIX (2006). Working Paper 7 
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However, the designation has no legal significance in itself, rather providing for associated protective 
measures in the text of the adopting instrument.224 This can include measures already available 
under an existing IMO instrument225 or measures that should exist and fall within the competence of 
the IMO, requiring the adoption of a new instrument to apply the measure. APMs identified by the 
PSSA Guidelines relevant to biosecurity include provisions already applied to the Antarctic area; 
being designated as a special area under the Annexes of MARPOL 73/78. Other relevant areas 
include ships’ routeing measures that could limit access to certain ecologically sensitive areas, 
reporting measures that would be required to promote compliance, buffer zones and “control of 
ballast water discharges”.226 Routeing measures include designation of “areas to be avoided” which 
are usually used to prevent possible grounding of tankers and other ships carrying hazardous cargo 
in environmentally sensitive areas.227 The implementation of routeing measures in ecologically 
sensitive areas is particularly useful for reducing the risks from bio fouling, where grounding poses a 
particular risk of introduction.228 These provisions are justified under the International Convention on 
the Safety of Life At Sea 1974,229 which although originally focussing on ship safety, now has a wider 
ambit including environmental protection.230 The purpose of the designation according to the 
relevant guidelines is to prevent pollution and they have been implemented widely in PSSAs.231  
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pollution (1998), 439. 
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 PSSA Guidelines, [3.1.3-3.1.5]. 
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 N Bowditch, ‘The American Practical Navigator: An Epitome of Navigation,’ (1995) National Ocean Service, Pub. No 9, 
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 J Roberts, ‘Protecting sensitive marine environments: the role and application of ships’ routeing measures’ (2005) 20 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 135; Roberts and Tsamenyi, above n 185, 566. 
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Nations Treaty Series 278 (entered into force 25 May 1980) (‘SOLAS’); widely implemented among Antarctic actors: 
Appendix 8: Antarctic Actors Treaty Database. 
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 Roberts, above n 228, 141; See for example: SOLAS, Ships Routeing, Regulation SOLAS V/10(1). 
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 See for example: MEPC, Designation of the Canary Islands as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area MEPC.134(53) (2005). 
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TABLE 3.2: ASSOCIATED PROTECTED MEASURES USED IN PSSAS UNDER THE IMO 
Associated Protected Measure IMO Instrument Utility in PSSAs (11 total)
232
 
Areas to be avoided General Provisions on Ships Routeing 
Resolution A.572(14), as amended 
72% (8) 
Mandatory no anchoring areas General Provisions on Ships Routeing 
Resolution A.572(14), as amended 
9% (1) 
Mandatory/Recommended routes General Provisions on Ships Routeing 
Resolution A.572(14), as amended 
4(6) 
Mandatory/recommended ship 
reporting 
General Provisions on Ships Routeing 
Resolution A.572(14), as amended 
54%(6) 
MARPOL 73/78 Special Area MARPOL 73/78 under Annex I, II, V 9% (1) 
 
The development of a mandatory polar code arguably makes designation as a PSSA redundant. Some 
commentators maintain the only utility of the PSSA concept is its symbolic quality, encouraging ship 
Masters to take additional precautions and thus reduce the possibility of pollution.233 Practically, the 
additional protective measures require IMO approval for adoption,234 thus removing the potential 
for AT Parties acting unilaterally to protect the Antarctic area. The introduction of the mandatory 
polar code allows AT Parties and the IMO to provide for employing all the additional protective 
measures available without designation as a PSSA. However, designation as a PSSA means as 
additional measures under the IMO are developed, so will the protection afforded the Antarctic 
marine area.235 The current development of measures to reduce the risks of biofouling highlights the 
importance of maintaining the strong linkages between the IMO and ATS.236 Ensuring compliance is a 
considerable limitation of the effect of the designation of any marine protected area on the high 
seas.237 Although the PSSA Guidelines oblige IMO member States to use specific compliance 
measures,238 enforcing rules on Parties outside the ATS remains difficult in high seas areas.239 
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3.2.2.7. COMPLIANCE IN THE WATER: LIMITATIONS OF THE FLAG STATE 
The sovereign immunity provisions in UNCLOS, MARPOL 73/78 and the Ballast Water Convention 
mean that most of the scientific support vessels in the Southern Ocean on government non-
commercial service are not obliged to follow any of the discharge standards, irrespective of 
compliance measures imposed.240 The biosecurity risks posed by scientific vessels can only be 
adequately addressed by international law if exceptions to the sovereign immunity provisions in the 
law of the sea are developed. That significant limitation aside, the flag state is responsible for 
enforcing appropriate jurisdiction and control on the high seas.241 Outside the specific offences of 
piracy, slavery, unauthorised broadcasting242 and rules regarding hot pursuit,243 foreign warships on 
the high seas can only board ships they suspect of being a “ship without nationality”244 or a ship that 
is in reality the same nationality as the warship, irrespective of the flag.245 Moreover, the flag state is 
an increasingly inadequate regulatory mechanism,246 with a considerable number of ship owners 
operating in the Antarctic area flagged to open registries or “flags of convenience”.247 The inspection 
provisions of the AT and PEPAT only permit inspections of vessels “at points of discharging or 
embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica”.248 Moreover, the prohibitive size and cost of 
enforcement action in the Southern Ocean limits functional utility of any inspection regimes, 
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especially as ship traffic grows in the area.249 In addition, post-entry inspection can identify potential 
biosecurity threats but do little to minimise them; a fouled hull will remain a risk irrespective of the 
negative report of an inspector. Article 13 of PEPAT provides for States to take appropriate measures 
within their jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the protection of the Antarctic environment, 
permitting unilateral action to a certain point. The possibility of enforcing port state control will be 
discussed in relation to the two activities of relevance in the Antarctic area: tourism and fishing.  
3.2.2.8 BIOSECURITY OF THE SOUTHERN OCEAN SUMMARY 
The biosecurity threats to the global marine environment are addressed in a fragmented and 
inconsistent manner. The broad requirement to take biosecurity measures in Article 196(1) of 
UNCLOS is only specifically elaborated by the Ballast Water Convention, promoting significant but 
limited action to reduce the risks of spreading NNS through ballast water discharge. UNCLOS and 
MARPOL 73/78 contain indirect limitations on sewage and garbage discharges from land and ships 
but do not strategically identify or mitigate the biosecurity threat posed by these discharges. 
Moreover, although a number of regimes recommend the protection of marine areas, few 
instruments offer concrete tools to protect the areas that are relevant to biosecurity threats.  
3.2.3 SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL BIOSECURITY PROVISIONS RELEVANT TO NAPS 
There is a wide range of international and regional instruments that reference NNS, but only a few 
have specific application to science in the Antarctic area.250 With the limited scope of activity on the 
Antarctic continent and islands, and significant protection already afforded the Antarctic terrestrial 
environment, the main utility of the provisions for an Antarctic biosecurity regime is in substantive 
biosecurity guidance and protection for the marine environment. The CBD CMS framework and area-
protection conventions offer a range of guidelines and reporting measures to assist implementation 
of PEPAT provisions. The general acceptance of the CBD is tempered by its limited provisions, 
although this is assisted by the reporting process that provides an indication of the healthy levels of 
implementation among AT Parties. Although only the CBD and ACAP can be arguably applicable in 
the Antarctic context, all provide a clear duty to take into account the harmful impacts of NNS on 
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Antarctic biodiversity and urge a precautionary approach to activities that might risk NNS 
introduction. In the marine environment, the IMO’s Ballast Water Convention, once in force, will 
empower AT Parties to create a significant barrier for introductions of NNS in the Antarctic area 
through ballast water. The development of biofouling guidelines through the IMO will create the 
opportunity for AT Parties to further safeguard scientific activities from being responsible for 
introducing NNS. Whether the provisions of the above conventions apply to third parties has more 
reference to the tourism and fishing industries as discussed below.  
3.3. ANTARCTIC TOURISM AND INTERNATIONAL BIOSECURITY 
The regional approach to the regulation of tourism does not adequately address the specific 
biosecurity risks posed by tourist vessels in the Antarctic area.251 Half of the IAATO members’ ships 
not registered to AT Parties are outside the ambit of the ATS.252 However, ship-borne tourism in the 
Antarctic253 is subject to the law of the sea associated with Antarctic marine areas.254 Unfortunately, 
all of the vessels outside the ambit of the ATS are flagged to States that are open registry with the 
considerable issues associated with flags of convenience. As part of the Commission on Sustainable 
Development’s international work programme on sustainable tourism development, the CBD 
addresses tourism as a cross cutting issue threatening biodiversity, although provides very little 
elaboration on how States should minimise risks from tourist vessels.255 Thirteen of the 20 known 
flag states of tourist vessels submitted Third National Reports to the CBD, five of which are non-
Parties to the AT.256 The reports indicate that non-Parties do not adequately address the risks posed 
to biodiversity by the tourist industry257 and have not implemented biosecurity measures as 
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comprehensively as the AT Parties.258 However, the considerable discretion available under UNCLOS 
to Antarctic gateway ports offers scope for implementing port state control measures to limit the 
biosecurity threats of tourism. 
 
FIGURE 3.3: REGISTRY OF IAATO MEMBERS DURING THE 2008/9 SEASON
259 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
activity in the 2008-9 season. (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas and Liberia; the other non-AT parties are either non-parties 
to the CBD or did not submit information relevant to tourism, suggesting non-compliance.) 
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Averaging 33% compared with the 57% of AT Parties, the ratification of the Interim Guidelines and Guidelines show an 
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3.3.1 GLOBAL GUIDELINES FOR SUSTAINABLE TOURISM 
Despite the rapid global growth of the tourist industry, very few instruments contain specific 
measures for managing the impacts of tourists introducing NNS into the environment.260 As both 
cross-cut the issue, NNS and tourism are discussed concurrently in the Tourism Guidelines provided 
by the CBD COP.261 These complement the ATS and IAATO, providing AT Parties and the industry 
with guidance on how to incorporate biosecurity considerations into tourist management regimes. 
The Guidelines specifically refer to the increased risk of introducing alien species or pathogens as an 
“impact of tourism” that should be taken into account when assessing individual tourist projects and 
the strategic vision for tourism as a whole.262 The Guidelines require the risks to be managed 
appropriately, “*p+reventing the introduction of alien species the construction, landscaping and 
operating of tourism activities, including for example from shipping associated with tourism.”263 
They also encourage appropriate management of other risky activities in the context of NNS, 
including waste,264 pollution, and “promoting appropriate behaviour by tourists so as to minimize 
their adverse impacts.”265 The adaptive management approach, essential to ensuring objectives and 
adjusted to meet the target of the overall vision in line with impact studies, is lacking in both the ATS 
Framework and IAATO’s self regulation.266 
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FIGURE 3.4: POLICY, PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT PROCESSES IN CBD TOURISM GUIDELINES
267
 
The Guidelines make reference to the “limits of acceptable change”268 and “recreational opportunity 
spectrum” 269 planning methodologies, both of which focus on compromise between management 
goals and recreational experiences, arguably inappropriate in the Antarctic context where the 
comprehensive protection and the environment and inherent values are the priority. However, 
based on the methodologies, in vulnerable ecosystems tourist activity can be restricted or prevented 
altogether.270 Where appropriate, this could provide legitimacy for restricting access to areas or 
particular activities. The potential breach of WTO fair trade practices has been identified as a 
potential barrier in the way of restricting activities, but the SPS agreement allows for biosecurity 
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measures as long as they are the least trade restrictive possible, transparent and consistent.271 One 
potential way for AT Parties to implement the integrated tourist management regime on the 
significant number of non-Party vessels is by Antarctic Gateway ports implementing port state 
control. 
3.3.2. DEVELOPING NON-PARTY COMPLIANCE: PORT STATE CONTROL 
Customary international law acknowledges the wide discretion available to States in exercising 
jurisdiction over its ports272 and a number of binding and non-binding measures exist in international 
law that makes use of the discretion. There is no general right to enter a port.273 In principle, there is 
also no objection to a State requiring a ship to mitigate biosecurity threats before departing from a 
port as a condition for entry.274 However, exercising port state jurisdiction still needs sufficient 
jurisdictional basis to allow States to enforce any measures.275 Enforcement must be justified on 
legislation based on international law276 and often, although a port state has the discretion to refuse 
vessels services, 277 it cannot enforce punitive measures.278 UNCLOS authorises port states to 
institute proceedings, where the evidence so warrants, with respect to illegal discharges occurring 
beyond its maritime zones.279 However, these proceedings only apply to breaches of “applicable 
international law and standards established through the competent international organisation or 
general diplomatic conference”.280  Although Article 13 of PEPAT essentially gives AT Parties 
unlimited potential to enact enforcement measures, enforcing third parties essentially offends 
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against the rule of pacta tertis.281 In consequence, the extent to which a State can use the principle 
to protect the Antarctic environment from biosecurity threats is somewhat limited. Under MARPOL 
73/78 there is limited scope for port state inspection of certificates and prosecution of violations282 
and the pollution provisions allow States to apply Article 218 of UNCLOS to sewage and garbage 
discharge. However, there are no rules regarding ballast water and bio fouling in force. In addition, 
UNCLOS significantly limits the States capacity to enforce measures on a foreign vessel, including 
permitting flag states to pre-empt detention proceedings.283 Arguably, where ships do not use ports, 
coastal state jurisdiction could be utilised to enforce ATS principles but the exercise of enforcement 
in the EEZ is even more limited.284 Nevertheless, Molenaar argues that these provisions simply 
reflect the progressive development of international law and do not limit the port state’s 
prescriptive and enforcement powers.285 Where a discharge standard proposed by a port state is 
more stringent than generally accepted and the states do not agree on enforcement, the port state 
is unlikely to justify criminal or administrative proceedings under UNCLOS.286 However, the state 
may still restrict port services, which in the case of Antarctic Gateway ports could have a significant 
impact on tourist activity in the area.  
The Ballast Water Convention puts an onus on port state inspection as an important compliance 
mechanism.287 Once it is in force, it will significantly extend the potential for the Antarctic gateway 
ports to act as a buffer to ballast water. Although limited by the customary need to avoid undue 
delay,288 it permits an inspection regime and introduces mandatory requirements and enforcement 
where threats are found. Once a ship enters a port, port state inspectors may carry out a physical 
inspection including ballast water sampling,289  and verification of the ships certification and 
                                                          
281
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records.290  If sampling indicates a biosecurity threat,291 the port state must prohibit the ship from 
discharging ballast water.292 Where there is evidence that Master and crew are not aware of or have 
not implemented ballast water management practices293 or certification is invalid, the port state may 
carry out a detailed inspection and take steps to ensure the ship does not discharge ballast water 
until the ballast water does not pose a biosecurity threat.294 Although flag states are responsible for 
sanctions, Article 10(2) permits port states to “take steps, warn, detail or exclude a ship in violation 
of the Convention,”295 a significant development from UNCLOS. In addition, unlike UNCLOS, a flag 
state cannot pre-empt detention proceedings. The IMO is in the process of developing guidelines for 
the implementation of the port state control requirements in the Ballast Water Convention which 
should provide some elaboration on the extent of the sanctions and the potential overlap with 
UNCLOS.296  
Although AT Parties were initially hesitant,297 the ATME on Ship Borne Tourism recommends the 
implementation of port state control in regard to tourist vessels in the Antarctic area.298 However, 
short of adopting a new instrument or a memorandum of understanding on port state control in the 
Antarctic and until the Ballast Water Convention comes into force, very little permits Antarctic 
gateway States to take additional port state measures to reduce biosecurity threats beyond refusal 
of service.299 Non-binding regional Memorandum of Understanding (‘MOU’) on port state control 
provides for a worldwide network exchanging information for the purpose of targeting substandard 
ships.300 The Southern Ocean is one of the only remaining gaps in the interconnected instruments.301 
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A similar agreement between all States with ships operating in the Antarctic area could provide the 
legal basis for more extensive port state measures, including those providing for biosecurity.302 
However, the optional nature of guidelines under the Memorandum of Understanding promotes the 
development of ports of convenience in line with open register flags allowing rogue operators to 
avoid port state control measures.303 Arguably, an optional MOU could not address this issue. An 
instrument adopted by the ATS and IMO establishing mandatory duties and responsibilities on 
gateway ports, focussing on supplementing conditional port access with punitive measures, could 
complement a MOU and explicitly provide for mitigation measures reducing the biosecurity threat of 
ship discharges and bio fouling. With no similar provisions found in international law, there is no risk 
of duplication highlighted by the ATME on Ship Borne Tourism in its recommendation to focus on 
existing port state control measures rather than developing new ones.304 The argument that 
restricting tourist vessels utilising port states services is contrary to free trade agreements will be 
addressed in relation to fisheries.305 
3.3.3. SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONS RELEVANT TO TOURISM 
The CBD provides a useful model for addressing sustainable tourism, which AT Parties should 
attempt to implement in relation to the management of Antarctic tourism. A strategic and 
structured approach to regulation, rather than focussing reactively on areas intensively used by the 
industry, will allow for targeting the biosecurity threats posed by tourist activities. An appropriate 
location to supervise and enforce this approach is the port, where biosecurity threats posed by ships 
can be identified and mitigated. Certainly, port states have the discretion to refuse services to ships 
for the purposes of quarantine, as long as they are non-discretionary and consistent. However, 
without a new instrument, departure state jurisdiction cannot be adequately or effectively enforced 
to target the Antarctic area. 
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3.4 SOUTHERN OCEAN FISHERIES AND INTERNATIONAL BIOSECURITY 
The customary freedom to fish in the high seas and primacy of flag state jurisdiction306 is 
safeguarded in UNCLOS, although expressly subject to their other treaty obligations.307 Although the 
implementation of the ecosystem approach to fisheries implicitly requires fisheries management to 
address the indirect impacts of fishing on elements of the ecosystem,308  including NNS, CCAMLR 
already provides for ecosystem based management.309 In addition, no instrument or guidance under 
the IMO or FAO address the specific biosecurity risks associated with fisheries activities in the 
Antarctic area. The CBD complements CCAMLR’s conservation measures as it does PEPAT,310 with 
Article 8(h) providing an obligation to address the biosecurity threats of fishing beyond the limited 
formulation found in CCAMLR.311  However, beyond the promotion of non-binding guidelines 
addressing the biosecurity risks associated with the maritime environment,312 mariculture and 
aquaculture313 and encouragement for States to mitigate against NNS spread through live bait.314 
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 CBD COP, Conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biological diversity, including a programme of work, 
Decision VII/5 (2004). 
313
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The CBD COP fails to provide appropriate measures to target the specific biosecurity threats 
associated with fisheries.  
A significant number of fishing vessels operate outside of CCAMLR’s jurisdiction in the Southern 
Ocean.315 International fisheries law complements the ATS through compliance measures giving AT 
Parties the necessary mechanisms to supervise and enforce biosecurity measures on fisheries 
vessels operating outside the jurisdiction of CCAMLR. In addition, the potential biosecurity threat 
posed by fisheries activities to Antarctic migratory species beyond CCAMLR’s jurisdiction is 
somewhat mitigated by the Convention on the conservation of migratory species of wild animals316 
requiring a consideration of NNS issues for certain migratory species.317 In contrast, the International 
Whaling Commission318 has not made any attempt to address the risks associated with NNS319 and is 
expressly excluded from ATS governance by the AT.320 The issue of protecting migratory whale 
species in the Southern Ocean is complicated by AT Parties polemic stances on the issue,321 the value 
of whales to scientific activity and the Antarctic ecosystem322 and Antarctic tourist operators.323 
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3.4.1 MANAGING THE WORLD’S FISHERIES: SCOPE OF COMPLIANCE MEASURES 
The hegemony of flag states control on the high seas is limited by the duty to cooperate with other 
States fishing on the high seas under UNCLOS. The duty is strengthened by the FSA in relation to 
straddling or highly migratory fish stocks324 which provides for cooperation with or joining a relevant 
regional fisheries management organisation (‘RFMO’) 325  and excluding Parties outside the 
organisation.326 Any signatory state to the FSA327 must join CCAMLR to utilise the marine resources 
of the area and therefore submit to the biosecurity measures provided under the instrument. 
However, any form of flag state control has proved particularly problematic to implement in the 
Antarctic area. Although all current States listed under the CCAMLR IUU non-Party vessel list are 
parties to the FSA,328 some appear to have no records or contradictory records of the vessels 
listed.329 Although Togo, Equatorial Guinea, and Panama are CBD Members, none have ratified the 
Ballast Water Convention and none report addressing marine biosecurity in NBSAPs or National 
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Reports to the CBD.330 Without effective control over ships flying their flag, the flag states 
implementation of biosecurity provisions is irrelevant. The ability of these flag states to enforce 
measures on the high seas is minimal, especially in the isolated and large expanses of the Southern 
Ocean.331 Sub-Antarctic coastal states have some jurisdiction to pursue IUU fishing within their 
EEZs.332 A number of judgments by International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (‘ITLOS’), in the 
context of aggressive enforcement actions on vessels accused of IUU fishing in  the EEZ of sub-
Antarctic islands EEZs, 333  refer to the importance of coastal states implementing CCAMLR 
jurisdiction.334 
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FIGURE 3.5: FISHING VESSELS NOTIFIED UNDER CCAMLR DURING THE 2008-09 SEASON
335
 
Without effective flag state or coastal state jurisdiction, the port is the most appropriate place to 
address the potential biosecurity risks from legitimate and IUU fisheries in the Southern Ocean.336 
The sovereign discretion for a port state to refuse services, particularly refusing landings and 
transhipments,337 is already established.338 The utility of fisheries law for biosecurity is the extent it 
creates mandatory port state responsibilities and a legal justification to board, detain and impose 
penalties on IUU vessels. Article 23(1) of the FSA339 provides for the port state to inspect documents, 
fishing gear and catch in port, although this is weakened by using “may” in relation to specific 
enforcement measures mentioned.340 The non-binding International Plan of Action on IUU Fishing341 
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also provides for port states to “take any actions consistent with international law” to prevent IUU 
fishing but Parties removed a phrase providing for “forfeiture of fish and fishery products” 342 and 
refers to consent by the flag state. Elements of the voluntary model scheme set up by the FAO to 
help implement the International Plan of Action343 have been formalised into a binding set of 
measures.344 Once in force, the FAO Port States Agreement will create a mandatory port state 
measures requiring advance notice of fishing vessels wishing to dock in port, inspection of vessels 
and where IUU fishing is suspected, refusal of entry and services.345 Although expressly not 
impacting on Parties discretionary capacity to take additional measures,346 even where an inspection 
determines clear evidence for IUU fishing, the instrument does not provide for any additional 
enforcement action without consent of a flag state.347 In addition, the instrument explicitly does not 
extend conservation measures adopted by a RFMO to non parties.348 
The instrument also implicitly addresses the concern that limiting access to port services might be 
contrary to the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade,349 providing for “fair, non discriminatory 
and transparent” application.350 GATT is part of the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) Agreements 
that provide binding rules and compulsory dispute settlement arrangements to ensure parties enjoy 
free market access to goods and services of other parties. Fisheries goods implicitly come under the 
article but Article V of GATT also provides for the freedom of transit, in particular providing that 
“except in the cases of failure to comply with applicable customs laws and regulations... traffic... will 
not be subject to any unnecessary delays or restrictions.”351 Traditionally, quarantine rules have 
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 General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature 30 October 1947. 55 UNTS 187 (provs. 1 January 
1948)(‘GATT’), reaffirmed in the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (April 15 1994). 
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 FAO Port State Agreement, Article 3(4); Shine 2000, 24-25. 
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 GATT, Article V(3); see also Article IX (general elimination of quantitative restrictions on imports).  
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been seen as an erosion of the trade benefits achieved through lowering tariffs and quotas and the 
GATT did little to resolve the issue.352 GATT creates “quarantine like” exceptions necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health or where measures related to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources.353 The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(‘SPM Agreement’)354 elaborates these rules to ensure quarantine is not used as a disguised 
restriction. The provisions, applicable to all WTO members,355 limits quarantine laws to those that 
are non-discriminatory, least trade restrictive and transparent. 356 Moreover, the measures are 
restricted to protecting the States own territory.357 CCAMLR conservation measures have been relied 
upon to justify exemptions358 and nothing in the instrument derogates from the principle of State 
sovereignty over ports as long as the measures are applied in a non-discriminatory manner.359  
The International Plant Protection Convention and World Organisation for Animal Health are also 
responsible for creating phytosanitary measures to govern trade, although these are essentially 
focussed on plant and animal “pests” that threaten the biodiversity of the territory of a State or 
groups of States.360 The measures have limited applicability to the Antarctic area but the IPPC 
creates an obligation for states to set up a designated National Plant Protection Organisation that is 
responsible for the designation, maintenance and surveillance of pest free areas consistent with the 
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 K C Kennedy, ‘Resolving International Sanitary and Phytosanitary Disputes in the WTO: Lessons and Future Directions’ 
(2000) 55 Food and Drug Journal 81, 83.  
353
GATT, Article XX(b) and XX(g);Riley, above n 6, 333. 
354
 WTO, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, adopted 15 December 1993 GATT Doc. 
MTN/FA II-AIA-4 (Commenced 1 January 1995). 
355
 See Appendix 8: Antarctic Actors Treaty Matrix. 
356
 Shine, above n 5, at 24-27 lists the all the relevant stipulations in the SPS Agreement; international standards as a basis 
for SPS measures; risk assessment based on scientific principles; consistent application; least trade restrictive alternatives; 
acceptance of equivalent measures; and transparency through notification of trade measures. For a discussion of the 
relationship between biosecurity and trade law see: Riley, above n 6, 343-358. 
357
 Shine, above n 5, at 24. 
358
 The United States prohibits import of Dissositichus eleginoides on the basis of CCAMLR Resolution 18/XXI, 50 Code of 
Federal Regulations 300.107(c)(iii); E J Molenaar, ‘Port State Jurisdiction: Toward Comprehensive, Mandatory and Global 
Coverage,’ (2007) 38 Ocean Development and International Law 1, 238. 
359
 F O Vicuña, ‘Port State Jurisdiction in Antarctica’, in D Vidas (ed.) Implementing the Environmental Protection Regime for 
the Antarctic (2000), 60. 
360
 R Lopian, ‘Feasibility of the International Recognition of Pest Free Areas’ (Discussion Paper for the IPPC Open-Ended-
Working—Group, 2008), 5-6. 
134 
 
SPM Agreement.361 AT Parties could benefit from collaborating with the IPPC to ensure protected 
areas are adequately protected and confirming their consistency with trade rules. 
There still remains a level of uncertainty when enforcing port state jurisdiction on foreign flag 
vessels362 that could be remedied by the provision for mandatory and extensive port state measures 
for the implementation of biosecurity provisions in the Antarctic area through the IMO process or a 
separate treaty. The reliance on rules already in place to manage port state jurisdiction evoked by 
the ATME on Ship Borne Tourism is short-sighted.363 
3.4.2. MIGRATORY SPECIES AND BIOSECURITY 
The ecosystem approach of CCAMLR prompts members to address the impacts of fishing on other 
species, particularly through regulations restricting by-catch. CCAMLR is limited in its capacity to 
address the biosecurity threats fishing activities pose to migratory species. The Antarctic is home to 
many species of bird, fish and cetacean that are not bound by the political considerations of the 
Antarctic Treaty area or even the geothermal limits of the Convergence, yet form a part of the 
Antarctic ecosystem. Managing the risks posed by migratory species requires international 
cooperation beyond the limited scope of the ATS. 364  As AT Parties are committed to the 
comprehensive protection of Antarctic ecosystems and managing the indirect impact of fishing 
activities, they are obliged to interact with other international frameworks that focus on species 
rather than geographic area.  
The CMS is a framework convention with the objective of conservation and sustainable use of 
migratory species. The CMS’s biosecurity provisions are limited in their applicability to the Antarctic 
area, primarily by its focus on endangered species and “Range States”. Although Parties define 
migratory species broadly, “...the entire population or any geographically separate part of the 
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population of any species or lower taxon of wild animals”365 a significant proportion of whose 
members cyclically and predictably cross one or more national jurisdictional boundaries 
“acknowledges the importance” of the conservation of all migratory species (CMS, Article II(1)) and 
provides for the promotion and cooperation of research in migratory species (CMS, Article II(3)), the 
instrument focuses on species with “unfavourable conservation status.” Favourable conservation 
status is defined by four factors being present on a “long term basis”: population dynamics data 
must indicate a stable place in ecosystem, the range must not be reduced, habitat must be sufficient 
and “the distribution and abundance of the migratory species approach historic coverage and levels 
to the extent that potentially suitable ecosystems exist and to the extent consistent with wise 
wildlife management.”366 Article III(1)(c) provides for Range States to take qualified biosecurity 
measures to protect listed endangered species that includes a number of Antarctic migratory 
species.367 The “Range State” is defined as “any State that exercises jurisdiction over any part of the 
range of that migratory species, or a State, flag vessels of which are engaged outside national 
jurisdictional limits in taking that migratory species.”368 The lack of explicit application to “areas 
outside national jurisdiction” limits the effectiveness of the CMS in the Antarctic. 
Despite this limitation, one agreement under the CMS is expressly relevant to the Antarctic area.369 
Under ACAP, Parties370 agree amongst a list of conservation measures to “eliminate or control non-
native species detrimental to albatrosses and petrels.”371 Activities that involve biosecurity threats, 
particularly linked to fishing activity, are not expressly addressed but the issue is the highest priority 
on the Advisory Committee Work Program and the Breeding Site Working Group has been instructed 
to make an invasive species list from each alien species at each breeding point.372 ACAP is invited as 
an observer to the ATCM and CCAMLR and has cooperated with the assessment and classification of 
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the Southern Giant Petrel.373 Instruments like ACAP provide a practical conduit for environmental 
measures to pass between the ATS and the domestic structures outside Antarctica that govern 
migratory Antarctic species. However, an ideal instrument would be ratified by all the Parties to the 
Antarctic Treaty, especially those that engage in any kind of activity associated with the relevant 
migratory species.374 Although specific measures must play a role in the protection of identifiably 
vulnerable areas or species, they cannot replace a general ecosystem based approach to the issue of 
NNS in Antarctica. 
3.4.3 SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONS RELEVANT TO FISHING 
International fisheries management has very little to add to the biosecurity regime in the Southern 
Ocean. Development of port state measures to target IUU vessels offers a way to exclude risks from 
rogue operators but the risk of NNS introduction to areas beyond national jurisdiction has not been 
addressed. It is identified as a gap by the CBD and IUCN and requires comprehensive risk analysis at 
the domestic, regional and international level. The biosecurity threats posed by fisheries and other 
activities on certain migratory species are addressed by ACAP, although the provision represents a 
very narrow approach to the management of biosecurity. 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
The plethora of international agreements relevant to biosecurity outside the ATS offers significant 
guidance and a precautionary structure to biosecurity considerations within the Antarctic area. 
However, there is no strategic focus on the types of activities in the Antarctic area and only limited 
applicability for a biosecurity framework in the Antarctic. Certainly, the obligations and guidance in 
the CBD offer mechanisms to better implement PEPAT responsibilities. Unlike the AT, the CBD and 
UNCLOS explicitly provide generic requirements to prevent the introduction of harmful alien species 
and the former substantiates the provision through Guidelines and a reporting process. Biosecurity 
is treated as a cross-cutting issue by the CBD and is explicitly incorporated into impact assessment 
guidelines, programs dealing with marine and coastal biodiversity, protected areas and tourism. The 
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approach is a useful model of how to address the issue in the ATS. Area protection conventions have 
some application to biosecurity risks in the Antarctic and experience of their implementation should 
be utilised by AT Parties in protecting areas in the Antarctic. Addressing the introduction of NNS to 
migratory species poses a particular issue in integrating ATS processes with other international 
norms. Although the approach of ACAP promotes a precautionary approach to NNS, the lack of 
consideration within the IWC is a gap in Antarctic biosecurity that cannot be addressed by AT Parties 
alone. To create norms that are relevant to States outside the ATS, AT Parties need to collaborate 
more effectively with these organisations and move past any residue of sovereign entitlement. 
A network of globally binding obligations and enforcement measures apply to Antarctic marine 
areas, regulating the considerable non-AT party activity in the area to a certain extent. The Ballast 
Water Convention coming into force and development of anti-biofouling procedures will address the 
considerable biosecurity risks associated with marine NNS. However, the current framework relies 
heavily on flag state implementation and does not expressly require port state measures to ensure 
compliance. In addition, the immunity for government vessels on non-commercial service 
significantly limits the utility of the international law of the sea for a precautionary biosecurity 
framework for the Antarctic. However, that the provisions in international and regional law promote 
comprehensive biosecurity frameworks is evident in the proactive domestic implementation of 
Australia and New Zealand. Both approaches will be discussed in the next Chapter, in relation to 
their Antarctic and sub-Antarctic territories. Moreover, the development of a mandatory Polar Code 
for the Antarctic, especially if provisions are developed for specific biosecurity consideration and 
port state control, could do much to fill the gaps in the current system. 
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4 
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BIOSECURITY IN THE 
ANTARCTIC AND SUB-ANTARCTIC 
 
“Antarctica New Zealand is committed to the biosecurity of both Antarctica and New Zealand and aims to 
minimise human transfer of species to areas where they are not naturally present.”
1
 
“Australia recognises that the movement of aircraft, vessels, personnel, support cargo and research equipment 
between Australia, Antarctica, the sub-Antarctic and the Southern Ocean creates a risk of transferring animals, 
plants, micro-organisms and materials of quarantine concern. The Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) is 
committed to conducting and administering activities in a way that will prevent or minimise such risks, 
consistent with the environmental principles of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic 
Treaty.”
2
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Gaps in regional and international biosecurity regimes leave AT Parties without the institutional 
mechanics to comprehensively prevent or minimise the risks of introducing NNS into the Antarctic 
area. However, the broad environmental principles under PEPAT place a particular onus on AT 
Parties to take the initiative in implementing, supervising and enforcing effective biosecurity 
measures. Domestic biosecurity regimes focus on reducing the risks of harmful NNS introductions 
into the territory of the State and in marine zones allocated to the territory.3 In the development of 
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 Antarctica New Zealand (‘ANZ’), Biosecurity and Non-native species Health, Safety and Environment Policy 7 (2009), 1. 
2
 Australia, Principles underpinning Australia’s approach to Antarctic quarantine management ATCM XXIX IP 44 (2006), 1. 
3
 M L Miller and L H Gunderson, ‘Biological and Cultural Camouflage: the Challenges of Seeing the Harmful Invasive Species 
Problem and Doing Something About It’, in M L Miller and R N Fabian, Harmful invasive species: legal responses (2004), 2. 
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an effective response to the risks of NNS introduction in the Antarctic, there is a significant place for 
case studies from States who have effectively applied domestic biosecurity arrangements to their 
Antarctic and sub-Antarctic operations.4 The frameworks provide models of best practice for other 
States to effectively implement the environmental principles of PEPAT and could be standardised 
into a comprehensive regime under the ATS. Moreover, gaps in the frameworks indicate areas 
where international cooperation is needed to exclude biosecurity threats. Australia and New 
Zealand are two such States that have also been heavily involved in the CEP consideration of the 
risks posed by NNS.5  
Both States are island nations with unique ecosystems, have large agricultural industries and incur 
large costs from invasive NNS.6 In addition, both are Parties to the CBD with NBSAPs that identify 
biosecurity as a crucial factor in protecting biodiversity.7 As a consequence, both are world leaders in 
biosecurity with dedicated government departments and a host of legal controls on the intentional 
and unintentional introduction of NNS.8 Both also have a significant investment in the Antarctic 
continent, claiming collectively 45% of the territorial land mass of the continent and permitting their 
nationals to engage in scientific, tourist and fishing activities.9 It is, therefore, not surprising that 
both countries have developed sophisticated controls to deal with the unintentional introduction of 
NNS into the Antarctic environment. Both employ domestic policy with the intention of minimising 
the risk of introducing NNS into their Antarctic operations and prohibit commercial tourism activities 
                                                          
4
 The importance of sharing experiences is highlighted by the CBD COP which requests States provide case-studies and 
experience focussing on the implementation of Article 8(h); CBD COP, CBD COP, Alien species that threaten ecosystems, 
habitats or species (Article 8 (h )): further consideration of gaps and inconsistencies in the international regulatory 
framework  Decision VIII/27 (2006). 
5
 See Appendix 1: Summary of Submissions to CEP on NNS: (Australia and New Zealand have submitted or contributed to 18 
of the 35 total submissions to the CEP on the subject of NNS). 
6
 Costs involved with Invasive NNS are over AUS$7 billion per annum in Australia and NZ$3.5 billion per annum in New 
Zealand (including multiplier costs); Australia, Australia’s Fourth National Report to the United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity (2009) < http://www.cbd.int/doc/world/au/au-nr-04-en.pdf> at 29 April 2009; Nimmo-Bell, Economic 
Costs of Pests to New Zealand, MAF Biosecurity Technical Paper 31 (2009), 45. 
7
 Australia, National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biodiversity (1996) 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/publications/strategy/pubs/national-strategy-96.pdf> (‘Australian 
Biodiversity Strategy’), 37; New Zealand, The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy (2000) 
<http://www.biodiversity.govt.nz/pdfs/picture/nzbs-whole.pdf> at 1 September 2009 (‘NZ Biodiversity Strategy’), 79. 
8
 Miller and Gunderson, above n 3, 1; M McConnel, Globallast Legislative Review Final Report, GloBallast Monography 
Series No.1 (2002), 71, 80. 
9
 Composed of approximately Australia (42%) and New Zealand (3%), although New Zealand’s claim includes the 487,000 
km
2
 Ross Ice Shelf.  
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in the Antarctic without permits conditional on mitigating against NNS. Both also apply considerable 
biosecurity measures to their sub-Antarctic territories, which are utilised by scientists, tourists and 
the fishing industry. These factors make the two States excellent examples of how biosecurity 
regimes can be implemented in the Antarctic environment. Moreover, the high level of protection 
afforded to the sub-Antarctic in both States, particularly Australia where the complexities of 
overlapping federal responsibilities must be negotiated, permits a reflection on the limitations of 
jurisdiction based on nationality and jointly-administered territory. This chapter will evaluate and 
contrast the two nation’s biosecurity measures relevant to the Antarctic and compare them with the 
measures taken in the sub-Antarctic, assessing their appropriateness as models of best practice for 
the ATS. As both have implicitly accepted a PEPAT principle to prevent the introduction of NNS,10 the 
gaps in their implementation of the principle will identify inherent problems in the ATS treatment of 
biosecurity. 
4.1.1. A DOMESTIC BIOSECURITY FRAMEWORK 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the fundamental problem with the ATS’s treatment of NNS is 
the lack of a strategic biosecurity framework. The necessary comprehensive, cohesive and 
coordinated approach promoted by the IUCN11 and prescribed by the CBD12 to exclude the impact of 
NNS is a significant challenge that has not been met. Australia and New Zealand’s proactive 
approaches employ Antarctic-specific policy and utilise the expertise of their domestic biosecurity 
agencies.13 Some biosecurity measures from the domestic provisions apply directly to Antarctic 
activities and provide the framework from which Antarctic-specific procedures can be built.14 In 
particular, the discretion available to port States identified in Chapters 2 and 3 permits the 
institution of quarantine measures on Antarctic bound ships to act as a buffer for Antarctic territorial 
and marine areas. 
                                                          
10
 See: Australia, Principles underpinning Australia’s approach to Antarctic quarantine management ATCM XXIX IP 44 
(2006), 1; New Zealand, A framework for analysing and managing NNS risks in Antarctica ATCM XXXII IP 36 (2009), 2. 
11
 C Shine, N Williams and G Gündling, A Guide to Designing Legal and Institutional Frameworks on Alien Invasive Species, 
IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 20 (2000), 38. 
12
 CBD, Article 6. 
13
 New Zealand, ANZ and Biosecurity: Meeting with MAF MAFBNZ Presentation by ANZ March 2008 (2008); Australia, 
Australia’s Antarctic Quarantine Practices, IP071/ATCM XXVII (2004), 2. 
14
 S Potter, ‘The Quarantine Management of Australia’s Antarctic Program’ (2006) 13 Australian Journal of Environmental 
Management 185, 187. 
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An Antarctic biosecurity framework should fit into a countries response to domestic biosecurity. The 
biosecurity frameworks of both Australia and New Zealand are composed of pre-border agreements 
and procedures, border control, contingency response plans, monitoring and a system of regional 
and national pest management for established NNS.15 As the Antarctic poses a set of unique risks 
requiring a range of vector-targeted interventions, a strategic and coordinated approach to 
biosecurity is essential on the domestic level.16 New Zealand’s Biosecurity Act 1993 achieves this 
through integrating the “law relating to the exclusion, eradication and effective management of 
pests and unwanted organisms”.17 It links together the different components under the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries Biosecurity New Zealand (‘MAFBNZ’) and an advisory council.18 A MOU on 
biosecurity activities gives the overall responsibility for biosecurity issues to MAFBNZ, but links 
strongly with the Department of Conservation (‘DOC’), the Ministry of Fisheries (‘MFish’), the 
Ministry of Health and Maritime New Zealand.19  
The Australian system, complicated by Federal and State responses, is much more fragmented.20 The 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Australia) (‘EPBC Act’) forms the 
nexus of Australia’s efforts at attempting to preserve native biodiversity, protecting Commonwealth 
reserves and areas of national heritage.21 However, the primary legislation relevant to biosecurity, 
the Quarantine Act 1908, suffers from a narrow focus, administrative complexity and lack of clear 
intent.22 The Australian biosecurity system for primary production and the environment 
(‘AusBIOSEC’) is in the process of rationalising the government’s biosecurity measures under an 
overarching national framework.23 The “partnership approach” includes the Biosecurity Services 
Group of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (‘DAFF’) that addresses pre-border 
                                                          
15
 M Jay, M Morad and A Bell, ‘Biosecurity: A policy dilemma for New Zealand’ (2003) 20 Land Use Policy 121, 125. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Biosecurity Act 1993 (NZ), Long Title. 
18
 Jay, above n 15, 125; a list of other pieces of relevant legislation and departments can be found on MAFBNZ’s website: 
<http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/biosec/pol>, (last updated 07/01/2009; accessed 10/10/2009). 
19
 MAFBNZ oversees border control and monitoring, DOC manages the control and containment of alien invasive species, 
MOU on biosecurity activities between Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and Department of Conservation, Ministry of 
Fisheries, and Ministry of Health, 31 October 2006 (2006). 
20
 R Beale, et al, One Biosecurity: A Working Partnership: The Independent Review of Australia’s Quarantine and Biosecurity 
Arrangements Report to the Australian Government (2008) <http://www.daff.gov.au/ 
_media/documents/about/beale/intro-exec-sum-rec.pdf> at 10 March 2010, 128. 
21
 Australia, above n 4, 79. 
22
 Beale, above n 20, 129. 
23
 Australia, above n 4, 79. 
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and border control, the Department of Environment, Heritage and the Arts (‘DEWHA’) that 
addresses NNS containment and control and a range of Commonwealth and State legislation and 
regulatory measures, as well as national strategies targeting particular NNS issues.24  
The integration of biosecurity processes and focus on the environment develops the potential for 
utility in the Antarctic area. Although neither piece of central biosecurity legislation directly applies 
to nationals going into the Antarctic area, both apply to nationals returning to New Zealand and 
Australia from Antarctica and the sub-Antarctic islands (with the exception of the HIMI Islands).25  
4.1.2. LIMITATIONS IN THE ANTARCTIC: JURISDICTION 
Although both New Zealand and Australia have long-established interests in the Antarctic 
continent,26 only three other nations in the world recognise their territorial claims.27 The scope of AT 
Parties’ jurisdiction in the Antarctic limits their capacity to reduce the risks of introducing NNS, 
particularly given the large number of different States operating within the Ross Dependency and 
AAT.28 Through implementing Article 4 of the AT,29 the States effectively acknowledge the territorial 
dispute and limit their jurisdiction to their own nationals. However, the significance of the claims 
should not be underestimated, particularly in relation to the maritime zones.30 The Antarctic-specific 
legislation of both countries expressly applies to all individuals in their respective Antarctic 
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 Ibid, 79-80. 
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 Potter, above n 14, 190-1; ANZ, Environmental Legislation applying to New Zealanders in Antarctica (2010) 
<http://www.antarcticanz.govt.nz/images/downloads/environment/may%202010%20nzlegislation.pdf> at 2 January 2010.  
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 The United Kingdom claimed the Ross Dependency (the sector between 150
o 
and 160
o
 west longtitude) under the 
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(the sectors between 45
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o
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o 
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o
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(Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act 1933, Act No. 8 of 1933). 
27
 A D Hemmings, ‘Problems posed by attempts to apply claimant’s domestic legislation beyond its own nationals in 
Antarctica’ (2008), 11 (3 & 4) Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law 207, 208. 
28
 Four stations operate within the Ross Dependency; McMurdo Station (USA), Scott Base (NZ), Amundsen-Scott South 
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29
 Antarctic Act 1960 (NZ) and Antarctic Treaty Act 1960 (Australia) (both enact the text of the AT in an attached Schedule). 
30
 D R Rothwell and S V Scott, ‘Flexing Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica: Pushing Antarctic National Treaty Limits in the 
National Interest,’ in L Kriwoken, J Jabour and A Hemmings (eds.) Looking South: Australia’s Antarctic Agenda (2007), 12. 
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territories.31 New Zealand maintains its right of sovereignty over the Ross Dependency32 but 
safeguards exist in the implementing legislation to prevent application to third parties.33 New 
Zealand has not formally commenced the Ross Dependency territorial or contiguous zone,34 declared 
an EEZ or submitted data to the CLCS, instead taking a “cooperative and low key” approach to the 
issue of maritime zones.35 Australia’s approach is a little more aggressive, although also has inbuilt 
safeguards.36 The official policy only applies Australian law to foreign nationals who voluntarily 
submit to Australian jurisdiction.37 However, Australia “has *also+ increasingly legislated for the 
Antarctic continent”38 proclaiming an EEZ adjacent to the AAT in 199439 and under the 
Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Australia) (‘EPBC Act’), declaring 
an Australian Whale Sanctuary.40 Killing, injuring and taking whales in the Sanctuary are strict liability 
offences within the EEZ41 that explicitly includes the AAT EEZ.42 An Australian Federal Court 
confirmed that these provisions apply to non-nationals in a 2008 ruling, ordering declaratory relief 
and an injunction against Kyodo Senpaku Ltd, a Japanese whaling company operating in the 
Southern Ocean.43 The case highlights the potential significance of Australian biosecurity legislation 
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 Antarctic Act 1960 (NZ), Section 3(1); Antarctic Treaty Act 1960 (Australia), Section 4(1); Antarctic (Environmental 
Protection) Act 1994 (NZ), Section 2(a); Antarctic (Environment Protection) Act 1980 (Australia), Section 4(1)(a). 
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 I Zovko, ‘Vessel sourced pollution in Southern Ocean’, in G Triggs and A Riddel (eds.), Antarctica Legal and Environmental 
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 Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977 (NZ); the legislation has never been formally 
commenced.  
35
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 Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 Proclamation, Commonwealth of Australia Gazette (Special), No. S290, Friday, 29 
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 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Protection Act 1999 (Australia)(‘EPBC Act’), Section 255. 
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 Ibid, Section 229-230. 
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 Ibid, Section 225(2), 5(1), 5(4), and 5(5); Australian Antarctic Territory Act (1954) (Australia), Section 8 and Sea and 
Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Australia), Section 10; R Baird, ‘They Said They’d Never Win: Humane Society International Inc 
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in the AAT and its attached marine zones. However, any utility to sovereign enforcement must be 
balanced by the potential to destabilise the ATS and its implicit values requiring attention to 
biosecurity considerations.44  
4.1.3 ESTABLISHED SPECIAL AREAS: PROTECTING THE SUB-ANTARCTIC 
Australia and New Zealand’s approaches to their sub-Antarctic territories45 offer an opportunity to 
assess the effectiveness of a territorial biosecurity framework over the nationality based approach in 
the Antarctic. It also offers a perspective on the objectives underlying biosecurity measures and the 
extent sovereign states have an interest in protecting environmental values in pristine areas. Where 
the areas are visited by tourist or scientific vessels en-route to the Antarctic, measures addressing 
biosecurity threats also provide a buffer to the Antarctic environment. Although the damage to 
biodiversity by NNS on some of the islands is irreversible,46 each island and island group has a 
distinct ecosystem and some are still pristine.47 Thus, as in the Antarctic, the focus of biosecurity has 
been precautionary and preventative management of pathways of introduction.  
TABLE 4.1: NUMBER OF INVASIVE SPECIES REPORTED IN SUB ANTARCTIC ISLANDS OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW 
ZEALAND
48
 
 McDonald Heard Macquarie Snares Antipodes Campbell Auckland Bounty 
Plants 0 2** 3 2 1 85 37 0 
Invertebrates 0* 2** 28 * * * * 0* 
Vertebrates 0 0 6 0 1 1 3 0 
The legal status of the areas determines the human interaction, affording the islands some of the 
most stringent protections available under domestic law.49 New Zealand Sub-Antarctic islands 
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 D K Anton, ‘Australian Jurisdiction and Whales in Antarctica: Why the Australian Whale Sanctuary in Antarctic Waters 
Does Not Pass International Legal Muster and is also a Bad Idea as Applied to Non-Nationals,’ (2008) 11 (3-4) Asia Pacific 
Journal of Environmental Law 171, 178. 
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 New Zealand also has jurisdiction over five sub-Antarctic island-groups: the Snares, Bounty Islands, Antipodes Islands, 
Auckland Islands and Campbell Islands and Australia has jurisdiction over two sub-Antarctic territories: Macquarie Island 
and the Heard and McDonald Island Group (HIMI Territory). 
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 Y Frenot et al, ‘Biological invasions in the Antarctic: extent, impacts and implications,’ (2005) 80 Biological Reviews 45, 
51. 
47
 T Tin, et al, ‘Impacts of local human activities on the Antarctic Environment,’ (2009) 21 Antarctic Science 1, 15 
48 * Unknown figure. ** These species are believed to have spread naturally. Frenot, above n 46; Ibid. 
49
 M S De Villiers, et al, ‘Conservation Management at Southern Ocean Islands: towards the Development of Best-Practice 
Guidelines’ (2006) 75 (2-3) Polarforschung 113, 116-117. 
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(‘NZSAI’) are protected as national nature reserves under the Reserves Act 1977; areas designated to 
“protect indigenous flora or fauna.”50 The Southland Conservancy of Department of Conservation 
manages the reserve51 and produced the New Zealand Sub Antarctic Island Conservation 
Management Strategy (‘NZSAI CMS’) 52 under the Conservation Act 1987. 53 The strategy includes a 
requirement to develop biosecurity procedures that are implemented in a separate plan.54 The 
terrestrial sea adjacent to the Auckland Islands is “fully protected” as a Marine Reserve55 and a 
marine mammal sanctuary by the DOC Southland Conservancy.56 Further marine protection for the 
sub-Antarctic is proposed, but has yet to be implemented.57  
The HIMI and Macquarie Island are world heritage and national heritage areas under the EPBC Act, 
which also applies to the extensive Marine Reserves adjacent to the territories.58 Under the EPBC 
Act, an individual can only engage in certain activities in accordance with a management plan.59 
However, Macquarie Island is part of the state of Tasmania and is listed as a National Park under the 
National Parks and Reserves Management Act 2002 (Tasmania). Macquarie’s Management Plan, 
produced by the Tasmanian Parks and Wildlife Service, prohibits all activity without a permit on the 
islands, and 3 nautical miles off the shore,60 and contains a strict Quarantine Management plan.61 
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 Reserves Act 1977 (NZ), Section 20 (1); in addition, the cultural and spiritual significance of the islands to iwi requires 
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 EPBC Act 1999, Section 5; T Stephens and B Boer, ‘Enforcement and Compliance in the Australian Antarctic Territory: 
Legal and Policy Dilemmas,’ in J K Kriwoken, J Jabour and A D Hemmings (eds.), Looking South: Australia’s Antarctic Agenda 
(2007), 63. 
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 EPBC Act, Section 354(1). 
60
 Tasmanian Parks and Wildlife Service, Macquarie Island Nature Reserve and World Heritage Area Management Plan 
2006 (2006) (‘Macquarie Island Management Plan’) 104; National Parks and Reserves Management Act 2002 (Australia, 
Tasmania), Section 37. 
61
 Macquarie Island Management Plan, 98. 
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Species-specific long term control measures also apply to the management of NNS on Macquarie 
Island.62 The Macquarie Island Commonwealth Marine Park63 is administered by the Director of 
National Parks under the EPBC Act, although in close cooperation with the Tasmanian State 
Government64 and the Australian Antarctic Division (‘AAD’) under a MOU.65 The Macquarie Island 
Management Plan expired in 2008 and interim management arrangements limit activities in the 
area.66 The lack of clarity between the different stakeholders has proved a challenge in practice and 
played a part in management oversights.67  
The administration of the HIMI Territory and Marine Reserve is not as complex as Macquarie Island 
with the AAD directly managing the area under the EPBC Act.68 The HIMI Marine Reserve 
Management Plan,69 prepared by the AAD, provides a unified regulatory framework and addresses 
the issue of NNS.70 In practice, Quarantine Tasmania is still responsible for implementing biosecurity 
measures on HIMI bound vessels and the legislative framework is quite convoluted.71 The EPBC 
Regulations allow for the control of a broad range of activities in the reserve but the Environmental 
Protection Management Ordinance 1987 (Australia) (‘EPMO’) makes it an offence to bring an 
organism onto the HIMI Territory without a permit72 and provides for a greater range of sanctions.73 
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Moreover, unlike the EPBC Act or Regulations, the EPMO 1987 prohibits entry into the area without 
a permit.74 Due to the national significance of the area, the EPMO 1987 is retained and takes 
precedence, unless inconsistent with the EPBC Act or Regulations.75 The remoteness and lack of 
frequent visitation could be a significant factor in the lack of NNS incidents thus far, rather than the 
effectiveness of the regulations.76 However, the HIMI Management Plan provides cohesiveness to 
the regulations and substantial provision for biosecurity.  
4.2. DOMESTIC MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL ANTARCTIC PROGRAMS  
The central role that many governments play in supporting and driving scientific activities in the 
Antarctic provides the ideal catalyst for a strong focus on biosecurity measures and the promotion of 
research supporting the management of NNS risks. Antarctica New Zealand (‘ANZ’), the New Zealand 
NAP is responsible for “managing New Zealand’s Antarctic activities.”77 The importance of the 
collective principles of the ATS in managing activities is evident in the mandate of the Crown entity. 
ANZ must act consistently with the need to conserve the intrinsic values of Antarctica and the 
Southern Ocean and active and responsible stewardship of the Ross Dependency for future 
generations.78 A draft strategic framework informs the research ANZ supports, linked together with 
the underlying theme of “global change”.79 In this framework, NNS issues are considered important: 
biosecurity is identified as an issue of National interest by the key Government end users of 
Antarctic research in 2008.80 The draft science strategy produced by the meeting includes supporting 
“biodiversity research related to the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy and New Zealand’s 
commitments to the CBD.” 81 Although no supported projects addressed the issue in the 2008/09 
season, several projects supported by ANZ have assessed risks posed by biosecurity.82 The Australian 
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Antarctic Division (‘AAD’) of the Department of the Environment, Water Heritage and the Arts 
manages Australia’s environmental obligations under the AT.83 In contrast with the support role of 
ANZ, the AAD is responsible for conducting Antarctic research directly and managing Australian 
National Research Expeditions. One of the central themes that the Australian Science Strategy 
addresses is the “*i+mpact of human activities in Antarctica”.84 In the 2008/2009 season alone, four 
projects including one coordinated by the AAD itself addressed the issue of NNS in Antarctica.85 
Despite the focus of the research, both New Zealand and Australia expose the Antarctic environment 
to a significant risk of NNS introduction through their activities. In the 2008/09 season, ANZ 
supported twenty-nine scientific events, slightly less than the thirty supported in the 2007/2008 
season.86 Scientific activities on this scale require significant support including flights, shipping and a 
permanently occupied station on Ross Island, all of which increase risks of NNS introduction.87 
Fourteen plane trips and four voyages via sea travelled into Antarctica to support the Australian 
program in the 2009/2010 season.88 Moreover, New Zealand is limited in its management capacity: 
American ships and aeroplanes play a key role in supporting New Zealand science.89 As a 
consequence, New Zealand does not have the ability to regulate all of the vectors that are involved 
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with its scientific program.90 Science also plays a key role in exposing the NZSAI to NNS as the 
greatest pressure for access comes from researchers.91 However, the Southland Conservancy of DOC 
must approve all access and prioritises research that will assist with management goals, including 
biosecurity.92 The Australian program is larger and thus exposes the environment to a higher risk of 
introducing NNS. Supporting three permanently occupied, continental stations93 with a dedicated ice 
breaker, the Aurora Australis, the AAD supported 175 projects in the 2008-09 season.94 Moreover, 
the AAD conducts and supports science in the sub-Antarctic,95 with a permanent base on Macquarie 
Island and infrequent visits to the HIMI region to conduct science and environmental management 
activities.96 Both Australia and New Zealand engage in an independently audited environmental 
management system to ensure environmental impacts are managed adequately.97  
4.2.1. PLANNING PROCESSES TO AVOID THE INTRODUCTION OF NNS 
Both States implement the planning principles of PEPAT in strategically managing environmental 
impacts of their Antarctic operations. While the legislation implements PEPAT’s biosecurity-relevant 
mechanisms without any additional requirements other than significant penalties for breaching 
provisions,98 specific biosecurity policies of both countries go beyond the explicit stipulations of 
Annex II, Article 4, integrating elements of PEPAT and their domestic quarantine systems to manage 
the risk of introducing NNS through their Antarctic operations.99 Both policies provide guiding 
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principles and substantive measures to exclude NNS risks in the planning of activity.100 However, as 
“no quarantine service is able to totally prevent the introduction of exotic organisms,”101 some risk is 
contemplated by all activity and neither State attempts to reduce or limit the scope of scientific 
activity in the Antarctic. In contrast, scientific activity in the sub-Antarctic is strictly regulated and in 
some cases, must be justified for the purpose of management goals. However, while both States 
employ a broad-ranging suite of practical biosecurity measures to protect the sub-Antarctic, the 
practical constraints with limited budgets and management capacity remain. The potential for State 
Parties to have more jurisdictional scope in the Antarctic area is offset by the utility of an area put 
aside for the “public heritage of humankind” and supervised through the diligent inspections of 
other AT Parties.  
Both States’ implementation of PEPAT’s biosecurity provisions in the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic is 
an attempt to reduce the risk of NNS introduction to “acceptable levels”.102 Neither States attempt 
to precisely define the concept,103 although both incorporate a level of precaution in assessing the 
risks associated with NNS to account for uncertainty.104 In practice, this results in a diligent but 
uneven approach to biosecurity, with some areas approached with extreme precaution and others 
neglected.105 
4.2.1.1. GATEWAYS TO ACTIVITY: ENTRY WITH CONDITIONS ATTACHED 
PEPAT’s EIA process106 allows ANZ and the AAD to evaluate planned scientific activities and approve 
projects conditional on biosecurity measures, although it is limited in its capacity to address 
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cumulative impacts and strategic planning.107 The advantage of territorial sovereignty is the capacity 
to prevent entry, demonstrated by environmentally assessed application process that strictly 
regulate the scope of science permitted in the sub-Antarctic area of both Australia and New Zealand.  
4.2.1.1.1. EIA: A LEAKY GATEWAY TO THE ANTARCTIC 
The most significant limitation in Australia and New Zealand employing the PEPAT EIA process is 
admittance of other States’ environmental approvals for activities in Australia and New Zealand’s 
disputed Antarctic territories.108 Although PEPAT requires AT Parties to take into account cumulative 
impacts of activities, without providing a mechanism for strategic planning, AT Parties are 
constrained in their impact management by the practices of other AT Parties. An example from the 
AAT is the initial direct disparity between India’s plan to build a station in the Larsemann Hills area 
and the Larsemann Hills ASMA.109 Despite AT Parties cooperating to limit cumulative effects, 
including measures to restrict the spread of NNS, another AT Party decided to unilaterally 
commence activity in the area. The issue cannot be addressed at the domestic level without 
undermining the ATS, and requires a strategic approach at the regional level. 
The extent to which Australia and New Zealand implement EIA procedures is also limited in 
applicability to biosecurity. The purpose of Part 3 of the Antarctic (Environmental Protection) Act 
1994 (NZ) is to give effect to Article 8 and Annex I of PEPAT and as such, puts into operation the EIA 
provisions of the PEPAT. The ambiguous threshold and provision for cumulative impact are not 
elaborated in the domestic legislation.110 In addition, biosecurity elements of the COMNAP EIA 
Guidelines are not invoked in the Act. Any applicants are advised to contact MFAT Antarctic Policy 
Unit who advises on EIA type and content, as well as providing examples of IEE on request.111 ANZ 
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coordinates the environmental evaluation of EIAs and advises MFAT on potential changes.112 MFAT 
has extensive powers to prevent or modify the activity proposed.113 However, the practical 
consideration of NNS in Antarctic planning is not consistent. ANZ’s IEE covers the development, 
management and execution of the New Zealand Antarctic Programme. The 2008/09 season’s IEE 
analysis of cumulative impacts of the program identifies the understudied “contamination of benthic 
biota” as a cause for concern114 but does not make explicit reference to the introduction of NNS in 
this context despite almost all EIA submitted to MFAT making reference to measures taken to avoid 
introducing NNS.115  
In addition, the effectiveness of the EIA in proactively addressing risks associated with New Zealand 
science is limited by scientists relying on ANZ’s biosecurity procedures. Most scientific operators 
carry out a Preliminary Evaluation, standardised by ANZ into a template.116 The template requires 
detailing mitigation measures taken to avoid the unintentional introduction of NNS.117 In practice, 
this often invokes the requirements in the environmental code of conduct118, rather than providing 
any additional measures to be taken.119 New Zealand has completed two CEEs for scientific projects: 
the multinational Cape Roberts Scientific Drilling Project and the multinational ANDRILL project. The 
latter refers to “normal procedures” taken to avoid the possibility of introducing NNS.120  
The Australian EIA regulations also provide for the Annex I EIA process.121 Unlike New Zealand, other 
legislation has an impact on the EIA process, although does not appear to substantively alter the 
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nature of the obligations under PEPAT.122 Guidelines provided by the AAD remain textually close to 
the ATS guidelines, yet do not explicitly require identification of biosecurity measures.123 The 
guidelines also stress “indirect and offsite impacts”, indicating the potential application to activities 
that might introduce NNS.124 Similar to ANZ, AAD will apply “conditions” requiring mitigating 
measures125 and it is an offence under the EPBC Act to breach a condition attached to the approval 
of an activity.126 However, the standard template for the Preliminary Assessment, filled out by all 
non-government organisations, requires consideration of cumulative impacts and the handling of 
ballast water, as well as mitigation measures, but does not explicitly require the consideration of 
potential NNS introduction.127 Of the 31 IEEs prepared by Australia, only a few of the impact 
matrixes make reference to the NNS risks involved in the particular activity.128 The relevant matrix 
mentions the introduction of contingency plans and equipment that has since been introduced for 
stations and field operations.129 However, Australia also displays evidence of relying on its 
quarantine management system rather than consistently identifying NNS issues.130 The IEE prepared 
for the introduction of an air transport network and upgraded organic waste management includes 
monitoring regimes that do not focus on NNS.131 This lack of consideration is a further example of 
the inconsistent application of biosecurity measures across PEPAT tools. 
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4.2.1.1.2 PERMITS: A SOLID GATEWAY TO THE SUB-ANTARCTIC  
The limitations of the Antarctic jurisdictional approach are demonstrated in the effectiveness of the 
territorial approaches in the sub-Antarctic where access is strictly regulated, requiring a permit from 
a relevant authority.132 As well as allowing managers to decide whether their research will justify the 
inevitable risk of NNS introduction, 133 the restriction empowers authorities to require biosecurity 
measures being taken, conditional on the permit. 134 Both States implement significant precautionary 
limitations on scientific activity in their sub-Antarctic areas, although with varying degrees of 
application. 
The freedom of passage through marine areas is not restricted in the NZSAI. Anyone is permitted to 
enter the Auckland Islands Marine Reserve135 and scientists may engage in certain non-invasive 
scientific activities without a permit, exposing the environment to potentially threatening NNS 
carried on ship surfaces and equipment without required decontamination procedures.136 However, 
certain sampling techniques require permits and allow DOC to place conditions on entry.137 New 
Zealand imposes strict precautions on its scientific activities on the islands: all researchers must 
apply for a number of permits including an entry permit and an activity or “concession permit” 
conditional on “ensuring proper quarantine measures”.138 Entering the area without this permit is an 
offence.139 Research will only be permitted on certain islands if the science supports management 
measures and biosecurity is the preeminent management focus of the NZSAI Research Strategy.140 
Quarantine procedures include a day either side of arrival and departure to “pack, clean and 
quarantine expedition gear” 141 at a quarantine store that, in turn, has its own Quarantine Plan 
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excluding NNS.142 Waste management, ballast and hull fouling requirements and inspection and 
monitoring processes are also conditional on the permit.143 To “ensure permit conditions, 
particularly those mitigating quarantine risk...are adhered to”, all visits must be accompanied by a 
DOC representative.144 However, the Southland Conservancy Board notes that the quarantine 
measures are “basic” in comparison to those employed at Macquarie Island,145 although the 
accuracy of these comments is disputable.146 
The Australian permit process also incorporates biosecurity measures, but less directly than the New 
Zealand process. Any scientific research in a Commonwealth reserve without a permit is an 
offence147 unless it complies with a management plan for that reserve.148 This includes the HIMI and 
Macquarie Marine Reserves. Moreover, the precautionary approach149 must be considered when 
granting a permit.150 As previously mentioned, the EPMO 1987 requires a permit for entry. 
Macquarie Island is a restricted area under the National Parks and Reserves Management Act 2002 
(Tasmania)151 and as such, also requires a permit for entry. In addition, any research must be 
approved by the Tasmanian Parks and Wildlife service.152 Given the permanent AAD station and the 
role the AAD has in regulating Antarctic and sub-Antarctic science, Tasmanian authorities are limited 
in their capacity to prevent scientific activity occurring.153 However, the AAD operations are as 
strictly regulated as New Zealand operations, ensuring a quarantine approved premise is used for 
cargo consolidation and that154 “all materials, equipment, transport and foodstuffs must be suitably 
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cleaned and/or fumigated.”155 Permits will not be issued without “a valid deratting certificate or 
deratting exception certificate recognised by AQIS.”156 The same level of quarantine is engaged in as 
the Australian Antarctic operations, including ozone treatment of produce and the use of quarantine 
detector dogs.157 The Parks and Wildlife Service also issues permits for the AAD to engage in 
limited158 hydroponics operations. They justify the use of NNS, with the lesser reliance on fresh 
produce on the island, which is a common carrier of NNS.159 HIMI is virtually pristine and predictably 
has more stringent quarantine conditions than Macquarie or the NZSAI.160 As well as most of those 
applicable to Macquarie, the HIMI Management Plan issues a ban on landing eggs, poultry meat, 
untreated timber, routing to the island from ports outside Australia161 and wearing ashore outer 
clothing previously used elsewhere.162 In addition to these processes, both New Zealand and 
Australia employ waste management, inspection and monitoring processes and response measures 
targeting NNS in their Antarctic and sub-Antarctic operations. 
EIA processes also play a key role in the sub-Antarctic; both States requiring EIAs for major 
infrastructure developments and some scientific activities.163 The AAD requires sub-Antarctic 
scientists to go through the same EIA process as Antarctic scientists, although there is no indication 
any more focus is drawn to biosecurity.164 A Preliminary Assessment template required before entry 
into the HIMI Territory assesses impacts of wastes, flora, fauna and ecological functioning as well as 
assessing whether the impacts will be cumulative and significant, but does not explicitly identify 
NNS.165 Moreover, the EPBC Act 1994 assessment and approval provisions apply to those activities 
which will or are likely to significantly impact world heritage areas.166 This is likely to have application 
to infrastructure development and allows DEWHA to make an informed judgment on the impact of 
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an action.167 However, the impact assessment and evaluation of scientific utility provided through 
the permit process is a more effective barrier to exposing the sub-Antarctic to NNS than those 
employed in the Antarctic. 
4.2.1.2. PROTECTING SENSITIVE AREAS: PERFECTING THE BALANCE 
The balance between the limitations of jurisdiction by nationality and the problems with territorial 
sovereignty over an area are demonstrated in the domestic management of special areas. Under 
New Zealand and Australian law, the whole of the Antarctic area is a “natural reserve”.168 While the 
protection afforded is less than is provided in domestic national parks and reserves, collective 
management allows for different perspectives on a common goal.169  
In particular, the ATS process allows AT Parties to propose sites for management. Twenty-seven 
ASPAs are in place in the AAT and Ross Dependency and 2 ASMAs, approximately 78% of which were 
originally proposed by Australia or New Zealand.170 Entering a protected area or acting contrary to 
the Management Plan for an ASMA or ASPA is an offence under the Antarctic (Environmental 
Protection) Act 1994 (NZ) and the Antarctic (Environmental Protection) Act 1980 (Australia),171 
allowing any AT Party to limit activity and enforce NNS measures that must be applied by New 
Zealand and Australian operators.172 Where appropriately implemented, this also means other AT 
Parties will legislate and enforce measures proposed by Australia and New Zealand once the 
consultation process is completed.173 The CEP process provides for consistency but the variety of 
sources removes the potential for bias in a single State’s approach. The high percentage of input 
from the territorial claimant State illustrates the relevance and importance of the frozen territorial 
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claims in protecting the area. Significant restrictions limit activity and research in the areas. For 
example, in the New Zealand nominated Sabrina Island, researchers must demonstrate a 
“compelling scientific purpose which cannot be served elsewhere.” 174 However, the biosecurity 
content of the area plans and implementation by AT Parties remains inconsistent.175 
Certain parts of the NZSAI, Macquarie Island and HIMI Territory are limited to researchers and 
require additional permitting processes and quarantine measures for access.176 The limitation of 
access reduces the risk of NNS introduction by creating baseline monitored and excluded biological 
communities. The NZSAI CMS categorises the NZSAI into “minimum impact” (pristine) and “refuge” 
islands177 based on their “ecosystem condition and vulnerability to disturbance,”178 which is defined 
according to the presence or absence of non-native mammals.179 The only research permitted on a 
minimum impact island is “for essential management purposes and can include monitoring of 
changes and identification of biological values.”180 The Macquarie Island management plan limits 
access to certain times of the year and requires additional permits to enter “Special Management 
Areas” to protect breeding species and their habitat. 181 The island is also zoned, with two zones 
allocated for servicing scientific operations, one just for approved data collecting and management 
programs and the other allowing in addition the erecting of infrastructure.182  
The sub-Antarctic’s designation under several international conventions highlights the utility of 
international designation in protecting areas. All of the areas are protected as “Natural World 
Heritage Areas”183 under the World Heritage Convention creating an obligation to report on threats 
to the natural values of areas to the international forum.184 In addition, domestic legislation creates 
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additional responsibilities for internationally protected areas.185 The EPBC Act requires all zones 
within Commonwealth reserves and Commonwealth reserves to be categorised according to the 
IUCN system.186 The EPBC Regulations state that strict nature reserves should be managed primarily 
for scientific research and environmental monitoring and public access may be limited.187 IUCN 
management principles adopted by the EPBC Regulations include the precautionary principle “where 
there is a threat of serious or irreversible damage” and ecologically sustainable use, where “the 
benefit of the use of the present generation should not diminish the potential or of the reserve to 
meet the needs and aspirations of future generations.”188 The territory and the marine area of the 
HIMI reserve are also zoned and all seven areas are categorised as strict nature reserves and 
although not listed, the areas are managed according to Ramsar principles.189 The World Heritage 
listing and the application of international conservation principles has significant implications on 
how the areas are treated and invokes international reporting standards promoting compliance.190 
4.2.1.3. WASTE SYSTEM: INTRODUCING NNS INTO THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT SINCE 1959 
The presence of permanent bases in the Antarctic and regular scientific activity means a large 
amount of potentially NNS-hosting waste. The ATS does not require the removal191 but most of that 
waste, including the biologically sensitive waste, is removed or incinerated in the Australian and New 
Zealand operations.192 However, it is the one aspect of the two State’s operations where NNS are 
indirectly but intentionally released into the Antarctic environment.193 New Zealand and Australia 
treat and pump sewage into the waters surrounding Antarctica and New Zealand allows field parties 
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to directly dispose of sewage into the ocean.194 The reason Annex III does not prohibit the release of 
NNS into the Antarctic environment is because entirely removing the wastes or completely 
eliminating NNS is currently unfeasible.195 Scott Base’s treatment system, including ultra violet 
disinfection before disposal, mitigates against the biosecurity threat but does not remove it 
entirely.196 Australia removes its sludge from the sewage plants for disposal in Australia and is 
trialling the introducing of UV sterilisation to all stations.197  
In contrast, waste management is not treated as a significant risk in the sub-Antarctic and lesser 
standards are employed. Similar to the Antarctic, NNS are intentionally but indirectly introduced into 
the environment through human and food waste. Unlike the HIMI and NZSAI, Macquarie Island has 
to deal with the waste from a permanently occupied base. The Macquarie Management Plan 
requires the treatment of sewage and grey water with maceration and releasing it into the ocean, 
“until such time that an alternative method is available.”198 However, quarantine standards are 
introduced for risky products: waste foodstuffs, plants or plant material which may germinate and 
sprout must be disposed of in a way previously approved that will ensure they will not “grow in the 
reserve.”199 Poultry products or brassica200 waste may not be disposed into the waters of the 
reserve.201 The HIMI management plan includes similar provisions, although provides for the 
reasonable disposal obliquely. All waste must be securely stored during a visit and then removed on 
departure202 apart from human wastes which must be either incinerated according to the approved 
procedure or “disposed where rapid marine dispersal is possible or at least in a way that minimises 
                                                          
194
 ANZ Waste Handbook, 31; Australia, Upgrade of organic waste management equipment, procedures and associated 
infrastructure at Australia’s Antarctic stations: IEE (2008), ATS EIA Database, 
<http://www.ats.aq/documents/EIA/01090enUpgrade%20of%20organic%20waste%20management%20IEE_final2_mt08.p
df> 1 August 2009, 14. 
195
 See Chapter 3; Australia, ibid, 31-32. 
196
 New Zealand, IEE for Scott Base Wastewater Treatment (2001) EIA Database, 
<http://www.ats.aq/documents/EIA/00550enFinal%20IEE%20WWTP.pdf> 7. 
197
 Australia, Upgrade of organic waste management equipment, procedures and associated infrastructure at Australia’s 
Antarctic stations: IEE (2008), ATS EIA Database, <http://www.ats.aq/documents/EIA/ 
01090enUpgrade%20of%20organic%20waste%20management%20IEE_final2_mt08.pdf> 1 August 2009, 14. 
198
 Macquarie Island Management Plan, 117. 
199
 Macquarie Island Management Plan, 99. 
200
 The brassica family includes swedes, turnips, cabbage, brussel sprouts, cauliflower, broccoli, and mustard seed.  
201
 Macquarie Management Plan, 99. 
202
 HIMI Management Plan, [6.3.6].  
162 
 
impacts on wildlife, water bodies and vegetation.”203 In practice, operational considerations might 
override any serious consideration of potential NNS introduction, without clear directions on how to 
dispose of waste. 
The NZSAI Quarantine Plan is even less strict, allowing toilet and biodegradable wastes to be buried 
fifteen centimetres deep or disposed of at sea.204 In contrast, the NZSAI Expedition Procedures 
require all biodegradable rubbish to be removed from the islands.205 Additional precautions must be 
taken with high risk foods206 that must be removed from the islands.207 At the time of writing, the 
discrepancies between the NZSAI Quarantine Plan and Expedition Procedures are in the process of 
being revised.208 Moreover, no waste disposal is permitted in the Auckland Island Marine Reserve.209  
4.2.1.4. PREVENTING NNS IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 
The paucity of marine biosecurity provisions in the international and regional legal framework puts a 
particular onus on AT Parties taking proactive approaches to the issue. Both Australia and New 
Zealand employ specific biosecurity measures to their Antarctic and sub-Antarctic activity, although 
do not extend the precautionary approach demonstrated in their approach to terrestrial NNS. In 
addition, vessels supplying the Australian and New Zealand NAPs will usually dock in Australian and 
New Zealand ports prior to departure to the Antarctic and are subject to the significant domestic 
controls on marine NNS.210 However, most of these regulations focus on the potential damage to 
domestic biosecurity and although offering effective protection to the sub-Antarctic areas, the 
Antarctic is left relatively unprotected.  
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Other than implementing responsibilities under Annex IV of the AT, relevant sections of the IMO 
Pollution Conventions 211 and recommending consistency with the Practical Guidelines for Ballast 
Exchange in the AT Area,212 Australia does not take any formal measures to minimise the risk of 
introduction of NNS into the Antarctic environment from ballast water or bio-fouling. However, 
Australia has developed a strategic focus on managing NNS in the marine environment with a Centre 
for Research on Introduced Marine Pests introduced in 1994 and a cooperative interstate agreement 
in 2005.213 The National Introduced Pests Coordination Group, with partners from government, 
industry and environmental NGOs, is responsible for implementing the agreement and has been 
involved in the production of a number of guidelines with relevance to the biofouling of ship 
surfaces. In contrast, New Zealand expressly addresses the protection of the Antarctic marine 
environment with specific conditions into its permits for fisheries and tourist operations in the 
Antarctic.214 Both are also in the process of developing ballast water management practices to ratify 
the Ballast Water Convention.215  
The current system employed by both countries is consistent with the comparatively lower 
standards of IMO’s Ballast Water Guidelines.216 Although neither country permits the discharge of 
untreated ballast water or sediment into their territorial seas,217 open water ballast water exchange 
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is accepted as the most common treatment,218 using the methods prescribed by the IMO.219 The 
limited effectiveness of the open water ballast exchange method or limiting discharge in sensitive 
high seas areas are not provided for under the regulations. The compliance mechanisms include pre-
arrival notification to the biosecurity agency220 and if ballast water is being exchanged in domestic 
waters, reporting criteria221 effectively protect domestic waters but do little to offer a buffer to the 
Antarctic. However, the focus is on domestic protection. Neither provides any restrictions around 
the uptake of water in sensitive areas, urged in the Ballast Water Guidelines.222 Moreover, New 
Zealand’s existing measures are focussed on the process of open water exchange encouraging token 
compliance, rather than the Ballast Water Standard provided under the BWM Convention.223 This 
reduces the utility of the area of a buffer, in particular not deterring against the uptake of NNS from 
the New Zealand or Australian environments. New Zealand and Australia’s imminent 
implementation of the additional requirements of the BWM Convention will go some way to 
minimise the risks surrounding the uptake of ballast water with NNS.224 However, New Zealand has 
expressly declared, if ratified, it will exercise its right under the BWM Convention and not apply the 
strict standards to ships registered in New Zealand and operating within waters under its 
jurisdiction. 225 As the BWM Convention also permits an exemption for vessels operating between 
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flag states and the high seas, it is unclear whether New Zealand intends to apply this exemption to 
ships operating in Antarctic waters.226  
Reflecting the lack of guidance from the international system, neither New Zealand nor Australia has 
binding rules regulating bio-fouling. However, both Australia and New Zealand have analysed the 
risks associated with hull fouling and introduced non-binding guidelines to address the elimination of 
NNS risks.227 However, the implementation of any binding restrictions without international 
agreement is unlikely228 and the AFS Convention does little to enforce alternative treatment 
options.229 Some progress has been made towards regulating alternative treatment-technologies to 
minimise the risk of introducing NNS.230 The Australian and New Zealand Environment and 
Conservation Council (‘ANZECC’) prepared a code of practice in response to perceived risks 
surrounding the in-water treatment of hulls.231 Prior to undertaking any in-water cleaning, approval 
must be gained from the relevant state/territory authority and conditions may be imposed under 
the Code. In particular: no debris removed must be allowed to pass into the water column.232 
Unfortunately, the risks surrounding in water cleaning may not exceed a fouled hull and the 
regulations may increase the likelihood of introducing NNS without adequate treatment facilities, 
which are costly to maintain and offer some significant operational hurdles.233 The ANZECC code is 
currently under review because of these issues.234   
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Occasionally, the sub-Antarctic poses an additional buffer for scientific vessels, particularly 
Macquarie Island which is sometimes supplied on the way to Australia’s continental bases.235 New 
Zealand’s approach to sub-Antarctic marine protection is outlined in the Marine Protected Areas 
Policy and Implementation Plan.236 The protection of NZSAI marine areas is currently in the 
consultation stage and the risk of bio-invasion is identified as a priority area.237 Currently DOC has no 
jurisdiction over ships sailing or anchoring near most of the sub-Antarctic islands238 but the New 
Zealand prohibition on discharging ballast without preapproval apply to the sub-Antarctic and it is 
very unlikely approval would be given to any discharge proximal to a sub-Antarctic island. In 2006, 
invasive Asian seaweed was found at the Snares Islands.239 Since then permits to land on the NZSAI 
are conditional on being inspected and certified clean less than 28 days before landing on the 
island.240 These provisions will not be effective until biosecurity protection is extended to the 
territorial seas of all the sub-Antarctic islands. 
In contrast to New Zealand’s marine protected areas, the Macquarie Island Management Plan 
specifically prohibits the discharge of any ballast water within the territorial sea.241 The policy also 
urges protection against hull fouling.242 To ensure this, Tasmanian officials “ensure that any small 
boats or barges have undergone hull inspection and thorough cleaning prior to entering the waters 
of the reserve.”243 The HIMI Management Plan utilises zoning restrictions to prohibiting ballast water 
exchange or discharge within the territorial sea or “inner marine zone”.244 It also requires all vessels, 
small craft and ship’s equipment regularly in contact with the water to be treated or cleaned to 
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eliminate fouling communities.245 Various hull fouling management measures have been 
recommended for ships likely to operate in the Macquarie Island Marine Park,246 including in-water 
hull cleaning, annual dry-docking and offseason lay-up in fresh water.247 The high costs, 
impracticalities and difficulty in meeting ANZECC standards make the practical implementation of 
these recommendations unlikely.248 Nevertheless, the Biosecurity Act 1993 and Quarantine Act 1908 
empower biosecurity officers and quarantine officers to board and if the ship is suspected of 
breaching ballast water management practices or being in an “insanitary condition” to detain 
without warrant.249 Moreover, it is likely with the implementation of the Ballast Water Convention 
and increasing protection shown to Highly Valued Areas,250 further protection will be afforded the 
sub-Antarctic marine areas, particularly surrounding the NZSAI. Similar provisions could have utility 
in the Antarctic, although AT Parties can only implement provisions in relation to their own vessels.  
4.2.1.5. PLANNING TO RESPOND 
Once a NNS is identified in the Antarctic environment, PEPAT creates an obligation for Parties to 
remove or dispose of it,251 especially if the incident is classified as an environmental emergency.252 
The preparation of contingency plans is also required as part of the Annex II permitting-process but 
overall, PEPAT lacks a strategic reactive component to NNS issues. This poses a particular issue 
where many States are operating in the same area and States are only responsible for their own 
activities. In the sub-Antarctic, confused jurisdictional arrangements have resulted in significant 
debate over the cost of response measures.253 The lack of “ownership” could be particularly difficult 
in the context of a larger invasive incident in the Antarctic, especially where high costs are involved. 
There is no additional provision in either Australia or New Zealand’s domestic legislation for the 
Antarctic that provides any obligations around the response to NNS introduction. Both have policy 
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that deals with the issue substantively, although largely rely on reactive management plans. The 
limited international provision for response is nevertheless fully implemented in the sub-Antarctic. 
Short term contingency measures exist to address NNS once identified and long term management 
plans are in place for some of the existing NNS.  
The domestic framework for New Zealand provides integrated response structures at various levels 
of governance.254 Australia is in the process of better integrating its response processes through 
AusBIOSEC.255 However, in the Antarctic, it is the Australian program that has developed practical 
contingency plans and prepared kits for the introduction of NNS.256 New Zealand has not yet put any 
procedures or contingency measures into place to respond to a potential invasion in the Antarctic, 
although the ANZ Biosecurity Policy does provide for “monitoring and control systems (e.g. traps) 
*being+ maintained as required”.257 Australia has several systems in place to ensure sufficient 
analysis is performed on any observed non-native species or animal disease outbreak. Each station, 
ship and major field camp is provided an “Unusual Animal Mortality Response kit” and an alien 
invertebrate collection kit, providing all the requisite materials to collect data in the field or station 
on observation of an alien species.258 Moreover, expeditoneers are required to utilise the AAD’s 
incident reporting scheme to report discoveries of introduced species, soil contamination of 
equipment and supplier non-compliance with environmental requirements.259 However, neither 
provide for practical response measures to be evaluated and decided in the case of introduction.  
Given the considerable costs of sub-Antarctic extermination,260 all the sub-Antarctic islands have 
contingency plans in case of invasive introductions. In particular, the AAD has developed a particular 
plan to deal with “unusual animal deaths or disease outbreaks.” In the interim between preparing a 
tailored response to the issue, the AAD will rely on the Draft Response Plan for the Discovery of 
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Unusual Animal Deaths.261 Standing permits exist for the collection of sick or dying animals,262 site 
access must be immediately restricted for containment263 and a response team must be immediately 
set up to take further action.264 This is supported by the Macquarie and HIMI Management plans, 
which introduce specific contingency plans in the case of introductions and long term strategy for 
the control of established NNS.265 Importantly, while both introduce hierarchical approaches to the 
management of NNS based on eradication, surveillance and control, the need to consider 
proportional response is highlighted in the HIMI plan.266 The eradication of cats on Macquarie has 
arguably led to more severe ecological damage than posed by the NNS and highlights the need to 
take measured and proportional response to established NNS.267 Any eradication operation in a 
Commonwealth Reserve must engage in the EIA approval process of the EPBC Act 1999, as well as 
the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority.268 However, the considerable costs 
associated with long term control and overlap in jurisdiction has limited management steps on 
Macquarie Island.269 The issues forecast the potential difficulties AT Parties will face if a NNS invades 
the Antarctic and highlight the need to establish clear international contingency plans for all possible 
situations. 
A potential best practice system is in place in the NZSAI Island Biosecurity Plan, which includes a 
comprehensive contingency plan in the case of pest invasion that is triggered by the detection or 
suspicion of a pest species.270 In the case of introductions into the NZSAI, no “pre-set plan” is in place 
to respond to an introduction271 but most of the sub-Antarctic islands are “minimum-impact”, 
implying the islands will be defined with a “high consequence of pest invasion” and a plan will 
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implemented quickly.272 The lack of immediate measures, including restricting access to the areas 
and stand-by permits, as provided for in the AAD Draft Response Plan for the Discovery of Unusual 
Animal Deaths, is a weakness in the plan but is mitigated by the fast-tracked procedure for 
management. The NZSAI Operational Procedure also requires the management of NNS plants by 
scientific expeditions to the islands. In the case of identification, it provides for directly reporting the 
incident and potential first response contingency measures that can be employed under direction 
and approval of DOC.273 Moreover, weed management kits are in place for all of the sub-Antarctic 
islands.274 
4.2.2. ALL EYES OPEN: EDUCATION, SURVEILLANCE AND INSPECTIONS 
Both Australia and New Zealand implement significant administrative and criminal sanctions for 
breaching the implementing legislation.275 However, education and effective surveillance are the 
most important aspects of compliance in the isolated Antarctic area.276 Monitoring and inspection 
processes are the only mechanisms created by PEPAT to ensure compliance with domestic 
biosecurity policy and PEPAT and comprehensive implementation should also ensure that any 
introductions into frequently used areas in the Antarctic are identified promptly. At the points of 
entry into the continent, New Zealand and Australia collaborate with domestic biosecurity agencies 
to inspect and decontaminate Antarctic-bound materials to ensure compliance with biosecurity 
objectives.277 However, in the Antarctic area, monitoring is the responsibility of the proponent of 
activity and although inspection processes provide additional objective analysis of activities, these 
are not designed to specifically identify risks associated with NNS.278 Sub-Antarctic operations have 
much more comprehensive monitoring processes and target the issues associated with self-
regulation by introducing third party inspections. 
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Within the domestic framework, both New Zealand and Australia closely monitor all major pathways 
into their countries.279 Border control is the focus of surveillance mechanisms in both jurisdictions 
but New Zealand is also developing a comprehensive biosecurity surveillance strategy to identify 
pests and diseases accidentally introduced into the New Zealand environment.280 Both States’ sub-
Antarctic management processes involve a number of targeted NNS monitoring processes.281 The 
World Heritage status of the sub-Antarctic islands282 put a particular onus on Australia and New 
Zealand to monitor areas of high risk for NNS presence.283 In the NZSAI, DOC engages in independent 
monitoring and requires scientists to replenish rodent monitoring stations and gather incidental 
observations and data on NNS.284 Both the Macquarie Island and HIMI Plans require the AAD to 
perform NNS monitoring activities.285 The HIMI Territory puts a particular onus on the AAD to 
engage in regular comprehensive surveys and laying of rodent bait and traps at the landing area.286 
The States also ensure that third parties are involved in inspection processes, promoting compliance 
and accountability.287 
Similar measures for the Antarctic area are not in place. Both science strategies focus on monitoring 
human impacts on the environment but neither biosecurity policy identifies systematic surveillance 
operations addressing NNS in the Antarctic environment or incorporating biosecurity into inspection 
processes.288 New Zealand and Australia have monitored for the presence of NNS in their inspections 
under the AT and PEPAT, but have not done so consistently.289 Other than the text of the Protocol 
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requiring “regular and effective monitoring of ongoing activities”290, the Antarctic Environmental 
Protection Act 1994 (New Zealand) does not provide for additional monitoring responsibilities. The 
Australian provision requires additional monitoring for activities requiring an IEE291 but otherwise 
does not identify a surveillance system.292 ANZ’s biosecurity policy only provides “monitoring and 
control systems (e.g. traps) are maintained as required” implying surveillance systems are only 
triggered in responding to an invasive incident.293 The need for targeted, post-border environmental 
monitoring programs has been identified but not implemented by either of the AT Parties.294 
However, both the AAD and ANZ put a strong emphasis on education and training of personnel to 
disseminate information on risks associated with NNS. Both issue a code of conduct that includes 
advice on decontaminating equipment, clothes and personal effects and invokes the limitations on 
intentional introductions in Annex II of PEPAT.295 Suppliers are also made aware of biosecurity 
standards by both programs.296 DOC has produced a similar Minimum Impact Code for the NZSAI, 
also urging visitors to take care between landings not to transport seeds and dirt.297 However, HIMI, 
Macquarie and NZSAI measures are all subject to the prioritisation of limited resources298 and the 
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self-regulation of managers, potentially resulting in operational interests being put ahead of 
environmental policy interests.299 In Tasmania and the NZSAI, the regular presence of third party 
observers may mitigate against the possibility of operators “taking short cuts,”300 but in HIMI 
Territory, the AAD is usually the only operator present at the time of activity.301 The role of 
education and awareness measures is essential but should complement more comprehensive and 
independent monitoring and inspection processes.  
The potential for gateway implementation of biosecurity control is reflected in the activities of both 
States. In addition to inspections of their own Antarctic programs, both Parties exercise the 
considerable discretion to enforce quarantine measures on air and sea vessels before entry to 
port.302 The close interaction between AQIS and MAFBNZ, especially for the purpose of aircraft 
disinfection, is a model for other Gateway ports in identifying and targeting biosecurity risks in a 
strategic and cohesive pattern. To target pathways covered by sovereign immunity, Australia 
expressly requires visiting military to arrive free from quarantine risk material and provides for 
offshore and port inspections to ensure compliance303 and detailed procedures for limiting of 
biosecurity threats from aircrafts claiming sovereign immunity without physical inspection.304 A 
strategic approach to departure state control is not employed by either party but the domestic port 
state procedures offer some potential for the development of port state control for the Antarctic 
area. 
4.2.3. SUMMARY OF NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN IMPLEMENTATION OF BIOSECURITY 
ON NAPS IN ANTARCTICA AND THE SUB-ANTARCTIC 
New Zealand and Australian engage in considerable scientific activity in the Antarctic and sub-
Antarctic and in doing so expose the environment to a significant risk of NNS introduction. The 
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presence of permanent bases in Antarctica and Macquarie Island, with the necessity of regular 
resupply, increases the risks of NNS introduction significantly and a comprehensive, strategic 
biosecurity framework is necessary to minimize risks. The nature of the inspection process and 
collective management promotes compliance and best practice, and both countries have acted 
consistently with their international obligations with a suite of practical mitigation measures aimed 
at reducing the risks of introducing NNS to the Antarctic environment through their scientific 
programs. Gaps still remain, in particular the developing rules surrounding biofouling and the lack of 
integration with other States processes. New Zealand’s adoption of a risk-based approach to their 
biosecurity policy in Antarctica, in the context of a more international response, could prove 
invaluable. The domestic processes around NNS management also provide a vital buffer to the 
Antarctic environment, although are not designed to address the issue and do not effectively 
minimise risks in their current form. The primary biosecurity provisions of the sub-Antarctic are 
more comprehensive; however, the practical implementation of the system varies.305 Gaps also 
remain in the protection of the marine environment, particularly in the NZSAI where virtually no 
additional protection is afforded the territorial seas outside of the Auckland Island Marine Reserve. 
Collective management in the Antarctic has its issues but could result in a more effective biosecurity 
regime than provided in domestic regimes. 
4.3. DOMESTIC REGULATION OF ANTARCTIC TOURISM 
The large proportion of tourist vessels flagged to non-AT party states challenge the utility of AT 
Parties jurisdiction over their nationals in the Antarctic. The extent Australia and New Zealand can 
manage tourist activities in the Ross Dependency and AAT is limited by the jurisdictional 
compromise of the AT and thus relies on the compliance of the industry.306 In contrast, tourist 
activity is addressed in the sub-Antarctic with a significant level of precaution. 
Although the activities associated with tourism present additional vectors for NNS introduction, 
tourism is not a pressing issue in the New Zealand and Australian claimed sectors of the AT area. 
Visits to the AAT and the Ross Dependency made up less than 3% of the total tourist numbers in the 
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2008/9 season and unlike the Peninsula, numbers are unlikely to increase.307 In addition, only four 
Australian308 flagged tourist ships operated in the Antarctic and only two operators based outside of 
Australia and New Zealand visited continental sites in the 2008/09 season.309  However, the risks are 
still present; the Ross Dependency is the focus of tourist activity in the continental region with sites 
visited 3500 times in the 2008/9 season, compared with 513 to the AAT.310 Eight tourist vessels will 
visit the New Zealand and Australian territory in the 2009-2010 season by sea.311 Moreover, the 
jurisdictional ambiguity means AT Parties only have limited control over the unique biosecurity 
threats posed by tourist activity.312 
Although tourism plays a significant role in the sub-Antarctic of both countries, the activity is treated 
with a more exacting application of the precautionary principle than scientific activity.313 Most sub-
Antarctic islands that allow tourism have dedicated sites that are carefully monitored with strict 
quarantine standards. Some tourist vessels visit the more accessible sub-Antarctic islands on the way 
to Antarctica; others focus only on the islands.314 A significant number of tourists visit Macquarie 
Island315 and NZSAI316 annually but only 202 tourists on six vessels visited Heard Island from 1995 to 
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2004. As with science, any tourist activity in the areas must be approved by the relevant 
governmental agency. 317  
TABLE 4.2: 2008/2009 IAATO TOURIST VESSELS FROM AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AND OPERATIONAL IN 
CONTINENTAL REGION
318
 
Vessel Vessel 
Registry 
Operator 
State 
Area visited Capacity Number 
of 
Voyages 
Number of 
Passengers 
Activities 
Australis Australia Australia All regions 9 (Yacht) 3 26 Zodiac, 
kayak, 
climbing 
Bremen Bahamas Germany All regions 164 4 130 Zodiac 
Kapitan 
Khlbenikov 
Russia United 
States 
All regions 108 3 68 Zodiac, 
helicopter 
Marina 
Svetaeva 
Russia Australia Continental/ 
Ross sea 
108 2 204 Zodiac, 
helicopter 
Orion Bahamas Australia Continental/ 
Ross sea 
106 3 288 Zodiac 
Philos Australia Australia All regions 5 (Yacht) 1 4 Zodiac 
Polar 
Pioneer 
Russia Australia Peninsula 56 10 511 Zodiac, 
kayak, 
camping, 
climbing, 
diving 
Sarsen Australia Australia Peninsula 15 1 8 Zodiac 
Spirit of 
Enderby 
Russia New 
Zealand 
Continental/ 
Ross sea 
48 5 140 Zodiac, 
hovercraft 
Spirit of 
Sydney 
Australia Australia (All regions)  8 (Yacht) 1 7 Zodiac 
 
4.3.1 PLANNING TOURISM TO PREVENT NNS  
The methods employed to regulate tourist activities from New Zealand and Australia governs the 
capacity of the States to minimize biosecurity threats. The concept of a national reserve or park in 
domestic law is often closely affiliated with rights surrounding recreational use and tourism319 and 
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both in the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic, Australia and New Zealand are committed to the legitimacy 
of tourism as an activity.320 However, both are also committed to ensuring that tourist activities are 
adequately regulated by the ATS,321 avoiding any further expansion of the industry or the erection of 
any permanent infrastructure.322 The New Zealand policy on tourism indicates a commitment to “the 
highest possible prevention of incident standards”323 and the Australian policy commits to “effective 
quarantine measures,”324 promoting a focus on biosecurity measures for tourism. All New Zealand 
and Australian operators are members of IAATO invoking the decontamination standards and 
reporting requirements of the industry organization. However, other than limiting the scope and 
supervising tourist activity, Australia and New Zealand do not apply additional quarantine measures 
to tourist vessels in the Antarctic, relying on the IAATO decontamination standards. In contrast, 
area-specific tools have been developed to manage tourism in the sub-Antarctic. 
4.3.2.1 KEYS TO THE GATE: TOURIST EIA 
Both Australia and New Zealand go beyond the requirements of the ATS to limit the scope of tourist 
activity and ensure biosecurity measures are taken. The AAD and MFAT require tourist and non-
governmental expeditions to go through an environmental approval process consisting of Advance 
Notice, EIA, conditional approval and a Post-Visit Report Form.325 One EIA form for an operator is 
filled out each season, with details of all planned voyages and activities.326 Both MFAT and AAD 
advise consulting the COMNAP Guidelines. Although there is no provision in the legislation requiring 
consistency, conditions are often imposed to ensure the Guidelines are abided by.327 Templates of all 
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of the documents are provided to operators, promoting specific mitigation measures to avoid NNS 
introduction. The AAD impact assessment questions do not specifically relate to non-native species 
introductions, although many of the provisions are impliedly relevant.328 Tourism applications are 
not “approved” unless they have addressed the issue of NNS within their application.329 Moreover, 
“most approvals include conditions related to non-native species introductions.”330 For example, an 
IEE approved by MFAT and the AAD in the 2008/09 season includes a separate document addressing 
environmental risks, including a section on the unintentional introduction of NNS.331 The provisions 
effectively replicate the IAATO requirements for waste management, sewage disposal and shore 
landings, highlighting the tendency for NAPs to rely on IAATO to regulate environmental risks 
effectively.332  
The environmental approval process for sub-Antarctic tourist operators are not substantially 
different from those required for scientific activities, but the scope of activity permitted is very 
restricted. Environmental approval is required to enter either States sub-Antarctic terrestrial areas. 
The Tasmanian Parks and Wildlife Service annually reviews its Guidelines for Tourist Operations and 
Visits to the Macquarie Island Nature Reserve (‘Macquarie Tourist Guidelines’), and thereby imposes 
an annual ceiling on tourist numbers permitted to land or come within the 3 nautical mile territorial 
sea of the island.333 The NZSAI CMS also limits tourist numbers in the NZSAI, with tourist landings 
prohibited in the “minimum impact islands” and limited to special areas in the refuge islands, 
although no additional express biosecurity procedures are introduced, as they are in the Macquarie 
Tourist Guidelines and HIMI Management Plan.334 The isolated and infrequent visitation of the HIMI 
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Territory has not made a restriction on numbers necessary. Precautions taken to prevent the 
introduction of pests are a condition on all entry permits, including abiding by strict 
decontamination standards, in the case of Tasmania, surpassing the requirements on scientists.335 
Unlike the Antarctic, where the ATS does not create any mechanisms to allow AT Parties to prevent 
the erection of infrastructure, if a tourist operator wished to engage in infrastructure development 
in the Australian Sub-Antarctic, an EIA process would be required by the EPBC Act 1999.336 Any 
erection of buildings or actions for a commercial purpose must be carried out under a management 
plan within an Australian Commonwealth reserve and the HIMI management plan explicitly prohibits 
such an activity.337 Moreover, it is unlikely such a development would be permitted in the NZSAI with 
the requirement of the Reserves Act (NZ) 1971 of “preserv*ing+ *the reserve+ as far as possible in its 
natural state.”338  
The same marine pollution restrictions that apply to researchers and supply vessels apply to tourist 
vessels, without the restrictions on sovereign immunity, increasing the applicability of the IMO 
Pollution Conventions.339 However, there are limitations in the regulations, identified by New 
Zealand as a particular risk for tourist vessels is not addressed comprehensively.340 DOC’s lack of 
jurisdiction in the marine areas surrounding the NZSAI limits the capacity to target the issue.341 
Where a vessel makes a landing, it must have its hull-inspected and certified clean but tourist vessels 
may only engage in sea sightings of the islands.342 In contrast, the HIMI and Macquarie Island 
Management plans limit access to marine areas surrounding the islands.343 The Macquarie Tourist 
Visit Guidelines, identical to the Management Plan, completely prohibits ballast discharge in the 
Reserve.344 In addition, the Guidelines require ships to provide a valid New Zealand Department of 
Conservation “Subantarctic Vessel Inspection Certificate” or equivalent, mitigating against bio-
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fouling.345 This is not provided for in the Management Plan, highlighting the discrepancy between 
the way researchers operate and the ideal management conditions. A certification process is 
nevertheless an effective way to ensure tourist vessels visiting protected areas do not introduce NNS 
through bio fouling.  
4.3.2. COMPLIANCE: EDUCATING, MONITORING AND SANCTIONING VISITORS 
As Australia and New Zealand do not authorize all tourist activity that occurs in their Antarctic 
territories, ensuring tourist operators comply with legislation is a challenge. One of the tools used to 
ensure tourist compliance is restricting entry into ASPAs.346 The commercial viability of a tourist 
vessel often relies on entry to the primary attractions of the Antarctic area, huts and sites of high 
biodiversity, that are often protected through the ASPA process.347 Although the ASPA process does 
not apply to vessels registered to non-AT parties, IAATO invokes the ATCM Tourist Guidelines in 
urging its members to apply for a permit from an appropriate national authority.348  An requirement 
for membership in IAATO is “operating within the parameters of the Antarctic Treaty System.”349 
Most tourist companies operating in the Ross Sea area apply for permits from Australia and New 
Zealand, in order to visit the ASPA areas in the Antarctic.350 In some areas of particular scientific 
interest or environmental vulnerability, no tourists will be approved access.351 In contrast, in the sub-
Antarctic, all tourist activity is restricted to areas put aside for tourism, allowing for better targeted 
monitoring activities and limiting cumulative impacts.352  
Vessels that are approved by Australia and New Zealand are subject to the sanctions available under 
the domestic implementing legislation.353 In addition, both Australia and New Zealand implement 
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awareness campaigns and supervision measures to target biosecurity threats. The educational 
component of awareness campaigns promotes vigilance as to the risk of NNS introduction. The AAD 
and MFAT refer operators to the ATCM Visitor Guidelines354 and ATCM Site Guidelines.355 In addition, 
New Zealand applies a significant condition for approval of tours wishing to land in the Ross 
Dependency; being accompanied by a national representative of the New Zealand government. A 
general inspector under the Antarctic (Environmental Protection) Act 1994 (NZ)356, the 
representative is responsible for, amongst other things, “any plant or animal quarantine regulations 
or procedures.”357 Australian policy is also to work within the ATS to institute a “coordinated 
inspection/ observer scheme to audit compliance with regulatory and voluntary measures governing 
tourist activities.”358 In practice, this involves direct observation once every few years, focussing on 
new operators and those who are not adequately complying with relevant obligations.359 This is also 
the policy in regards to visits to the HIMI Territory,360 although it is rarely implemented.361 Moreover, 
both Australia and New Zealand implement the ATCM Post Visit Reporting system, although do not 
include any additional requirement to comment on NNS presence or absence.362 The enforcement of 
these provisions could prove problematic if activity increases in the area. However, given the small 
size of the industry, this appears to be an effective method of ensuring compliance. 
The potential for tourist vessels to act as hubs of monitoring activity is not realised in either Australia 
or New Zealand, although the HIMI management plan “invites” all visitors to report to the AAD any 
sightings of alien NNS and tourist operators have responsibilities to monitor for and respond to NNS 
incidents.363 As in research expeditions and the Antarctic, any tourist landing in the NZSAI must be 
accompanied by a DOC representative who will ensure quarantine management steps are taken.364 
In the HIMI Territory, “the Director may seek to recover any costs associated with management 
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action taken to mitigate or address NNS introduction to the Reserve, from those responsible for the 
introduction,”365 creating an additional reason to monitor activities carefully. One of the obligations 
on the AAD in Macquarie Island is the monitoring of tourist landing areas for the presence of new 
NNS.366 
4.3.3. SUMMARY OF DOMESTIC REGULATION OF ANTARCTIC TOURISM  
Antarctic tourism is regulated sparsely by the New Zealand and Australian authorities, perhaps due 
to the proportionately low numbers visiting continental sites and the perceived effectiveness of 
IAATO. The precautionary mitigation measures in place applicable to scientific and tourist operators 
do a great deal to reduce the risk but the lack of any form of required response measures or 
contingency plans is a dangerous gap in the system. The presence of a National Representative on 
vessels landing in the Ross Dependency and NZSAI allows for rigid enforcement of the quarantine 
measures in place and identification of issues that may arise. However, the capacity of the States to 
limit the spatial extent and quantity of tourism in the Sub-Antarctic demonstrates the significant 
benefits to sovereignty when addressing private industry. There are gaps, especially in the marine 
environment of the NZSAI, which is in the process of being adequately protected, but the proactive 
approach to the management of tourism is a model for the development of Antarctic regulation. 
4.4. DOMESTIC REGULATION OF ANTARCTIC FISHERIES 
The scope of Australian and New Zealand fisheries activity further exposes the Antarctic 
environment to the risk of NNS introduction. However, the lack of consideration given to biosecurity 
in relation to fishing vessels at the international and regional level is to some extent mitigated by 
domestic practice. Although a strategic approach to exclude introductions of NNS through fisheries 
activity is not adopted,367 as with tourism, limiting the scope of the activity limits the potential for 
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introduction and both States effectively manage their own fishing vessels activity.368 Both Australia 
and New Zealand are members of CCAMLR and of their flagged vessels engaged in marine living 
resource harvesting in the Southern Ocean:369 none have been listed on CCAMLR’s black list. 
However, the ecosystem approach promoted by CCAMLR and requirement to consider potential 
impacts of NNS has never been implemented systematically.370 Commercial fisheries also operate in 
the EEZ around the NZSAI, Macquarie Island and the HIMI territory. Significantly, within those areas 
Australia and New Zealand have the power to enforce their fisheries regimes, in contrast to the 
limited enforcement capacity in the Antarctic. New Zealand and Australia’s domestic management of 
the fisheries industry has been rated amongst the most comprehensive in the world.371 However, the 
latest analysis concluded, “the highest ranking country *New Zealand+ does not approach the high 
standards set either by international convention or consensus amongst scientists and managers,”372 
which is evident in the absence of biosecurity.  
4.4.1 LIMITING A PATHWAY OF INTRODUCTION: MANAGING FISHERIES IN THE ANTARCTIC 
AND SUB-ANTARCTIC  
The main statutory limit on fisheries activity in the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic is the requirement for 
a permit.373 Both Australia and New Zealand reserve the right to impose conditions on those 
permits.374 It is an offence to fish in the Antarctic without one and it is an offence to act contrary to a 
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condition in the permit.375 In certain areas however, one cannot gain a permit to fish commercially. 
Some analysis of activity is required before commencement. To engage in a “new activity” in the 
fisheries industry, one must trigger CCAMLR’s new and exploratory fishery regime.376 In March 2009, 
Australia published a Guide to CCAMLR New and Exploratory Fisheries giving operators a framework 
on how to apply for access to CCAMLR’s new and exploratory fisheries. 377 These include the 
environmental standards that the ship must meet before Australia will submit their entry to the 
Commission.378 The AFMA Vessel suitability assessment guidelines focus on the safety of the vessel, 
rather than its environmental suitability.379 Fisheries vessels are not subject to the EIA process. 
Although New Zealand did for some time,380 it no longer requires its fisheries vessels to engage in an 
EIA.381   
Although both acknowledge the importance of spatial management of fisheries and protecting areas 
for stock recovery, there is significant difference between Australia and New Zealand’s standard of 
MPAs in their domestic fisheries. Australia invests almost 10% of the landed value of fisheries into 
MPAs and New Zealand contributes less than 1%.382 While Australia protects its marine areas 
surrounding its sub-Antarctic, New Zealand only protects a small percentage of its marine area. The 
legal underpinning of fishing in New Zealand waters is similar to that in Antarctic waters. The 
purpose of the Fisheries Act 1996 is “to provide for the utilisation of fisheries resources while 
ensuring sustainability.”383 New Zealand permits trawling and long-line fishing around the sub-
Antarctic islands, although most is conducted outside the 12 nautical mile limit of the Territorial Sea. 
No trawling by vessels greater than 46m can take place inside the New Zealand nautical mile 
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Territorial Sea, although this does not exclude commercial fisheries under that size.384 The 
Auckland/Mohu Maha Islands are designated a Marine Reserve with all commercial and recreational 
fishing banned in the 498,000 ha surrounding area.385 However, New Zealand’s commitment to 
marine protection is outlined in the Marine Protected Areas Policy and Implementation Plan and 
includes more comprehensive protection of the Marine Sub-Antarctic environment.386 
Australian Commonwealth fisheries are managed by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority 
(‘AFMA’), under the provisions of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Australia). Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement Fisheries Arrangements exist between each state/Northern Territory and 
the Commonwealth government applies state law within 3 nautical miles of the coast, and 
Commonwealth rules from 3 to 200 nautical miles, which permits Tasmania to designate a no-take 
zone within 3 miles of Macquarie Island’s coast under National Parks and Reserves Management Act 
2002 (Tasmania).387 Fisheries around Macquarie Island are very limited.388 Commercial trawl fishing 
takes place between 3 and 200 nautical miles outside the Macquarie Island Marine Park and a 
demersal longline trial is currently active in the Macquarie Ridge sector.389 In 2005 a strategic 
assessment under the EPBC Act 1999 established that the fishery operates under an adaptable and 
precautionary regime capable of controlling, monitoring and enforcing the level of take from the 
fishery.390 Consistent with their designation as IUCN strict nature reserves,391 commercial and 
recreational fishing is prohibited in the HIMI Territorial Sea, inner marine zone.392 However, outside 
a 1 nautical mile buffer of the Territorial Sea, Australian commercial fishing targets Mackerel Icefish 
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and Patagonian toothfish.393 The fishery falls within the ambit of the adjoining CCAMLR statistical 
division 58.5.2. Both HIMI and Macquarie marine areas, designated reserves under the EPBC Act 
1999, are no-take zones.394  
 
4.4.2. CASTING A NET FOR NNS: PREVENTING INTRODUCTION FROM FISHERIES 
Neither New Zealand nor Australia’s CCAMLR ratifying legislation address the issue of NNS, except 
through the ratification of CCAMLR, Article 3(c).395 Both implement the relevant conservation 
measures of CCAMLR,396 which decreases the risk of NNS introduction to some extent. AFMA has 
enacted regulations for the fisheries in the HIMI Territory397 and Macquarie Territory, but neither 
contains any additional requirements relevant to NNS.398 However, significantly, New Zealand 
permits issued for the collection of Antarctic marine living resources include a condition that 
requires a hull clear of any fouling organisms prior to departure for the CCAMLR area.399 However, 
the Australian approach relies on non-binding guidelines under the national response to marine 
pests. Australia’s Biofouling Guidelines for Commercial Fisheries Vessels, promoting safe cleaning 
and antifouling application, advises steaming of nets close to the fishing ground specific to fishery 
operations and locally sourced bait wherever possible to prevent introduction of NNS.400 Where 
marine pests are identified, the Guidelines urge the reporting of interactions with marine pests and 
freezing of samples. It lists indicators as “unusually heavy biofouling, dominance of the fouling by 
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one species or a new ‘species’ not seen before in your region.”401 If an emergency pest outbreak 
occurs, additional reporting to specific ports or areas might be required or if caused by negligence of 
the operator, might give rise to liability.402 
Some evidence suggests the CM 26-01 is implemented consistently. New Zealand’s model EIA that 
was provided for fisheries vessels addresses waste consistently with the CM; biodegradable food 
wastes macerated and sewage discharged as far away and at least 12 nautical miles from land.403 
Similarly, the Australian New and Exploratory Fisheries guidelines provide for “a prohibition on the 
discharge of poultry products and brassicas to ensure diseases and pests are not introduced to the 
Antarctic environment”.404 However, there is no evidence of effective ballast water management on 
fishing vessels or conditions on fishing equipment or bait. 
4.4.3. OBSERVING AND INSPECTING FISHERIES: IMPLEMENTING COMPLIANCE 
The compliance measures in CCAMLR are reinforced by both New Zealand and Australia requiring 
joint international and government representatives on board fishing vessels and engaging in 
fisheries enforcement patrols in the Southern Ocean.405 Inspectors under both jurisdictions are given 
significant powers to board vessels suspected of contravening rules under the Acts and arrest 
without warrant, as well as a significant number of other useful compliance measures.406 Although 
the biosecurity measures are not a focus of inspectors, they provide the opportunity for 
identification of NNS issues and promoting compliance with the relevant provisions. In addition, the 
biofouling guidelines promoted by both New Zealand and Australia encourage compliance through 
education. However, no specific measures are employed in relation to Antarctic activity.407 
Enforcement and surveillance in relation to domestic fisheries is more comprehensive. In the HIMI 
                                                          
401
 Ibid, 10. 
402
 Ibid; AQIS, Australian Ballast Water Requirements (Version 4, 2008), 10. 
403
 New Zealand Longline, Antarctic Chieftan, IEE – 2008/2009, (2009), 22-23. 
404
 AFMA and DEWHA, Guide to CCAMLR New and Exploratory Fisheries (2010) 5. 
405
 Email from Ben Sims, International Adviser, MFish (NZ), 16 April 2010; Potter, above n 67, 189. 
406
 Antarctic Marine Living Resources Conservation Act 1981 (Australia), Section 13-17; in 2001, an amendment to the New 
Zealand Antarctic Marine Living Resources Act 1981 merged the Antarctic inspector regime with the high sea inspection 
regime under the Fisheries Act 1994: Section 13Q-W. 
407
 See above, Section 4.2.1.5. 
188 
 
EEZ, IUU fishing has not been observed in the Reserve.408 Surveillance patrols are carried out by 
civilian and Australian Defence Force vessels, with the intention of enforcing fisheries legislation and 
deterring IUU fishing in the Reserve and CCAMLR area. Australia and France cooperate in their 
surveillance of the adjacent EEZs surrounding HIMI and Illes Kergulen.409 Regular surveillance and 
monitoring is also prescribed for the NZSAI and Macquarie Island Marine Park.410  
4.4.4. SUMMARY OF DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF FISHING 
Fishing activity poses the most significant challenge to any regime attempting to protect biodiversity. 
An established industry with significant interests and investment vested in the CCAMLR and sub-
Antarctic fisheries will always resist additional costs and the presence of large scale illicit fisheries 
means enforcing biosecurity measures on legal operators may be fruitless.411 The Australian and 
New Zealand protection of domestic fisheries demonstrates the effectiveness of sovereign control 
over marine areas; especially Australia addressing fisheries’ specific biosecurity issues. Australia and 
New Zealand have useful methods to support implementation and ensure compliance with ATS 
norms that effectively limit the environmental impacts of fishing activities in the Antarctic. However, 
issues identified in the best-practice Australian guidelines including: non-local bait, bio-fouling of the 
hull and refuge areas, are not addressed consistently in relation to the Antarctic. Both employ 
educational measures to prevent biofouling in domestic territory, including the sub-Antarctic. New 
Zealand’s adoption of hull fouling standards for its Antarctic fishing operations are an important first 
step towards a systematic management of biosecurity threats associated with fisheries activity. To 
implement Article 3(c) of CCAMLR adequately, the domestic buffer provided by ports must be 
effectively utilised to limit biosecurity threats to the Antarctic marine environment from fishing. 
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4.5. AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTARCTIC 
BIOSECURITY FRAMEWORK: A SUMMARY 
Australia and New Zealand have both developed a sophisticated biosecurity framework to provide 
for controls on the unintentional introduction of NNS into their own environments that have limited 
applicability to their Antarctic operations. Both have policy which effectively reduces risks from 
Antarctic operations but it is without the strategic basis necessary for comprehensive protection, in 
line with best practice under the CBD. In the scientific, terrestrial Antarctic context, New Zealand and 
Australian provisions provide a useful model for other AT Parties and their domestic biosecurity 
provisions provide a limited buffer to marine pests making the voyage south. The main issue, in 
comparison to the sub-Antarctic, is the presence of other operators in similar areas complicating 
preventative, monitoring and response application.  
Moreover, the gaps that remain are symptomatic of the issues faced in the ATS. Tourist and fisheries 
activities are effectively governed by the same biosecurity measures as those designed for scientific 
programs, and often the specific problems relevant to fisheries and tourist activities have no risk 
assessment or mitigation. The marine environment has minimal additional protection in the 
domestic regime, with both States ballast water practices developing to comply with the Ballast 
Water Convention, although still currently relying on the problematic open water exchange. In 
addition, the certification process to avoid biofouling in the NZSAI and Macquarie Island has some 
applicability to tourist ships visiting the sites, but otherwise there is very little to protect the 
Antarctic marine environment from invasive marine NNS. In addition, even in the sub-Antarctic 
where jurisdiction is confirmed, practical enforcement is limited by the remoteness of sub-Antarctic 
environments. Political factors in the Australian sub-Antarctic surrounding the confusing 
jurisdictional nexus of players and geographical issues with enforcement are a serious barrier to 
effective control.412 In the collective governance of the ATS, political factors benefit the 
management, with diplomacy and reputation having a role in encouraging State parties to comply 
with obligations under the ATS. However, the lack of a central inspectorate body means the primary 
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method of ascertaining compliance is limited to AT Party-initiated inspections, which are not always 
effective. 
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5 
A BIOSECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANTARCTIC AREA 
 
 “…the Antarctic provides one of the last opportunities available to humankind to demonstrate our ability to 
instigate and apply continent-wide control and conservation measures...failure to do so will provide an 
irreversible legacy.”
1
 
“The establishment of *biosecurity+ commitments in legally binding form would be an important manifestation 
of the commitment of the Treaty Parties to being proactive on the [NNS] issue, to setting standards for 
themselves of an appropriately precautionary kind and to taking collective steps to secure compliance by the 
wider international community.”
2
 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The final chapter of the thesis provides a summary of the gaps and priorities in biosecurity in the 
Antarctic area and critically analyses the options the ATS has to address the risks posed by the 
introduction of NNS. The first section summarizes the gaps identified in the preceding chapters, with 
a focus on the risk areas that are not adequately addressed. The second section identifies the 
components of an ideal framework for biosecurity in the Antarctic, evaluating both the objectives 
and institutions forming the foundation of the framework and the substantive components and 
compliance mechanisms for implementing the objectives. The final section discusses the most 
appropriate steps to implement the system, analysing the extent regional and international 
approaches can be synthesized to better protect the Antarctic region.  
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5.2. THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK: GAPS AND PRIORITIES 
 
FIGURE 5.1:  IP, WP AND SP RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF NNS SUBMITTED TO THE CEP 
The legal and institutional fragmentation characteristic of domestic biosecurity frameworks is 
compounded in a region where individual States are responsible for implementing their own 
interpretation of collective rules. Although the ATS needs a strategic approach, comprehensive 
planning processes and effective compliance mechanisms to mitigate the inevitable inconsistent 
approaches, PEPAT only expressly regulates intentional introductions. The prioritisation of 
biosecurity in the context of Article 3 of PEPAT through the CEP sets the foundation for a strategic 
approach. Mansfield and Gilbert noted “an early phase in the process *of addressing biosecurity+ 
should include promotion of awareness of the issue and encouragement of the sharing of best 
practise.”3 The growing number of papers submitted by AT Parties,4 SCAR’s Environmental Code of 
Conduct and the ICG on Biosecurity indicate an increasing consideration of biosecurity in AT Parties 
practice. Moreover, although addressed primarily by Australia, New Zealand and NGOs until 2007, in 
2008 and 2009, 11 different states submitted relevant IPs and WPs.5 However, while an ambitious 
work program addresses the issue and a number of states and organisations offer specific advice for 
aspects of Antarctic activity, it is a reflection on the limitations of the ATS that after almost 12 years 
of consideration, no formal recommendation offers any guidance on holistically implementing 
biosecurity on Antarctic activities. Based on an overview of international instruments and national 
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best practice, the IUCN provides a checklist for States in the process of implementing a national 
framework.6 The table below demonstrates that, although the ATS has enacted considerable 
biosecurity coverage in the Antarctic area, it does not approximate the comprehensive coverage 
necessary to minimise NNS risks. 
TABLE 5.1: SUMMARY OF REGIONAL LEGAL MEASURES PROVIDING FOR BIOSECURITY IN THE ANTARCTIC
7
 
Key Component(s) Program Element Legal Measures
8
 
International 
standards 
Implement and enforce international 
standards in quarantine measures 
and transport controls;  
Practical Guidelines on Ballast Water management in the 
Antarctic adopted by the IMO. 
Border Control Apply preventative and 
precautionary measures, using risk 
analysis, permits or other 
appropriate tools, to control 
introductions into and within 
[Antarctica]; 
PEPAT, Annex II, Article 4: prohibiting intentional 
introductions without a strictly limited permit (with the 
exception of food) and requiring precautions to prevent 
the unintentional introductions of micro-organisms. Sterile 
soil and live poultry is prohibited. 
[Tourists] IAATO Decontamination Guidelines. 
[Scientists] SCAR Environmental Code of Conduct 
Protected areas Prohibit, or strictly regulate the use 
and release of alien species in or near 
closed or vulnerable ecosystems and 
protected areas; 
Consideration of biosecurity in ASPA Management Plans, 
ASMA Codes of Conduct and Site Guidelines.
9
 
Surveillance Provide for monitoring [to inform 
short-term response]  
PEPAT, Article 3(2)(e): “regular and effective 
monitoring...to facilitate possible unforeseen effects of 
activities carried out within and outside the AT area.” 
Short-Term Response Implement early warning and 
emergency planning systems to 
supply rapid responses where 
biological invasions are detected; 
PEPAT, Article 15, Annex VI PEPAT: Contingency plans, 
response and liability for default in so far as NNS are 
defined as an “environmental emergency”. 
PEPAT, Annex II, Article 4(5): requiring NNS introduced 
without permits to be removed, unless that removal would 
result in a greater adverse environmental impact. 
[Tourists] 
Long-Term Response Require timely measures for 
eradication or control of species that 
are already invasive or become 
invasive in the future, subject as 
necessary to prior assessment of 
techniques to be used; 
- 
Compliance Strengthen compliance by public, 
commercial and private actors; 
AT, Article X; PEPAT, Article 13: Generic Compliance 
Measures; 
PEPAT, Article VII, PEPAT Article 15: Inspection Regime 
PEPAT, Article 17: Reporting Process  
Research and public 
awareness 
Support research, training, education 
and public awareness. 
Aliens in Antarctica International Polar Year Project. 
Alien Species in Antarctic Biodiversity Database. 
*Tourists+ “Guidelines for Visitors to the Antarctic” 
Recommendation 1/ATCM XVIII (2005). 
[Scientists]SCAR Environmental Code of Conduct. 
 
                                                          
6
 C Shine, N Williams and G Gündling, A Guide to Designing Legal and Institutional Frameworks on Alien Invasive Species 
(IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 20, 2000), 40-41. 
7
 Key Components and Elements based on Shine, ibid, ‘4.3.3. Primary Goals and Components of Legislation’ 40-41. 
8
 Informal guidance offered through CEP Information Papers is discussed at Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1.2 and in Appendix 1.  
9
 See above Chapter 3, Section 2.2.1.3; United Kingdom, Review of provisions related to NNS introductions in ASPA and 
ASMA management plans ATCM XXXII WP 33 (2009). 
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As a strategic regional approach to biosecurity is necessary to minimise the risk of NNS introduction, 
there is little in global biodiversity law which directly complements the ATS. The CBD offers a 
qualified framework of tools that have some utility in the Antarctic area. Implementing some of the 
provisions in relation to Antarctic activities, in particular the generic requirement to take biosecurity 
measures as well as strategic assessment and reporting processes, would benefit a strategic 
approach to biosecurity in the Antarctic. However, the CBD does not effectively address areas 
beyond national jurisdiction and is not well implemented by AT Parties. There potential of the CBD is 
in building stronger relationships with other legal regimes and building legitimacy in the 
international community.  
Correspondingly in the marine environment, the consideration of NNS is required by UNCLOS but 
without elaboration, the obligation has little practical impact. In relation to identified high-risk 
aspects of marine activity, the comprehensive Ballast Water Convention has yet to come into force 
and there is no express obligation or mechanism to prevent ships with fouled hulls and surfaces 
introducing NNS to new environments. A significant proportion of ships operating in the Antarctic 
marine area are either flagged to States not party to the ATS or covered by the sovereign immunity 
provisions in the ATS, BWM Convention and UNCLOS. This implies the ATS is limited in its capacity to 
mitigate a significant proportion of biosecurity risk for the marine environment. Despite the 
limitations, the ATME on Ship-Borne Tourism recommends enhancing the relationship between the 
IMO and ATS and with the development of biofouling guidelines through the former, further 
collaboration for the purposes of biosecurity is foreseeable.10 However, the IUCN and CBD identify 
the marine environment as a significant gap in the international regulation of biosecurity.11 
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FIGURE 5.1: CURRENT RESPONSES TO THE RISKS OF NNS INTRODUCTION IN THE ANTARCTIC AREA
12 
The figure above demonstrates the number of interconnected regimes applying to AT Parties activity 
in the Antarctic and the lack of a single unitary regime. The proactive approach of New Zealand and 
Australia demonstrates biosecurity risks can be mitigated effectively by collaborating with domestic 
biosecurity agencies. The application of biosecurity policy to NAP activity and effectively limiting 
tourist and fisheries activity represents a model of best practice. However, limitations at the 
international level mean that considerable gaps and inconsistencies remain, particularly in relation 
to high-risk aspects of activity, sewage disposal, biofouling of ship surfaces and ballast water 
management.13 Moreover, other AT Party States do not have the same level of domestic biosecurity, 
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indicated by the limited extent to which the States have implemented elements of the invasive 
species programme of the CBD. In addition, comparing Australia and New Zealand’s Antarctic 
policies with the extensive biosecurity provisions for the sub-Antarctic demonstrates the limitations 
of jurisdiction over activities rather than geographic areas. Preventative biosecurity measures ideally 
rely on a nation employing border control mechanisms based on territorial sovereignty and 
legitimate maritime zones.14 Restricting jurisdiction to nationalities means the best practice of a 
number of States will be undermined by one State adopting a laissez-faire approach to the activities 
under its control. The 2008 COMNAP survey of 15 National Antarctic Programs that together run 
70% of all Antarctic stations suggest AT Parties have adopted an informal approach to the 
management of NNS. Although 53% adopted monitoring and surveillance programs and 38% have 
implemented operational procedures that target NNS, the most prominent measure implemented 
by 86% of surveyed AT Parties is the “awareness program”.15 Although this is an important 
component, consistent operational procedures are needed to effectively minimise the risks of NNS 
introduction.16 Similar issues are faced by a number of States and regional organisations that have 
developed biosecurity systems incorporating transboundary cooperation or collaboration between 
sectoral jurisdictions. The IUCN’s work in addressing common problems in biosecurity management 
identifies priorities for the domestic response to NNS risks that are of particular significance in the 
Antarctic area. These include providing a cohesive framework for biosecurity consideration that 
identifies key objectives, comprehensive coverage and consistent terminology, cohesive institutional 
support and compliance measures that allow for both supervision and enforcement. 
5.3. THE IDEAL FRAMEWORK 
Comprehensively addressing the risks posed by NNS requires a strategic approach that surpasses the 
limited vision of the CEP work plan. Although PEPAT provides the structure for biosecurity 
consideration through the CEP and Annex II, Chapter Two of this thesis demonstrates that the ATS 
lacks in an integrated biosecurity framework and mechanisms to implement a framework. The ATS 
does not provide an adequate gateway to prevent the aspects or classes of activities that pose 
particular risks of NNS introduction or methods to evaluate whether individual States 
implementation of PEPAT is effective. There are three general aspects to any biosecurity strategy: 
the institutional foundation, substantive provisions and procedures to ensure compliance. 
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 Shine, above n 6, 30. 
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 COMNAP, Survey on existing procedures concerning introduction of NNS in Antarctica ATCM XXXI IP 98 (2008). 
16
 Shine, above n 6, 41.  
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Discussion on the most appropriate method of implementing the measures is reserved for the next 
section, except where necessary for the purposes of the analysis. 
5.3.1 FOUNDATIONS 
Establishing a strong foundation is particularly important in the Antarctic area, where jurisdiction 
based on nationality leads to variety in approaches to implementation across AT Parties.17 To 
achieve the level of consistency and precaution required to mitigate the risks of NNS introduction, 
the general objectives and guiding principles must suitable for operationalisation at the regional 
level. As well as general requirements for AT Parties to take biosecurity measures on their own 
programs, the system needs to provide for institutional support that complements the institutions of 
both the regional and international approaches to biosecurity. A “framework approach” is adopted 
for this thesis, establishing objectives and terminology and an institutional framework to address the 
more substantive issues.18  A framework has benefits over an umbrella or comprehensive approach 
as it can adaptively respond to biosecurity risks as information about the baseline and the threats of 
ongoing activities emerge and build upon existing agreements.19  
5.3.1.1. RISK SETTING: KEY OBJECTIVE, BROAD SCOPE AND SPECIFICALLY DEFINED TERMINOLOGY 
The foundation of an effective biosecurity framework is a clear and concise set of objectives, with a 
broad scope and specifically defined terminology.20 The lack of explicit objectives is a common 
problem in national regimes and can limit action on the risks of NNS unless there is a demonstrated 
threat to agro-forestry or fisheries interests.21 Despite the conceptual framework offered by the ATS, 
without an explicit statement of objectives, biosecurity action may be justified on the basis of 
national biosecurity practice, which may not be consistent with Antarctic values. Definitions “go to 
the heart of legal certainty” and especially where they will be implemented in different legal 
systems, clarity is essential.22 It is appropriate that addressing the ambiguous scope as well as lack of 
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 K Bastmeijer, The Antarctic Environmental Protocol and its Domestic Legal Implementation (2003), 448-449. 
18
 D M McGraw, ‘The CBD – Key Characteristics and Implications for Implementation,’ (2002) 11 Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law 1, 18. 
19
 Ibid, 19. 
20
 Shine, above n 6, 43. 
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 Ibid, 37. 
22
 Ibid, 44. 
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defined terminology and objectives should be one of the first steps in establishing a biosecurity 
framework for the Antarctic.23 
Firstly, the object and subject of biosecurity in the Antarctic must be defined adequately to address 
the scope of the framework. Although Annex II provides some guidance on the definition of species 
covered by the Annex and the AT area offers a specific geographic area, it does not provide 
definitions for the concept of introduction and only prescribes preventative action for micro-NNS.24 
AT Parties must provide clarification through a set of definitions consistent with domestic policy and 
relevant international conventions. The CBD Secretariat in collaboration with other international and 
regional organisations developed a concise set of standard definitions that are useful to examine in 
the Antarctic context. 25  The CBD definition of a NNS 26  is suitable for the Antarctic area, 
encompassing a broad definition of spatial and taxonomical criteria that can encompass all species 
groups and intra-continental transfers between sites.27 The overlap with CCAMLR jurisdiction should 
not detract from the holistic framework focussing on all species, including those that spend all their 
lives in the water. The subject of the provisions, however, requires further isolation through 
establishing the object of the biosecurity process. Naturally dispersed NNS cannot come under 
human jurisdiction, so only those NNS that are introduced by human agency should be addressed by 
biosecurity. However, as that human agency can be intentional or unintentional and either cause the 
introduction or establishment of NNS, each element needs separate attention. The ambiguous way 
the ATS addresses “introduction”, without any clear distinction between intentional and 
unintentional introductions or establishments, can be rectified by adoption of the CBD’s partition of 
human agency into intentional and unintentional introductions and establishment, and addressing 
each in turn.28  
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 Discussed in more detail at below, Section 5.3.1.1. 
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 See above, Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1.2.2. 
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 CBD COP, Guiding Principles for the Implementation of Article 8(h) Decision VI/23 (2002), n57; see also CBD, Glossary of 
Terms <http://www.cbd.int/invasive/terms.shtml> at 01/02/2010; a CBD webpage aimed at providing definitions agreed 
on the international level. 
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 Strictly alien species, interchangeable with NNS, Shine, above n 6, 1. 
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 i. "[non-native] species" refers to a species, subspecies or lower taxon, introduced outside its natural past or present 
distribution; includes any part, gametes, seeds, eggs, or propagules of such species that might survive and subsequently 
reproduce, CBD COP, above n 24, n57. 
28
 Shine, above n 6, 34; “ii. "invasive alien species" means an alien species whose introduction and/or spread threaten 
biological diversity…”, ibid. 
iii. "introduction" refers to the movement by human agency, indirect or direct, of an alien species outside of its natural 
range (past or present). This movement can be either within a country or between countries or areas beyond national 
jurisdiction. Ibid. 
iv. "intentional introduction" refers to the deliberate movement and/or release by humans of an alien species outside its 
natural range.” ibid. 
v. "unintentional introduction" refers to all other introductions which are not intentional, and  
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However, a framework cannot target all the risks of introduction. A strict zero tolerance approach to 
risks29 would completely exclude human interaction with the Antarctic, which is undesirable and 
inconsistent with the goals of peaceful and scientific activity in the ATS.30 Biosecurity is not an end in 
itself but is a mechanism for the protection of certain values in an area.31 PEPAT confirms and 
defines the inherent values of Antarctica under the ATS.32 Any biosecurity objectives must include 
the protection of the Antarctic environment and its dependent and associated ecosystems and the 
scientific, aesthetic and wilderness values of the area. The objectives must also be consistent with 
other relevant legal obligations, including the rational use of Antarctic marine living resources in 
CCAMLR as well as the other general provisions relevant to NNS found in international 
environmental law, particularly Article 8(h) of the CBD and Article 196 of UNCLOS.  
The focus on multiple objectives can undermine a biosecurity framework through permitting 
acceptable risks in the context of more prioritised concerns, especially where there is no systematic 
hierarchy of risk.33 The Lake Vostok CEE ultimately involved Russia deciding to place the scientific 
and potential commercial34 value of drilling into the lake above the potential damage to the lake’s 
scientific, wilderness and environmental values by contamination.35  The adoption of a strict 
precautionary approach reflects the recommendations of both the CBD and IUCN and is appropriate 
in the context of Article 3 of PEPAT.36 To reflect this approach, the introduction or establishment of 
NNS should always be defined as a more than minor or transitory impact on the Antarctic 
environment. Action should be rationalised by taking into account the probability of an activity 
introducing NNS and the extent to which the activity is necessary in the context of the values the 
biosecurity regime protects. The higher the probability the activity will introduce NNS, the stronger 
the onus on the activities proponent to demonstrate the activity is necessary to retain the value of 
the ATS.37 Thus, the main focus of AT Parties should be “biosecurity threats”: those matters or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
vi. "establishment" refers to the process of an alien species in a new habitat successfully producing viable offspring with 
the likelihood of continued survival,” ibid. 
29
 Australia, France and New Zealand, A work program for CEP action on NNS ATCM XXXII WP 05 (2009), Recommendation 
1. 
30
 See above Section 1.3. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 PEPAT, Article 2, 3. 
33
 M Jay, M Morad and A Bell, ‘Biosecurity: a policy dilemma in New Zealand’ (2003) 20 Land Use Policy 121, 126. 
34
 Bastmeijer, above n 17, 347. 
35
 See for example: Ibid, 346-348.  
36
 See Chapter 1.3; CBD COP, above n 24, Guiding Principle 1; Shine, above n 6, 34. 
37
 See A Trouwborst, ‘The Precautionary Principle in General International Law: Combating the Babylonian Confusion’, 
(2007) 16 (2) Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 185, 188. 
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activities which, individually or collectively, significantly increase the risk of NNS introduction or 
establishment.38  
Consolidating these issues, an appropriate key objective is “to prevent or minimise biosecurity 
threats in the AT area consistent with the protection of the Antarctic environment and its dependent 
and associated ecosystems; the value of the continent to scientific study and the aesthetic and 
wilderness values of the area under PEPAT; conservation and rational use of Antarctic marine living 
resources under CCAMLR and other relevant international law.” Any further enunciation of the 
objective complicates its application. This objective identifies the underlying and interlinked goals of 
the system: 
 Precautionary approach to management of biosecurity threats. 
 Consistency with legal obligations in the ATS and wider international system. 
 Conservation of Antarctic environment, and dependent and associated ecosystems. 
 Protection of the intrinsic value of the AT area under Article 3, PEPAT. 
 Consistency with the freedom of scientific investigation under Article II of the AT and the 
rational use of Antarctic marine living resources under Article 2 of CCAMLR. 
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 Adapted from IUCN Guidelines for the Prevention of Biodiversity Loss Caused by Alien Invasive Species (2000), 3. 
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5.3.1.2. GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
 
FIGURE 5.2: GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 8(H) OF THE CBD
39
 
The limited impact of an objective without substance is evident in the CBD’s response to invasive 
species.40 Guiding principles elaborate objectives allowing AT Parties to harmonize objectives and 
scope and indicate the underlying ideological framework for biosecurity interventions without the 
considerable negotiation and compromise necessary for binding measures. These should ultimately 
reflect international best practice and include the ecosystem based management focus on 
prevention and precautionary approach identified in Chapter One.41 An onus should be placed on 
the role of cooperation between domestic biosecurity regimes. States with effective biosecurity 
should play an active role in sharing expertise and actively assisting programs meet the ambitious 
objectives. The AAD has already compiled a list of “Quarantine Principles” underlying its program 
that reflect a precautionary approach.42 In addition, the Guiding Principles offer an opportunity to 
increase the consistency and collaboration between the CBD and ATS, and allow for integrated 
implementation at the domestic level. The guiding principles in the context of the CBD have 
provided “useful guidance for work on invasive species, and for raising awareness among national 
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and regional authorities and organizations about the ways and means for addressing invasive 
species.”43 The CBD approach is evident in the AT Parties response in the Antarctic, WP 05 (ATCM 
XXXII 2009) confirming a precautionary approach to biosecurity as well as a focus on the three stage 
hierarchical approach of prevention, surveillance and response. PEPAT implicitly applies the 
ecosystem approach in providing for the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment 
and associated and dependent ecosystems, with shared information and international cooperation a 
foundation of the ATS. In addition, the precautionary approach to intentional introductions is 
consistent with the permit approach of Annex II, Article II of PEPAT. The CBD Guiding Principles 
should form the template where a more precautionary approach that reflects the intricacies of the 
Antarctic area can be developed. However, the controversy surrounding benefit sharing should be 
avoided. 
A focus on the risks of NNS being introduced from Antarctica to other areas is an area that requires 
enunciation in the principles. The risk of the Antarctic as a dispersal location may pose a significant 
threat to AT Party interests. Identifying biosecurity threats in the Antarctic area as threats to areas 
outside the AT area is an important role of the guiding principles. Most countries already treat the 
Antarctic as a separate territory for the purposes of quarantine and engage in normal customs 
processes when personnel and visitors return.44 Practically, the ATS should not address the issue 
formally, as it involves the development of domestic biosecurity procedures. The Guiding Principles 
can offer an appropriate option: informal guidance on implementing relevant biosecurity measures 
in departing from the Antarctic.  
5.3.1.3. INSTITUTIONAL GUIDANCE: A SUBSIDIARY GROUP ON NNS 
Institutional support, in the form of a dedicated biosecurity advisory body concerned with 
implementing the key objectives and guiding principles, is necessary in the context of ATS 
biosecurity. NNS issues currently come under the CEP’s mandate.45 Despite the NNS issue being 
afforded top priority, an increasing workload limits the capacity of the CEP to adequately address 
even the higher priority issues. The Biosecurity ICG has been set up to address this issue and the 
work plan establishes five years of ascertainable objectives and scope for expansion. However, the 
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 CBD Executive Secretary, In-Depth Review of Ongoing Work on Alien Species that Threaten Ecosystems, Habitats or 
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 See for example: Australia, IEE: Upgrade of organic waste management equipment, procedures and associated 
infrastructure at Australia’s Antarctic stations (2008), 27. 
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 Including those relevant to fisheries: Chapter Two, Section 4.1. 
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ICG is not a permanent institutional response and is not strategically designed to act as an advisory 
body to the ATCM on the issue of biosecurity. There are several options for institutional response 
within the ATS. The Antarctic Secretariat is a permanent institutional arrangement of the ATS, 
providing ongoing support for the ATCM. It is an organ of the ATCM but is empowered to “perform 
those functions in support of the ATCM and the CEP, which are entrusted to it by the ATCM.”46 It is 
also empowered with an operational budget, giving it the advantage over other arrangements in the 
ATS reliant on AT Parties sponsorship. AT Parties have resisted the institutionalisation of the ATS, 
however, and negotiating an appropriate expansion of the role of the Secretariat may pose 
difficulties or significant compromises for biosecurity.  
The CEP can establish subsidiary bodies with the approval of the ATCM.47 Previous experience with 
the SGMP has shown that more permanent groups, communicating via electronic means, are more 
effective than an ICG.48 While the ICG can effectively address a set of objectives, a more permanent 
group can fulfil more systematic tasks within the ATS. A permanent Subsidiary Group to the CEP on 
NNS (‘SGNNS’) could fulfil a purpose similar to the treatment of NNS as a cross cutting issue by the 
CBD, integrating biosecurity considerations into the ATS. The group should be created with four key 
terms of reference and the scope to expand as the ATS develops. In its early stages, it should 
promote and consolidate risk analysis activity and environmental management activity relevant to 
NNS. This could be achieved through consultation and collaboration with an appropriate working 
group of the SC-CAMLR, SCAR SSG-LS, and COMNAP. With a focus on risk management, the group 
could collaborate with the CEP in advising for the integration of biosecurity consideration into 
relevant Annexes and recommendations under PEPAT. The SGNNS could also promote the 
integration of biosecurity into more systematic changes to the ATS, for example, SEA, a reporting 
regime or strategic inspections. SEA, biosecurity and strategic inspections offer appropriate areas for 
the SGNNS to analysing gaps in the implementation of biosecurity and suggest improvements. In 
order to effectively operate as a biosecurity advisory group, it should be composed of biosecurity 
experts. Membership should be open to any Party, but require previous biosecurity experience and 
the chair of the committee should be appointed based on that experience. Given the body will be 
made of experts, its operation should be as transparent as possible and all members should be 
encouraged to participate across consecutive intercessional periods to promote consistency. The 
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 ATCM, Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty ATCM XXVI Measure 1 (2003); ATCM, Provisional application of the Secretariat 
Measure  ATCM XXVI Decision 1 (2003).   
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 ATCM, Revised Rules of Procedure for the CEP ATCM XXXII Appendix to Decision 6 (2009), Rule 10. 
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 Brazil, Report on the Effectiveness of the Trial Informal Group ATCM XXXI WP 57 (2008). 
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operation of the SGNNS should be achieved through electronic methods of communication, 
particularly utilising collaborative software and encouraging public participation where 
appropriate.49 Collaborative software, in particular wiki technology, is a method of electronic 
collaboration that is not widely utilised in governance50 but could provide a transparent and 
adaptive core for intercessional biosecurity discussion. In particular, reporting of biosecurity 
measures could be categorised, and each nations approach discussed in relation to identified risks. If 
this is done as measures are implemented, it would constitute an active form of adaptive 
management, with the potential to address risks proactively and reactively. 
The objectives and operational procedures should complement the approach of the Biosecurity ICG. 
The body should be responsible for promoting and integrating risk analysis across all National 
Antarctic Programs, tourist operations and fishing activity based on the techniques already in place 
in domestic programs.51 An important role of the body should be consultation with relevant agencies 
and establishing a clear responsibility to address developments in the CBD, GISP, IMO and other 
relevant international legal bodies should be a priority. The role of the CBD within the ATS remains 
negligible,52 yet AT Parties would greatly benefit from integrating the expertise of the CBD into the 
biosecurity framework. In addition, the Antarctic could provide a key case study for the CBD in 
protecting the biodiversity of international spaces, and increase the transparency and potentially 
acceptability of the ATS environmental management regime in the international community. The 
SGNNS should also play an important role in the development and implementation of mechanisms 
to support biosecurity discussed in the next section. 
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FIGURE 5.4: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE SUBSIDIARY GROUP ON NNS 
5.2.2. SUBSTANTIATING THE FRAMEWORK: ANALYSING AND RESPONDING TO NNS RISK 
Any substantiation of the guiding principles should be undertaken in the context of risk analysis. The 
analysis of risk is fundamental to biosecurity and involves three basic processes: risk assessment, risk 
management and risk communication.53 The assessment looks at “the size and nature of the 
potential adverse effects” of a potential introduction and the probability of the effects happening.54 
The focus should be on all pathways of introduction and identifying activities which are likely to 
increase the risk of NNS introduction significantly.55 A considerable amount of risk assessment has 
already identified the aspects of activities that pose a considerable threat to the Antarctic 
environment through their potential to introduce NNS.56 However, the focus of AT Parties should be 
incorporating risk analysis into the relevant mechanisms governing conduct under the ATS and the 
international system. The full scope of comprehensive measures to exclude NNS risks is too wide a 
subject to cover but this section will examine several key components necessary to limit risks 
associated with NNS. In addition, the section will explore the extent the subsidiary group on NNS can 
guide the development and utilise the components. 
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FIGURE 5.5: SUGGESTED AREAS TO BE COVERED BY THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF BIOSECURITY 
FRAMEWORK 
5.3.2.1 PLANNING FOR PREVENTION: EIA, SEA, CONTINGENCY AND MONITORING 
A crucial step in implementing a risk based approach to Antarctic biosecurity is ensuring the planning 
of activity in the Antarctic area takes into account the biosecurity threats of the proposed activity. 
There are several steps to this process that need to be separately addressed by a biosecurity 
framework. The overall strategic plans, programs and policies of AT Parties and Antarctic operators 
determining the quality and quantity of Antarctic activity have a significant impact on the risks of 
NNS introduction. The systematic biosecurity threats of Antarctic activity should be addressed at the 
strategic level, including mitigating the cumulative impacts of different tourist operators and NAPs 
operating in the same geographic area. The planning of specific activities will also involve certain 
biosecurity threats and the Annex I EIA process provides a limited obligation to evaluate the risks 
and consider potential mitigation measures. Finally, comprehensive and region-specific contingency 
plans should be introduced to all Antarctic stations to provide for both short term and long term 
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response in the case of NNS introduction and establishment. The Disease ICG has identified a draft 
contingency plan in the case of outbreak. Further development of effective contingency measures, 
modelled on the comprehensive provisions in the NZSAI, is relatively uncontroversial and can be 
done in the context of the CEP’s integration of biosecurity into existing processes. This section will 
focus on the development of more strategic and informed impact assessments for planning 
purposes to target a wider scope of biosecurity threats in the Antarctic. 
The planning of specific activities and the provision for contingency plans are expressly provided by 
PEPAT, although neither expressly invokes biosecurity considerations in the text of the Annexes. One 
area of particular concern is the domestic implementation of the EIA process, with a number of 
commentators identifying discrepancies in the quality and quantity of submissions.57 Chapter Two 
indicates that some AT Parties systematically include biosecurity considerations in their EIA 
submissions. AT Parties need take consistent steps to assess and mitigate against biosecurity threats 
in the planning of new activities. Guidance on the term “minor or transitory” can reduce the 
inconsistencies in domestic implementation. Given the considerable datasets now open to AT Parties 
after more than 10 years of EIA implementation, an informed decision on the types and extent of 
activities that constitute a more than minor or transitory impact should be possible. This process 
could involve an extensive risk analysis of the types of activities and aspects of activities that have 
the potential to introduce NNS. Where NNS introduction or establishment is deemed likely, the 
impact should be at least minor or transitory. Its status as “more than minor or transitory” should 
depend on the likelihood of the NNS to breach natural and artificial barriers. 
Strategic planning is already required by Article 3 of PEPAT. As well as planning to avoid impacts to 
biodiversity and habitats, the Article requires ongoing monitoring of activity, ensuring planned 
activities do not have unforeseen impacts. However, other than providing for Annual Reports and 
unlike the EIA mechanism for new activities or changes to activities, there is little within the ATS that 
supports the implementation of strategic planning to avoid environmental impacts. In domestic 
systems, the EIA process is usually in the context of a wider strategic assessment of the suitability of 
the type of activity in an area.58 The Antarctic policies of States, individually and collectively, are not 
addressed by the EIA process. Introducing SEA into the ATS provides for the strategic analysis of the 
policies of AT Parties, “moving towards joint EIAs covering large geographical areas, including all 
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actors involved in that area.”59 The SEA allows AT Parties to examine whether the types of activities 
proposed or the particular policy is likely to significantly increase the risks of NNS being introduced 
and whether that increase in risk is acceptable. The process could also provide the opportunity for 
AT Parties to ensure appropriate mitigation measures are built into the strategy of new programmes 
in the Antarctic.  
 
FIGURE 5.6: FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANTARCTIC APPLICATION OF THE SEA PROCESS BASED ON THE SEA 
PROTOCOL
60
 
A model for the implementation of SEA is provided by the SEA Protocol to the ESPOO Convention.61 
Although only nine AT Party States have ratified the Protocol and its primary focus is “particularly 
harmful stationary activities”, its structure as the only binding substantive treaty on SEA is worth 
considering for adoption in the Antarctic area.62 In addition, the issues it addresses offer potential 
development for the EIA process. The primary difference with the EIA process is the scope of the SEA 
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Protocol. The screening process identifies plans, programmes and policies of Parties requiring SEA. 
The process under the SEA Protocol explicitly excludes non-governmental plans63 and exhaustively 
lists a number of activities already prohibited in the Antarctic area.64 However, if a plan or 
programme sets out a “framework for future development consent” and it is “likely to have 
significant environmental impacts”65, an SEA is required under the Protocol. It is this latter definition 
which is useful for the Antarctic area. First, if a particular AT Party or AT Parties collectively wish to 
introduce a new category of activities that are likely to have significant environmental impacts, the 
plan or programme for those activities should be examined by the SEA. SEA is a costly and lengthy 
process66 and adopting a strict environmental analysis for every policy change could limit the 
reactivity of the ATS to environmental issues. A suitable threshold for Antarctic activity, 
incorporating the wording of Annex I, is if the policy, plan or programme is to have a “more than 
minor or transitory impact” on the environment and apply where a new policy, plan or programme is 
proposed or where the change proposes “the increase or decrease in the intensity of an existing 
activity.”  
The SEA Protocol distinguishes between plans and programmes, and policy. Parties are only required 
to “endeavour to ensure that” a SEA is carried out in the latter.67 This is not an appropriate 
distinction to make in the Antarctic. The plans and programmes of Antarctic National Programs 
should be under the scrutiny of AT Parties through the PEPAT reporting process. New policy, if it 
meets the threshold, should be accorded the same consideration as new plans or programmes. It is 
the evaluation of that policy that is one of the beneficial aspects of the SEA process, providing for a 
higher level examination of AT Parties’ approaches to the Antarctic. Although each SEA Protocol 
Party is responsible for carrying out SEA on its own plans, policies and programmes, a similar process 
in the Antarctic could allow the CEP and AT Secretariat to evaluate the collective policy of AT Parties 
towards Antarctica. For example, if AT Parties were to legitimise bio prospecting, the AT Secretariat 
could be empowered to carry out a SEA to ensure the activity fits within the ambit of PEPAT’s 
Environmental Principles and appropriate mitigation measures are taken to ensure that it does. 
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Moreover, any biosecurity policies implemented should be subject to careful impact assessment to 
determine if the policy effectively reduces the risks of NNS. 
Consultation also plays an essential role in encouraging compliance in the SEA Protocol. Scoping 
under the SEA Protocol is similar to the Annex I EIA process, consisting of preparing an 
environmental report and consultation. The latter permits the input of a body like the SGNNS to 
examine the biosecurity content of a proposed plan, policy or programme and promoting 
appropriate mitigation measures or advise against anything that exposes the Antarctic environment 
to an unacceptably high risk. The environmental report under the SEA Protocol includes a 
consideration of the impacts, potential alternatives and mitigation measures and how 
“environmental objectives, established at international national and other levels” may have 
relevance to the program.68 The clear environmental objectives established in PEPAT give this 
provision particular clarity in the Antarctic environment. Finally, the SEA Protocol requires Parties to 
take due account of the conclusions of the environmental report, measures to prevent, reduce or 
mitigate the adverse effects identified in the environmental report and the consultation in making a 
decision to proceed, and monitor impacts as they occur.69 It is this last step which creates difficulties 
in the Antarctic context. A SEA regime does not guarantee that environmental considerations are 
implemented in decision making, although developing strategic compliance procedures could 
identify potential impacts and draw attention to those impacts in the consultation processes. 
Considerable work needs to go into developing an adequate SEA process for the Antarctic that 
incorporates biosecurity considerations.  
5.3.2.2 ERECTING A CONTAINMENT FIELD: SPATIAL MANAGEMENT AND DECONTAMINATION MEASURES 
The SEA process under ESPOO does little to implement the ecosystem approach into planning 
mandated by Article 2 and 3 of PEPAT, required for an effective biosecurity framework.70 Moreover, 
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despite expressly providing for the analysis of cumulative impacts,71 the EIA process is essentially 
limited to States’ activities in a given area, rather than the cumulative impact of human activity in 
that area. Protected areas in the Antarctic provide an opportunity to integrate spatial planning 
procedures into a biosecurity framework, implementing additional protection for representative 
biologically sensitive areas and managing cumulative impacts in frequently used areas. The 
application of the “domains analysis” to the existing system is not a high priority for the CEP but 
marine spatial planning is a top priority.72 AT Parties already incorporate biosecurity consideration 
into almost all ASPA and ASMA management plans but area protection is not used strategically for 
the purpose of biosecurity. Moreover, the ASMA is not an effective legal tool for managing 
cumulative impacts as the “Code of Conduct” is not binding on AT Parties and a permit is not 
required before entry.73 One way to better manage cumulative risks is strengthening the ASMA and 
employing it more widely. By introducing permit requirements and requiring compliance with 
management plans, ASMAs could be more effectively employed to limit the risks of NNS in shared 
areas. 
Moreover, the SGNNS should play a role in examining the findings of the SGMP relevant to 
biosecurity. Although the latter is the most appropriate to identify the biosecurity protection found 
in a management plan, the SGNNS can evaluate whether the biosecurity measures identified are 
sufficient and suggest potential improvements. The impacts of any human activity on native 
microorganisms and thus potentially the scientific utility of an area cannot be addressed through 
decontamination procedures. The body can also have a role in the designation of areas that are of 
particular importance to biosecurity. In particular, designating and identifying pristine representative 
areas for wilderness value and only justifying entry for the purpose of research into the pristine 
natural environment of the area or monitoring, would be useful. In addition, providing a catalyst for 
AT Parties to collaborate on protecting areas of high use, modelled on the Larsemann Hills ASMA, 
would be appropriate.  
The spatial management of biosecurity threats in the context of a strategic environmental impact 
analysis may identify risks, but the employment of appropriate decontamination procedures is 
necessary to reduce the risk of NNS introduction.74 Cargo, personal equipment, waste, marine 
discharge from land and sea and the outside surfaces of marine equipment, including vessels, all 
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pose a biosecurity threat that can be mitigated if appropriately treated. Decontamination involves 
two steps: inspection and treatment.75  Several information papers already identify potential 
methods of inspection and treatment processes on vehicles within the continent76 and outside the 
continent.77 In addition, IAATO already employs extensive decontamination procedures on tourist 
operations. However, requirements on the performance of decontamination may be inappropriate 
given the differences in transport arrangements and domestic biosecurity procedures. A required 
standard, equivalent to the BWM Convention’s performance standard, employed for all transport 
vectors could adequately complement a strategic inspection regime, the components of which will 
be discussed later in the chapter. The SGNNS can play an essential role in this process, equivalent to 
the BWM Convention Secretariat in compiling information about treatment options and submitting 
to the CEP for consideration.  
5.3.3 COMPLIANCE: EDUCATION, SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT 
One of the most significant gaps identified in the implementation ATS is the lack of compliance 
measures under Article X of the AT and Article 13 of PEPAT.78 The complex jurisdictional issues in the 
Antarctic both complicate and necessitate innovative approaches to ensuring that both AT Parties 
and non-AT Parties consistently implement the substantive aspects of a biosecurity framework. A 
comprehensive biosecurity framework should be composed of three aspects of compliance. The 
most important is providing a comprehensive information sharing portal that can inform all relevant 
vectors of best practice biosecurity, current threats and responsibilities under the ATS and 
international law. The role of “developing attitudes” and self regulation amongst the community of 
States, operators and visitors is a strength of the ATS and should be exploited for the purposes of 
biosecurity.79  A biosecurity framework would benefit from SGNNS as a hub of information, 
processing regular and strategic reports on station biosecurity measures, information on monitoring 
for NNS and best practice biosecurity provisions and providing recommendations to non-compliant 
stations. This should be supported by a strategic supervision process, whereby vessels and 
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aeroplanes are inspected for NNS at the port, and stations, and arrival locations are inspected on the 
continent. Theoretically, in concert, education and the deterrent impact of surveillance should 
sufficiently secure compliance.80 However, sanctions should be available in case violations are 
suspected.  
5.3.3.1. EDUCATION AND REPORTING IN A CLEARING HOUSE FOR BIOSECURITY 
Education is an essential aspect of encouraging biosecurity compliance. The discrepancy between AT 
Parties domestic biosecurity capacity highlights the need for a system to share expertise81 and 
disseminate information on biosecurity threats and NNS in the AT area. Although the AT and PEPAT 
provides a sufficient framework for the exchange of technical and scientific cooperation,82 the 
reliance on different agencies to coordinate that exchange limits its efficiency.83 COMNAP addressed 
NNS as a strategic project in 2008-09 as part of the IPY Aliens in Antarctica project, and the action by 
SCAR84 and IAATO85 on the subject indicates the willingness of AT Parties and Antarctic operators to 
cooperate towards disseminating best practice guidelines. However, despite SCAR and IAATO 
recommending significant decontamination measures in relation to scientific research activities and 
tourists, COMNAP has not addressed the systematic disposal of untreated sewage in the AT area or 
provided procedures for decontamination of vessels, cargo and visitors. Without a single agency 
being responsible for the dissemination of biosecurity relevant information, a consistent level of 
precaution cannot be maintained.86  
A model is found in the CBD’s Clearing House Mechanism designed to promote and facilitate 
technical and scientific cooperation among Parties, other Governments and stakeholders.87 The 
institution has evolved into a global network of websites under the CBD main website, consisting of 
national clearing-house mechanisms and supporting agencies.88 The institutional support for the 
information sharing mechanisms under the AT is provided by the AT Secretariat which manages the 
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dissemination of information. 89  The clearing house is based on the philosophy that broad 
participation and easy access must be a top priority, which has also underpinned recent 
developments in the AT Secretariat.90 The CBD Clearing House is coordinated by the Executive 
Secretary, but guided and overseen by an Informal Advisory Committee set up by the Parties to the 
Convention.91 Although several IPs support and demonstrate the implementation of the Biodiversity 
Database for recording and disseminating information about present NNS,92 there is no overarching, 
specific mechanism for disseminating information relevant to biosecurity. Nevertheless, the active 
cooperation and collaboration on the issue and EIES provide a robust foundation and approximation 
of a Clearing House Mechanism in the Antarctic context. The SGNNS could play an important role in 
facilitating information and expertise exchange between countries with sophisticated biosecurity 
processes and those with less developed procedures. In addition, the SGNNS should collaborate with 
COMNAP, CCAMLR, IAATO, the AT Secretariat and relevant AT Parties to promote research and 
development of gaps in the system and integrate considerations within the individual bodies.  
The annual reports required by Article 17 of PEPAT could be utilised for recruiting the necessary 
information from AT Parties. Other than providing for the EIES, AT Parties have taken no steps to 
elaborate the reporting process. The CBD developed reporting templates to serve the utility of the 
system for compliance. Generally worded provisions can communicate qualitative details more 
effectively but for the purposes of compliance, quantitative scales are more appropriate. A possible 
option would be for the EIES to identify whether a Party has analysed biosecurity risks from all its 
Antarctic activities and then the presence or absence of specific mitigation measures in a template. 
The template could resemble the approach of the CBD Third National Reports. Although the low 
levels of implementation amongst AT Parties in the Third National Reports to the CBD does not 
indicate such an approach will measurably increase compliance, it will encourage States to annually 
review their biosecurity procedures and have access to the measures adopted by other countries. 
The development of reporting measures should also attempt to incorporate the internationally 
harmonised approach under UNEPs World Conservation Monitoring Centre. 93  Integrating the 
manner in which reporting information is presented between global and regional instruments that 
concern the same subject matter provides legal certainty on the responsibilities under the 
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conventions and enables more consistent decision making processes.94 Although Antarctic-specific 
reporting templates are necessary,95 integrating the approach of the CBD, particularly in AT Parties 
including approaches to the Antarctic in their NBSAPs and National Reports, will increase 
transparency and consistency between biodiversity conventions, allowing more efficient 
implementation at the domestic level.  
5.3.3.2. STRATEGIC SUPERVISION: CONSULTATION AND PORT STATE CONTROL 
The importance of AT Parties supervision for ensuring compliance is evident in almost every 
mechanism under the ATS. AT Party compliance is discussed in the CEP, CCAMLR and ATCM 
informed by a number of reports required by the relevant instruments. It is therefore appropriate 
that supervision processes should be adapted strategically to ensure compliance with biosecurity 
measures. Inspection and monitoring processes and reports should proactively address biosecurity 
threats and enable discussion at the regional level. A significant gap, however, is evident in the high 
seas where inspection has only been developed in relation to fishing activities under CCAMLR and 
not for compliance with PEPAT generally or pollution conventions.96 Where appropriate, Antarctic 
port states should exercise their discretion to inspect incoming vessels and aircraft to ensure 
compliance with biosecurity measures.  
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FIGURE 5.7: RECOMMENDED STRUCTURE OF STRATEGIC INSPECTIONS AND MONITORING 
Inspection is the primary form of supervision in the ATS and without a strategic approach, the 
regime is applied in an inconsistent and limited manner.97 To address the issue, some have proposed 
an international corps of inspectors, backed up with adequate resources and entitled to prosecute 
breaches before an international tribunal.98 Implementing such an approach in the context of the 
ATS would require considerable and lengthy negotiation and might not be acceptable to some 
states. An effective inspection regime for the purposes of biosecurity simply requires AT Parties to 
cooperate in a more coordinated fashion through the AT Secretariat. If empowered by the ATCM, 
the AT Secretariat could coordinate regular, systematic inspections by each NAP on all operations 
issuing advance notice under Article VII(5) of the AT. Frequency could be ascertained depending on 
the size of operation and capacity of the AT Party and a randomness heuristic included to maintain 
uncertainty. If implemented effectively, both the deterrent impacts of supervision and regular 
monitoring regime could be maintained within the context of current operations. The checklist 
should include a section on biosecurity, incorporating both an examination for the presence of NNS 
in stations, ships and protected areas and the presence of appropriate mitigation measures, based 
on the recommendations of the horatory guidance developed through the Biosecurity ICG and 
SGNNS. All inspectors should also be aware of domestic legislation and note infractions where 
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relevant. Along with the formal inspection process, supervision could be strengthened by pre-travel 
education encouraging Antarctic visitors to identify NNS or biosecurity risks, defined by reference to 
regularly updated and geographic area specific “high risk” promotional material that lists the 
potential species, activities and areas that pose a biosecurity risk. An electronic reporting form could 
allow any individual, from station leader to tourist, to report the presence of NNS or biosecurity 
risks. The form could be submitted to both the SGNNS and the closest station, the latter feeding into 
a region-specific comprehensive contingency plan. The SGNNS should play a role in examining the 
biosecurity sections of the inspection reports and reporting forms for relevant gaps and advising 
resolution of the issue, and coordinating the preparation of the high risk promotional material. An 
effective inspection regime could also benefit from the EIES system. The template EIES, as discussed 
above, could provide for the reporting of monitoring processes and specifically include the presence 
of NNS. Although only a self report measure, the deterrent impact of a potential inspection 
promotes accuracy. Nevertheless, the marine environment and non-Party activity remain a 
significant gap in the compliance mechanisms. 
As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the geographic isolation of the Antarctic and the discretion 
of the port state is a useful barrier that AT Parties can exploit to increase compliance in both AT 
Party and non-Party operators.99 Port state provisions have been discussed in relation to the ATS and 
international pollution conventions, and in their current state are not utilised for the purposes of 
reducing the risks of NNS being introduced into the Antarctic area.100 The potential dimensions of 
port state control, relevant to biosecurity, could involve the inspection of ships in port for the 
presence of NNS or biosecurity threats and accreditation for activity in Antarctica. Where any ship 
does not meet biosecurity requirements, some form of sanction should be employed to limit the 
potential risk of NNS introduction. There has been considerable focus on the accreditation of tourist 
vessels and operators;101 an important aspect of environmental protection in the Antarctic area. 
However, port state control measures should pursue a rigid inspection and accreditation process 
across all Antarctic actors. The considerable issues surrounding sovereignty of vessels on non-
commercial government service should be resolved in the Antarctic area by suspending their 
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operation. The AT and PEPAT have complex resolution and arbitration processes that can be invoked 
where there is a dispute.  
AT Parties can implement non-discriminatory biosecurity standards in relation to their own territory 
without controversy. There is scope for an AT Party to limit access to ports and port services for 
vessels that do not comply with domestic legislation. However, any such application requires a 
consistent approach across gateway AT Parties to ensure compliance. Potential ways to implement 
comprehensive and mandatory port state control will be discussed in relation to the implementation 
of the biosecurity framework as a whole. A significant limitation of port state control is the financial 
burden it puts on gateway port states, particularly ports in developing countries.102 Before enacting 
any port based biosecurity regime, AT Parties should evaluate the potential costs to port states. 
Where the costs are deemed prohibitive, parties should look at alternate ways to fund port state 
control. A voluntary levy imposed by the port on all Antarctic visitors might be appropriate and 
consistent with the notion that environmental costs of Antarctic activity should be borne by the 
actors.103 In addition, a central fund could be established with differentiated inputs according to 
capacity with the intention of distributing to those States that share the greatest burden. 
Alternatively, industry organisations could play a role in paying stipends depending on the profits 
made in the Antarctic area. This could only be effectively based on a voluntary system but could be 
supported by the mandatory port state measures. A form of collective Antarctic tax is outside the 
ambit of this thesis, but worth exploring in the context of port state control.  
5.3.3.3. THE INTRODUCER PAYS: APPLYING LIABILITY PROCESSES TO NNS 
Dissemination of relevant information reinforced by a rigid and strategic supervision should be 
sufficient to ensure compliance with biosecurity measures. However, the legal framework should be 
prepared for intentional and unintentional breaches of primary rules. As a deterrent, the role of 
withdrawing activity authorization or imposing a fine or imprisonment plays an important role in the 
domestic implementation of PEPAT.104 Although PEPAT does not provide for any specific sanctions, it 
requires States to “modif*y+, suspen*d+ or cance*l+” activities if they result in impacts inconsistent 
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with the planning principles under Article 3.105 IAATO’s bylaws also provide for sanctions for 
breaching the bylaws.106 However, the only practical elaboration of sanctions under PEPAT is in 
relation to liability. The IUCN recommends biosecurity frameworks promote a “culture of 
accountability and civil and administrative responsibility on all levels.”107  
The concept of polluter pays both stimulates greater care on the part of operators to take a 
precautionary approach to NNS risks and provides for recovery and remediation.108 However, 
traditional liability approaches have limited utility for biosecurity.109 Unauthorised or unintentional 
introductions are hard to detect, and because of time lags it is often impossible to determine the 
cause of an introduction with the certainty required by a legal liability regime.110 Moreover, the 
damage can be unlimited. An approach similar to Annex VI is useful for the Antarctic. The approach 
would limit liability to cases of environmental emergencies where the source of an introduction is 
clear and appropriate response measures are taken by another actor or are quantifiable. Such an 
approach could invoke the provisions of Annex VI by expressly identifying clear NNS introduction and 
establishment as an “environmental emergency”. This would also create a precautionary duty to 
prepare contingency plans and respond to any identified introduction or establishment in the 
Antarctic area. A potential solution that avoids the issues of causation and unlimited liability is a no-
fault liability fund, financed by a fee collected at the point of entry of the Antarctic area.111 Similar to 
the Annex VI Fund, in the absence of a liable party, the fund could support any response action. 
Economists have already devised methods to determine the extent of environmental harm from an 
invasive episode and incorporate the cost into a levy system112 and similar methods have been 
implemented in the Australian Ballast Levy Acts. 113  However, in the context of Antarctica, 
quantifying potential damages might prove more difficult than a domestic State, where wilderness, 
                                                          
105
 PEPAT, Article 3, 4(b). 
106
 IAATO, IAATO Bylaws, Article III(h). 
107
 Shine, 2000, 81. 
108
 Bush, 2000, 39. 
109
 Shine, 2000, 34;  
110
 Ibid, 82. 
111
 See for example in relation to NNS generally: M Perrault and W Carroll William, ‘Turning off the Tap: A strategy to 
Address International Aspects of Invasive Alien Species,’ (2002) 11(2) Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 211. 
112
 M Margois, J F Shogren and C Fischer, ‘How Trade Politics Affect Invasive Species Control’, (2005) 52 Ecological 
Economics 305, 310; J Touza, K Dehnen-Schmutz and G Jones, ‘Economic Analysis of Invasive Species Policies’ in W Nentwig 
(ed.) 193 Biological Invasions (2007), 353. 
113
 Ballast Water Research and Development Funding Levy Act 1998 (Australia) and Ballast Water Research and 
Development Funding Levy Collection Act 1998 (Australia); S Riley, ‘Invasive Alien Species and the Protection of 
Biodiversity: the Role of Quarantine Laws in Resolving Inadequacies in the International Legal Regime,’ (2005) 17 Journal of 
International Law 3, 358. 
220 
 
aesthetic and scientific values are protected. There is a considerable scope for innovative methods 
of funding response and port state control. 
 
5.3. ADOPTING A BIOSECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE ANTARCTIC AREA 
There are several different options for the implementation of the various aspects of the ideal 
biosecurity framework. Many of the approaches discussed above impliedly involve substantial 
changes to the measures and recommendations underpinning PEPAT and the text of the Annexes 
themselves. The current approach adopted by the CEP is limited but forms the foundation of the 
biosecurity framework. The NNS work plan proposes generating objectives and guiding principles, 
building biosecurity into existing procedures, developing guidance based on a “Prevention, 
Surveillance and Response” approach and gathering expert advice for high risk areas.114 However, 
there is no indication how these measures should be implemented in the ATS. There is value in a 
single framework that can strategically integrate the various elements into a comprehensive system. 
The IUCN recommends reviewing and consolidating existing measures into a unitary legislative 
framework that covers all categories of species, areas and activities.115 However, proactively 
addressing all the risks of biosecurity is a lengthy, complex and technical task and could have the 
effect of displacing otherwise effective environmental planning mechanisms and institutions.116 This 
section will promote a unitary framework that incorporates the sectoral approach of the CEP with an 
end goal of comprehensive, binding measures. 
Approaching the issue from a global perspective is a possible alternative to consideration within the 
ATS. The adoption of a comprehensive instrument addressing biosecurity under the ambit of UNEP, 
drawing from the example of the IMO in promoting specific regional protection in the Antarctic 
could have several advantages over the ATS.117 A global negotiation process could include those 
third party states that authorise activity in the Antarctic and provide for comprehensive compliance 
procedures across ports and international spaces. However, any negotiation process would be 
lengthy and potentially involve compromising standards beyond that necessary to protect Antarctic 
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values. A regional approach can identify the specific risks in the Antarctic area and the ATS has 
proven it can address Antarctic environmental issues in a proactive and precautionary way.  
Moreover, the acceptance of any external control over the Antarctic area is unlikely where territorial 
claims remained unresolved.118  
PEPAT and the AT are flexible framework conventions with inbuilt mechanisms to adapt to new 
environmental risks and changing patterns of use in the Antarctic area. Adopting a new instrument 
within the ATS is not necessary as biosecurity implicitly fits within the comprehensive environmental 
protection of PEPAT. Moreover, biosecurity is a cross cutting issue across the mechanisms of PEPAT. 
Updating the various tools and mechanisms to incorporate strategic area based planning should be 
prioritised over the adoption of a single instrument. However, performance obligations for 
decontamination in the Antarctic and restrictions on discharge require articulation in legally binding 
form. Adopting annexes or amending Annex II is the most appropriate legal mechanism for 
implementing a framework of biosecurity measures within the ATS. The key objective, appropriate 
guiding principles and definitions can be formalised as in the Annex. The appropriate provisions 
annexed from Article 4, Annex II will be separated into general, unintentional introductions and 
intentional introductions and the scope widened to incorporate monitoring for establishment. AT 
Parties will also be obliged to developed contingency plans and respond to identified NNS 
introductions, based on the approach of Annex VI. The Annex will also formalise the role of the 
SGNNS and its recommendations, independent of the consideration of the CEP and ATCM. The 
amendment provisions also permit AT Parties to separately integrate strategic impact assessment 
that focusses on area based management and strategic inspection processes that are necessary 
components to the management of biosecurity. Strengthening some aspects of the system, for 
example amending Annex V to include permit and compliance with management plans, would not 
involve substantial changes to domestic legislation with some AT Parties already employing the 
ASMA as a binding tool.119 
However, the negotiation history of Annex VI demonstrates the difficulties in establishing an annex 
to PEPAT, even when there is a clear obligation to do so in the text of PEPAT.120 Furthermore, 
amending an Annex can involve considerable negotiations and compromise of environmental 
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values.121  The amendment of Annex II and preparation of an annex with the objective of 
comprehensively addressing biosecurity threats in the Antarctic area could prove difficult to 
negotiate and, if compromised in eventual formulation, may constitute less of a protection than in 
place under subsidiary measures. PEPAT itself only took one year to negotiate as it effectively 
integrates the environmental measures already present in the ATS. Analogously, if a number of 
biosecurity measures are implemented in the ATS already, the Annex only has to integrate these 
measures into a coordinated instrument.  
A combination of measures, recommendations and CMs through CCAMLR should form the initial 
stages of the regime. Although soft law approaches cannot approximate the level of compliance 
required for effective biosecurity,122 they can play a role in “*serving+ a focus for the emergence of a 
more widespread and consistent body of practice.”123 At the completion of the work of the ICG, a 
Meeting of Experts should be convened with the role of creating a forward looking framework that 
has an end goal of a comprehensive, binding Annex. The key objective and guiding principles under 
consideration could then be then annexed to a resolution that confirms the importance of 
biosecurity in the AT area and adopts the relevant definitions from the CBD. The initial resolution 
should also confirm the institution of a subsidiary group on NNS that can guide the development of 
further measures and recommend more fundamental changes to PEPAT’s environmental 
management system. An important starting point for the SGNNS is proposing changes to the 
guidance that have been adopted by the ATCM with a focus on biosecurity. The role of awareness-
raising in the ATS is acute and it is essential that the information on how to plan activities 
consistently imparts a precautionary approach to NNS.124 Part of this process will be the adoption of 
a “quarantine manual” that offers an opportunity for AT Parties sophisticated in biosecurity to share 
their knowledge and reduce of NNS introduction posed by other AT Parties’ activities. The 
development of more systematised reporting process can also feed into this process. The limitation 
of the approach is evident in the regulation of tourism, where resolutions and site guidelines direct 
tourist activity but do not approximate the strategic, area based management that is necessary to 
exclude potential introductions. It is thus essential that AT Parties strategically develop binding rules 
on the implementation of biosecurity standards.  
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FIGURE 5.8: SUMMARY OF CEP ACTION PLAN ON NNS AND SUGGESTED IMPLEMENTATION
125
 
Employing measures has some utility in this process. Measures can create a binding performance 
obligation, complemented by resolutions annexing guidelines on the means to achieve the 
obligation.126 Although the measure is not quite a Treaty, the negotiation process can be lengthy and 
involve compromise.127 It is important the SGNNS takes an active role in developing attitudes 
amongst AT Parties that promotes a precautionary and comprehensive approach to biosecurity in 
the negotiation of new agreements. In particular, the SGNNS should analyse risk assessments 
performed under the ambit of the ICG and identify performance standards necessary to reduce high 
risk biosecurity threats. These performance standards can then be implemented as a measure, 
which could possibly take a significant amount of time to come into force but even before becoming 
effective, can indicate where the law is going and change AT Parties behaviour. The SGNNS can also 
utilise the measure to encourage the CEP or a relevant AT Party to enact strategic area protection 
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for the purpose of biosecurity. However, the Larsemann Hill ASMA is not an adequate model for 
future development. Strategic mechanisms for monitoring, planning activity and avoiding biologically 
sensitive areas should be employed in a comprehensive management plan for all areas where a 
number of States are operating.  
The measure could also be utilised for the introduction of port state measures, including mandatory 
inspection and sanctions as well as the “no-fault” liability fund or tax invoked by gateway states on 
visitors. Whether a measure under the ATS to protect the Antarctic environment would be sufficient 
justification to adopt sanctions is not clear.128  A memorandum of understanding (‘MOU’) modelled 
on the Paris MOU of 1982 or the Viña de Mar MOU of 1992 has been suggested as an appropriate 
means to implement an effective port state control regime in the Antarctic area.129 Vicuña proposes 
“special certificates of Antarctic worthiness” under such an instrument, which might be an 
appropriate way to ensure biosecurity-relevant inspections are regularly carried out on AT vessels.130 
However, further exploration of this issue in the CEP will be useful and the polar code should include 
mandatory port state responsibilities.131 
There is still a significant role for external standards and collaboration with international regimes 
outside the ATS for the management of biosecurity in the Antarctic area. The non-application to 
tourist operators flagged to non-AT Party States will evoke a significant gap in the implementation of 
any spatial management system by the ATS. High risk areas and aspects of activity in the marine 
environment are appropriately addressed by the IMO and ATS in unison, as the all States operating 
in the Antarctic area are members of the IMO.132 Assigning marine areas more protection in oceans 
law invokes the awkward balance between conservation and rational use of Antarctic marine living 
resources, as well as the limited scope of MPAs in international law.133 However, the designation of 
the Antarctic Special Area under MARPOL 73/78, adoption of Ballast Water Guidelines for the 
Antarctic area and the increasing cooperation between the IMO and ATS, increases the potential for 
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the designation of effective marine protected areas. 134 In marine areas, to target biosecurity threats 
designation must prohibit access to an area, limit activities in an area or prevent discharge in the 
area. A Special Area can directly prohibit certain types of pollutants but a PSSA is a basis through 
which measures may be taken by the IMO.135  The protection offered by the IMO includes 
designation as a Special Area to restrict discharge of pollutants,136 adoption of routing and reporting 
systems137 and additional protections with a legal basis, including establishing no-discharge zones for 
ballast water.138 The possibility of developing biofouling guidelines or mandatory procedures to 
prevent biofouling and ballast water discharge increases the utility of Antarctic PSSAs. The role of 
the SGNNS in this process is one of promotion, identifying biosecurity threats in the marine 
environment through both the CEP and SC-CAMLR and encouraging further linkages with the IMO to 
limit the potential impact of the threat. The potential incorporation of ballast and biofouling 
measures into the Mandatory Polar Code should be contemplated. 
Moreover, collaboration with the CBD and area protection regimes promotes transparent and 
integrated approaches to biosecurity in area protection. Tourist activities pose particular risks to 
certain areas and restricting tourist activities to specific areas in the terrestrial and marine 
environment could limit the potential for NNS introduction. The potential designation of areas under 
other conventions could encourage non-AT Party compliance and harmonise Antarctic management 
better with global biodiversity protection conventions. In the terrestrial environment, this is very 
difficult. There is no scope in the Ramsar Convention, World Heritage Convention or the Man and 
the Biosphere Program for protecting areas outside of national jurisdiction.139 Article 8(h) of the CBD 
does apply outside national jurisdiction and part of its program of work promotes the development 
of guidance, best practices and pilot projects that address the threats of invasive alien species to 
particular sites or habitats protected under the above Conventions. In order to create some scope 
for Antarctic designation, AT Parties need to empower the AT Secretariat to interact with area 
protection regimes on behalf of AT Parties. Moreover, AT Parties must ensure the ratification of the 
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relevant Conventions and promote the creation of mechanisms for protection of international 
spaces. It is unlikely any such measures will be promoted while the sovereign status of Antarctica 
remains ambiguous. However, interaction with the CBD on the protection of special areas, if only to 
provide key studies of ASPAs designated for ecological significance, will do much to increase the 
legitimacy of the ATS amongst non-State Parties. The SGNNS is the most appropriate support agency 
for such an interaction. Moreover, AT Parties regulation has thus far focussed on the potential risks 
from intensity of visitation but just as threatening is the scope of tourist activities. Systematised 
limitation of tourist activity to areas that can be regularly monitored is important and the 
development of adequate regulatory standards in collaboration with IAATO should be a focus of AT 
Parties. 
Although the establishment of commitments in legally binding form must be the outcome of the 
development of a biosecurity framework in the Antarctic, the effectiveness of biosecurity will be 
contingent upon the development of attitudes towards the issue. Constant vigilance is necessary for 
a regime to be effective, integrating the changing patterns of use and climate into the constantly 
developing field of international biosecurity. Through the establishment of a permanent expert body 
under the CEP, making recommendations and developing best practice guidelines, AT Parties can 
collectively contribute to the incremental development of a biosecurity framework that can take into 
account these developments. This body, as envisioned in this chapter, should be responsible for a 
strategic focus on biosecurity that must integrate the global, regional and domestic developments 
into a cohesive and consistent set of practices that can once sufficiently accepted can be codified in 
the form of an Annex. A series of resolutions editing the current guidance, formalising the 
objectives, institution and guidance should form the foundations of the framework. Where more 
radical developments are deemed necessary through the analysis of risks, measures that incorporate 
biosecurity performance standards and strategic inspection processes should be implemented and 
Annexes amended to incorporate a strategic, area based management system into PEPAT.  
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5.4. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
“He looked out at the great blank of a Polar continent, the wide white page upon which he would write a new 
civilization…”
140
  
“Man is by definition the first and primary weed under whose influence all other weeds have evolved.”
141
 
 
Since whalers and sealers plundered the Southern seas and islands and early explorers sought 
immortality in achieving milestones, the Antarctic area’s isolation has been its attraction. A visit to 
the sprawling town of McMurdo will dispel any illusion that Antarctica is the “bare canvas” imagined 
by artists. However, it is the absence of one of the most obvious symptoms of human presence, 
invasive NNS, that still offers significant value to commercial operators and scientists alike. To avoid 
apocalyptic homogeneity predicted for other regions,142 safeguarding the wilderness aspects of the 
Antarctic environment necessitates radical action by AT Parties to minimize or eliminate the risk of 
human activity introducing NNS. 
In every wilderness area protected by legal processes, there is a balance between human utility and 
environmental protection. These risks are epitomized and amplified by NNS fundamentally attached 
to all human movement. A growing knowledge base has begun to explore the extent Antarctic 
operations introduce NNS. Increasing research indicates that NNS can survive and have established 
in some Antarctic environments. Some of those likely to visit Antarctica are the same individuals 
likely to visit other high altitude or latitude locations, whether they be ecotourists, scientists or 
vessels and thus have the potential to pick up potentially viable NNS and accidentally dispose 
propagules into the Antarctic area. Moreover, the climactic isolation that protects the Antarctic is 
slowly disappearing and as geologically contiguous areas become suited for NNS dispersal, the 
potential for human impacts will increase. PEPAT introduces a focus on minimizing environmental 
impact in the Antarctic, primarily through introducing awareness processes in the management of 
NAPs and compliance through mutual inspection and consultation. This stops short of “the very best 
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efforts of the ATCPs to protect the Antarctic environment”143 and the lack of legal mechanisms to 
address the vectors of NNS introduction is a serious gap that requires attention. 
The final chapter proposes some proactive measures to exclude NNS that include but surpass 
mandatory quarantine standards. Precautionary, holistic, area based and strategic planning 
processes must be introduced into the Antarctic area, with independent supervision and 
enforcement measures adopted to ensure compliance. A fundamental revision of the concept of 
precaution as applied to Antarctica is necessary to achieve the level of protection needed. The 
concept of sustainable use, whether for research purposes, aesthetic pleasure or marine living 
resources, needs to be revised, prioritizing conservation of indigenous ecosystems. Planning 
processes must be developed that do not focus on individual State programs but holistically on 
human interaction with the continent. Large, representative areas should be put aside for higher 
protection in the terrestrial and marine environment. Analogous to the New Zealand Sub-Antarctic 
Minimum Impact Islands, visitation to any protected area should be justified on the basis of 
management purposes. Moreover, any human presence should fit within a strategic plan for 
interaction with the continent that includes a focus on biosecurity. To implement these approaches, 
an international institution equipped with legal personality, the capacity to inspect all actors and 
take sanctions against States who do not comply should be created. To essentially revise the ATS is 
an ambitious goal and would require a considerable amount of work within the international 
community and ATS, however, the changes are necessary to effectively protect the Antarctic from 
the threats associated with NNS. 
The flexibility of the ATS has often been cited as the heart of its success.144 To actually put into effect 
the change in focus from peaceful, scientific use to comprehensive protection of the Antarctic 
environment, that adaptability must be further tested. In the year 2010, looking back at the list of 
NNS packed on the voyage on Captain Robert Falcoln Scott’s final, fatal attempt on the Pole is 
staggering. Recounted in Anne Michael’s Ice House: the “thirty five-dogs…fifteen ponies, one guinea 
pig, one fantail pigeon, three rabbits and one cat with its own hammock, blanket and pillow”145 do 
not begin to describe the propagule load that early explorers and scientists brought to the 
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continent.146 Fortunately, the climactic isolation has somewhat protected the Antarctic area but the 
same cannot be said for the many other areas of the planet where the careless and naïve 
introduction of NNS has fundamentally changed the balance of ecosystems.147 It is to be hoped in a 
hundred years time, the future generations that will benefit from the protection of areas like 
Antarctica do not equally bemoan our lack of foresight. The most damaging NNS will always be the 
human and although eradication is not an option, the priority of those wishing to protect Antarctica 
for future generations should be on containment and control. 
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APPENDIX 1 
SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS TO COMMITTEE FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ON NON-NATIVE SPECIES 
 
KEY:  
 
Categories based on C Shine, N Williams and L Gündling, ‘A Guide to Designing Legal and Institutional Frameworks on Alien 
Invasive Species,’ IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 40 (2000). 
 
Risk Assessment: The identifying the risk involved with non native species or risks surrounding particular activities. 
Education: Disseminating information about Antarctic NNS and biosecurity responsibilities and best practise to actors likely 
to interact with the Antarctic environment. 
Surveillance: Developing a baseline of NNS in the Antarctic, monitoring for NNS and communicating the results of 
monitoring to other AT Parties. 
Structure: Describing or addressing the systemic or strategic treatment of NNS in the ATS. 
Response: Describing or addressing biosecurity response measures. 
Quarantine: Measures preventing or reducing the risks of NNS entering a geographic area (terrestrial environment unless 
indicated otherwise). 
Marine: Quarantine specific to the marine environment. 
Protected areas: Quarantine specific to protected areas. 
 
SOURCE: 
 
AT Secretariat, Topic Summary of CEP discussions on Non-native species (NNS) in Antarctica ATCM XXXII SP11 (2009). 
IPs and WPs to the CEP on subject of NNS. 
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TABLE 1: SUBMISSIONS TO THE CEP ON NNS (1998-2006) 
 
Year (CEP) State/NGO Submission Category Practical Consequences 
1998 (CEP I) Australia Introduction of Diseases to Antarctic Wildlife: 
Proposed Workshop (IP 4) 
Risk 
assessment 
[WP 32 (CEP II)] 
1998 (CEP I) IUCN Introduction of NNS in the Antarctic area: An 
increasing problem (IP 53) 
Risk 
assessment 
NNS priority for the CEP. 
1999 (CEP II) Australia Report to ATCM XXIII on outcomes from the 
Workshop on Diseases of Antarctic Wildlife 
(WP 32) 
Risk 
assessment 
“Disease” ICG established to 
identify and diminish risk of 
wildlife disease . 
2000 (CEP III) Australia Diseases of Antarctic Widlife (WP 6) 
 
Risk 
assessment 
Extend Disease ICG with terms of 
reference: 
- risk analysis 
- prevention 
- response 
2000 (CEP III) SCAR and 
COMNAP 
Wildlife diseases (WP 20) Risk 
assessment 
2001 (CEP IV) Australia Report on the open-ended intersesssional 
contact group on Diseases of Antarctic 
Wildlife: Report 1: Review and Risk 
Assessment (WP 10) and Report 2: Practical 
Measures to Diminish Risk (Draft) (WP 11).   
Risk 
assessment 
Education 
Quarantine 
Surveillance 
Response 
Disease risk very low: Disease ICG 
complete. 
[IP 62 (CEP V)] 
Set of Guidelines for diminishing 
risk of disease introduction. 
2002 (CEP V) Australia Draft Response Plan in the Event that Unusual 
Animal Deaths are Discovered (IP 62) 
Response Guidelines for contingency plan 
in the case of suspected disease 
outbreak (implemented by 
Australia). 
2004 (CEP VII) Australia Australia’s Antarctic Quarantine Practises (IP 
71) 
Education 
Quarantine 
Surveillance 
Response 
 
2005 (CEP VIII) Australia Measures to address the unintentional 
introduction of non-native biota and disease 
to the AT Area (WP 28) 
Education 
Quarantine 
Surveillance 
Response 
Australia proposes ICG on 
biosecurity (instituted in 2009). 
New Zealand propose workshop 
on quarantine and NNS 
[WP 13 (CEP IX) and IP 46 (CEP 
IX). 
2005 (CEP VIII) IUCN Introduction of NNS, Parasites and Diseases 
(IP 63) 
Risk 
Assessment 
2005 (CEP VIII) IAATO Decontamination Guidelines and the 
Introduction and Detection of Diseases in 
Antarctic Wildlife: IAATO’s Perspective (IP 97) 
Quarantine  
2005 (CEP VIII) COMNAP 
and IAATO 
The use of Ballast Water in Antarctica (IP 121) Marine 
Quarantine 
[WP 5 rev 1 (CEP IX)] 
2006 (CEP IX) United 
Kingdom 
Practical Guidelines for Ballast Water 
Exchange in the ATA (WP 5 rev 1) 
 “Ballast Water Exchange in the 
ATA” Resolution 3 ATCM XXIX 
(2006) 
2006 (CEP IX) New 
Zealand 
“NNS in the Antarctic”: Report of a Workshop 
(WP 13) and  
“NNS in the Antarctic”: A Workshop (IP 46) 
Risk 
Assessment 
Education 
Quarantine 
Surveillance 
Response 
CEP supports recommendations: 
- highest priority for CEP 
- CEP takes lead on issue 
- provide information and take 
advise from relevant bodies 
- build knowledge base 
- integrate into existing 
procedures 
- prepare comprehensive 
guidelines on prevention, 
surveillance, response approach 
2006 (CEP IX) Australia Principles underpinning Australia’s approach 
to Antarctic quarantine management (IP 44) 
Structure  
2006 (CEP IX) IUCN Antarctic NNS: what can we learn from the 
global situation? (IP 57) 
Risk 
Assessment 
 
2006 (CEP IX) COMNAP The Use of Ballast Water in Antarctica (IP 83) 
and the Use of Anti-fouling Biocide Paints by 
national Antarctic Program Vessels (IP 82) 
Marine 
Quarantine 
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TABLE 2: SUBMISSIONS TO THE CEP ON NNS (2007-2009) 
 
 
Year (CEP) State/NGO Submission Category Practical Consequences 
2007 (CEP X) SCAR Hull fouling as a source of marine invasion in 
the Antarctic (IP37) 
Marine 
Quarantine 
 
2007 (CEP X) New 
Zealand 
The Invasive Species Database (IP43) Surveillance [WP 16 (CEP XI)] 
2007 (CEP X) IUCN Prevention and Management of Harmful NNS 
in the Antarctic and the sub-Antarctic (IP126) 
Risk 
Assessment 
Education 
Knowledge 
Base 
Quarantine 
Surveillance 
Response 
 
2007 (CEP X) Australia 
and SCAR 
Aliens in Antarctica (IP49) Risk 
Assessment 
Surveillance 
 
2007 (CEP X) New 
Zealand 
Non-native species: Pathways and Vectors 
between New Zealand and Scott Base, 
Antarctica (NZ) (IP36) 
Risk 
Assessment 
Surveillance 
[IP 36 (CEPXII) 
2008 (CEP XI) Australia Antarctic Alien Species Database (WP16) Surveillance  
2008 (CEP XI) COMNAP Survey on existing procedures concerning 
introduction of NNS in Antarctica (IP98) 
Structure  
2008 (CEP XI) Australia, 
China, 
India, 
Romania 
and 
Russian 
Federation 
Measures to protect Larsemann Hills, East 
Antarctica, from the introduction of NNS 
(IP17) 
Quarantine 
Surveillance 
Response 
 
2008 (CEP XI) Uruguay Medidas Previvas para evitar la introduccion 
de species alienas en la Antartida, en 
cumplimiento del Anexo II del Protocolo (IP33) 
Education 
Quarantine 
Surveillance 
Response 
 
2008 (CEP XI) New 
Zealand 
NNS Incursions at Scott Base, Antarctic (IP75) Surveillance 
Response 
 
2008 (CEP XI) USA NNS Awareness Campaign: “Don’t Pack a 
Pest” When Travelling to Antarctica (IP93 rev. 
1)  
Education  
2008 (CEP XI) USA Report on Exploration of Antarctic Subglacial 
Aquatic Environments; Environmental and 
Scientific Stewardship (IP110) 
Quarantine  
2009 (CEP XII) Australia, 
France, 
New 
Zealand 
A work program for CEP action on NNS 
(WP05) 
Structure NNS focussed ICG established with 
terms of reference: 
- objective and key guiding principles 
- biosecurity measures for 
transferring into Antarctica and 
between sites 
- identify risks 
2009 (CEP XII) United 
Kingdom 
Review of provisions relating to NNS 
introductions in ASPA and ASMA management 
plans (WP33) and ASPA and ASMA 
management plans: review of provisions 
relating to NNS introductions (IP12) 
Protected 
Areas 
2009 (CEP XII) New 
Zealand 
A framework for analysing and managing NNS 
risks in Antarctica (IP36)  
Risk 
Assessment 
2009 (CEP XII) ASOC Impacts of local human activities on the 
Antarctic environment: a review (IP02) 
Risk 
Assessment 
2009 (CEP XII) AT 
Secretariat 
Topic Summary of CEP discussions on Non-
native species (NNS) in Antarctica (SP11) 
Structure 
2009 (CEP XII) South 
Africa 
Propagule transport associated with logistic 
operations: a South African appraisal of a 
regional issue (WP23) 
Quarantine United Kingdom to merge the two 
sets of guidelines. 
 
 2009 (CEP XII) United 
Kingdom 
Procedures for vehicle cleaning to prevent 
transfer of NNS into and around Antarctica 
(WP32). 
Quarantine 
2009 (CEP XII) SCAR SCAR’s environmental code of conduct for 
terrestrial field research in Antarctica (IP04). 
Quarantine Environmental guidelines for 
scientific activity in Antarctica 
focused on biosecurity 
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APPENDIX 2 
BIOSECURITY WORK PLAN FOR THE CEP 
 
SOURCES: 
 
1. CEP, Final Report of the Report of the CEP XII (2009), Annex I. 
2. Australia, France and New Zealand, ‘A Work Program for CEP Action on NNS’ ATCM XXXII WP05 (2009). 
 
TABLE 1: 2009 FIVE YEAR CEP WORK PLAN 
 
Note: Only two years have relevant actions for biosecurity. 
 
Issue / 
Environmental 
Pressure 
Priority 
for CEP 
Actions Timetable for actions to be addressed at CEP meetings and 
during the Intercessional periods (subject to annual review) 
   Interses. 
period 
CEP XIII 2010 Interses. 
period 
CEP XIV 2011 
Introduction of 
non-native 
species 
1 1. Review 
Workshop 
recommendation
s 
2. Develop 
practical 
guidelines / 
standards / 
norms for all 
Antarctic 
operators. 
3. Establish a 
database of non-
native species 
occurrences in 
Antarctica. 
 
IC
G
 a
s 
p
e
r 
th
e 
w
o
rk
 p
la
n
 
Consideration 
of results of 
Aliens in 
Antarctic IPY 
project. 
 
Report from the 
ICG 
IC
G
 a
s 
p
e
r 
th
e 
w
o
rk
 p
la
n
 
Report from 
the ICG 
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TABLE 2. 2009-2012 WORK PROGRAMME FOR ICG 
 
CEP XII (2009)  Adopt work program for high priority issue ‘Introduction of non-native species’ and 
incorporate into five-year work plan 
 Initiate Intercessional work to commence development of quarantine manual 
(general aspects) 
 Consider interim results of Aliens in Antarctica IPY project 
 Consider outcomes of CEP / SC-CAMLR workshop discussion of non-native 
species  
 Review SCAR Code of Conduct 
Intercessional 
Period 
 Commence development of quarantine manual (general elements) 
 Members encourage input of non-native species records to Biodiversity Database 
 SGMP consider measures to address non-native species concerns in protected areas 
 Consider measures to address non-native species concerns as part of work to 
develop general guidelines for visitors 
CEP XIII 
(2010) 
 Consider outcomes of intercessional work and provide directions for further 
Intercessional work to develop quarantine manual (specific aspects) 
 Consider results of IPY Aliens in Antarctica project 
 Dedicated discussion of high risk environment / areas / activities / species and 
further research and monitoring requirements, and commission expert advice as 
appropriate (for submission to CEP XIV) 
 Review work program 
 Provide progress report to ATCM 
Intercessional 
Period 
 Continue development of quarantine manual (specific aspects) 
 As appropriate, development of expert advice on high risk environment / areas / 
activities / species and further research and monitoring requirements 
 Members encourage input of non-native species records to Biodiversity Database 
CEP XIV 
(2011) 
 Consider outcomes of Intercessional work and provide directions for further 
Intercessional work to develop quarantine manual (specific aspects) 
 Review non-native species records in Biodiversity Database 
 Consider expert advice on research and monitoring requirements 
 Review work program 
 Provide progress report to ATCM 
Intercessional 
Period 
 Continued development of specific guidelines  
 Commission expert advice on research and monitoring requirements 
CEP XV (2012)  Consider outcomes of Intercessional work 
 Review progress on the introduction non-native species and identify any 
requirements for further work. 
 Report to ATCM on progress and future work. 
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APPENDIX 3 
BIOSECURITY CONTENT OF INSPECTION REPORTS SINCE PEPAT 
CAME INTO FORCE 
 
SOURCES: 
 
AT Secretariat, List of Inspections under Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty and Article 14 of the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection (2009)  
< http://www.ats.aq/e/ats_governance_listinspections.htm> at 12 November 2009. 
Australia, Peru and United Kingdom, Report of Joint Inspections Under Article VII Of The Antarctic Treaty And 
Article 14 of the Environmental Protocol ATCM XXIX WP 34(2005) 
Australia, Scott Base and Mcmurdo Station: Report of an inspection under Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty and 
Article 14 of the Protocol on Environmental Protection ATCM XXVIII WP 16 (2005) 
Belgium and France, Joint Inspection in Eastern Antarctica conducted in 1999 by Belgium and France under 
Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty ATCM XXIII IP 42 (1999) 
Finland, Report Of The 2004 Finnish Antarctic Inspection Under Article VII Of The Antarctic Treaty And Article 14 
Of The Protocol On Environmental Protection To The Antarctic Treaty ATCM XXVII IP 31 (2004) 
Germany and United Kingdom, Report Of A Joint Inspection Under Article VII Of The Antarctic Treaty Antarctic 
Treaty Inspection Programme: January, 1999 ATCM XXIII WP 23 (2000) 
New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States, Ross Sea Protected Area Inspections 2006 ATCM XXIX WP 34 
(2006) 
Norway, Report of the 2001 Norwegian Antarctic inspection under Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty and Article 
14 of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty ATCM XXIV WP 25 (2001) 
Sweden, France and New Zealand, Report of the Antarctic Treaty inspections undertaken jointly by Sweden, 
France and New Zealand in accordance with Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty and Article 14 of the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty ATCM XXX WP 16 (2007) 
United States Report of Inspections ATCM XXX IP 10 (2007) 
United States, Team Report Of The Inspection Conducted In Accordance With Article VII Of The Antarctic Treaty 
And Article XIV Of The Protocol Under The Auspices of the United States Department of State ATCM XXIV IP 17 
(2001) 
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TABLE 1: BIOSECURITY IN INSPECTION REPORTS CONDUCTED UNDER ARTICLE VII OF THE AT 
AND ARTICLE 14 OF PEPAT 2005-2009 [2 PAGES] 
 
Submitted 
to ATCM 
Inspecting 
Party  
Inspected Facilities  Identified NNS/Biosecurity Threats  
IP 96/ 
ATCM 
XXXII 
(2009) 
Norway Princess Elisabeth (Belgium) 
Halley (UK) 
Novo Airbase 
[No report available] 
WP 16/ 
ATCM XXX 
(2007) 
Sweden, 
France and 
New 
Zealand 
Amundsen-Scott South Pole (United States)  
Concordia (France-Italy) 
South Pole: 
Hydroponics permitted. 
Conchordia: 
None permitted. 
Both: 
No measures taken to avoid accidental introduction 
of NNS. 
Avian products, carcasses – returned to France/US. 
US – Hydroponics permitted. 
IP 10/ 
ATCM XXIX 
(2007) 
United 
States 
Rothera (United Kingdom) 
O’Higgins (Chile)  
German Receiving Station at O’Higgins (Germany)  
Esperanza (Argentina) 
Bellingshausen (Russian Federation)  
Great Wall (People’s Republic of China) 
Palmer (United States)  
Field camp at Petermann Island (tour operations)  
Vessels: 
M/S National Geographic Endeavour,  
M/S Lyubov Orlova,  
M/S Explorer II  
 
Rothera: preventative biosecurity measures in place 
after transient NNS introduction at base. 
O’Higgins: 
None mentioned – even though close contact with 
indigenous species. 
Esperanza: 
All equipment cleaned and fumigated before entering 
– fresh fruits minimal quantities – no NNS reported. 
Bellinghausen:  
Discharge untreated sewage into nearby stream 
(broken treatment plant).  
Plants + non-sterile soil possibly not compliant with 
PEPAT. 
Great Wall: 
None mentioned. 
Tourist vessels: 
IAATO decontamination measures implemented. 
No ballast water discharged inside AT area. 
 
WP 34/ 
ATCM XXIX 
(2006) 
New 
Zealand, 
United 
Kingdom 
and United 
States 
Protected Areas 
ASMA 2: McMurdo  
Dry Valleys; ASPA 116: Cape Bird, New College 
Valley; ASPA 122: Arrival Heights 
ASPA 154: Cape Evans; ASPA 157: Cape Royds; 
ASPA 158: Hut Point  
No discussion of NNS or biosecurity threats. 
WP 32/ 
ATCM 
XXVIII 
(2005) 
Australia, 
Peru and 
United 
Kingdom 
Esperanza, Marambio, San Martín, Decepción, 
Brown, Petrel, Comandante (Argentina) 
Ferraz (Brazil)  
St. Kliment Ochridiski (Bulgaria)  
Capitán Arturo Prat. Risopatron. Yelcho, 
Gabriel Gonzalez Videla,  Teniente Luis Carvajal 
Villaroel (Chile) 
Unnamed Czech Station, James Ross Island (Czech 
Republic)  
Pedro Vicente Maldonado (Ecuador)  
Great Wall (Peoples Republic of China)  
King Sejong (Republic of Korea)  
Bellingshausen (Russian Federation)  
Gabriel de Castilla, Juan Carlos I (Spain)  
Akademik Vernadsky (Ukraine)  
T/N Ruperto Elichiribehety (Uruguay)  
Rothera Research Station (UK)  
Vessels and Protected Areas 
Eco-Nelson (Non Governmental) 
MV Professor Molchanov (Tourist Vessel) 
HSM 55: Stonington- East Base; HSM 63: ‘Base Y’, 
Horseshoe Island; HSM 61: Base A, Port Lockroy; 
HSM 62: ‘Base F’ (Wordie House) Winter Island; 
HSM 64: ‘Base E’, Stonington Island  
Express identification of biosecurity threats and 
general identification of lack of biosecurity measures 
across stations. 
Bellinghausen: 
Untreated timber from cold climate. used to build 
church. 
House plants. 
[No other specific NNS or biosecurity threats 
identified] 
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Submitted 
to ATCM 
Inspecting 
Party  
Inspected Facilities  Identified NNS/Biosecurity Threats  
WP 16/ 
ATCM 
XXVIII 
(2005) 
Australia Mc Murdo Station (United States)  
Scott Base (New Zealand)  
RV Nathanial B Palmer (US vessel) 
Protected Areas: 
ASPA 122: Arrival Heights, Hut Point Peninsula, 
Ross Island; ASPA 158: Hut Point, Ross Island;  
HSM 18: Hut at Hut Point, Ross Island; HSM 19: 
Cross at Hut Point, Ross Island; HSM 20: Cross on 
Observation Hill, Ross Island; HSM 54: Richard E. 
Byrd Historic Monument, McMurdo Station  
HSM 75: The A Hut of Scott Base;  
Tourist activities on Ross Island were also observed  
 
NNS observed 
Scott Base:  
No NNS observed, hydroponics facility. 
McMurdo:  
No NNS observed at McMurdo. 
Both stations treat sewage. 
IP 31/ 
ATCM 
XXVII(2004
) 
Finland Troll (Norway)  
SANAE IV (South Africa)  
Wasa (Sweden)  
Neumayer (Germany)  
Aboa (Finland)  
Wasa:  
Local lichen and moss species periodically inventoried 
for human impact studies. 
Neumayer: 
 House plants present. 
IP 
17/ATCM 
XXIV 
(2001) 
United 
States 
Jubany (Argentina)  
Comandante Ferraz (Brazil)  
Kliment Ohridsky (Bulgaria)  
Frei (Chile)  
Escudero (Chile)  
Great Wall (China)  
King Sejong (Republic of Korea).  
Arctowski (Poland)  
Bellinghaussen (Russian Federation)  
Juan Carlos I (Spain)  
Vernadsky (Ukraine)  
Artigas (Uruguay)  
Juan Carlons I:  
Unusual grasses observed. 
Bellinghausen: 
Domestic plants present. 
Frei: 
Domestic plants present imported prior to PEPAT. 
Artigas: 
Visual inspection at Chilean airfield and again upon 
arrival. No NNS observed. 
King Sejong: 
Hydroponics and house plants present. 
WP25/ 
ATCM XXIV 
(2001) 
Norway Maitri (India)  
Novolazarevskaya (Russia)  
SANAE IV (South Africa)  
Troll (Norway)  
Site of the former Georg Forster station (Germany)  
EPICA drilling site (Germany)  
Maitri 
House plants present. 
Novolazarevskaya 
House plants present, waste disposed directly into 
environment. 
WP 23/ 
ATCM XXIII 
(2000) 
Germany 
and United 
Kingdom 
Esperanza (Argentina)  
Jubany (Argentina)  
St Kliment Ochridski (Bulgaria)  
Presidente Arturo Frei (Chile)  
Profesor Julio Escudero (Chile)  
General Bernardo O’Higgins (Chile)  
Great Wall (China)  
Receiving Station, O'Higgins (Germany)  
Arctowski (Poland)  
Bellingshausen (Russian Federation)  
Gabriel de Castilla (Spain)  
Juan Carlos I (Spain)  
Academic Vernadsky (Ukraine)  
Rothera Station (United Kingdom)  
Palmer Station (United States)  
Artigas (Uruguay)  
T/N Ruperto Elichiribehety (Uruguay)  
Marco Polo (Tourist vessel)  
Academic Ioffe (Tourist vessel)  
The following Historic Sites and Monuments were 
also Inspected: 
HSM 38: Snow Hill  
HSM 62: ‘Base F (Wordie House)’ on Winter Island  
HSM 61: Base A, Port Lockroy  
HSM 71: Whalers Bay, Deception Island  
 
No mention of NNS or biosecurity threats. 
IP42/ 
ATCM XXIII 
(1999) 
Belgium 
and France 
Mawson (Australia)  
Davis (Australia)  
Casey (Australia)  
Wilkes (Australia & USA)  
RSV Aurora Australis (Australian Program vessel)  
[No full inspection report available] 
No mention of NNS or biosecurity threats in 
summary. 
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TABLE 2: ANALYSIS OF INSPECTION REPORTS 
 
Percentage of Reports Identifying 
Biosecurity Issues 
Research Sites  or 
Abandoned Stations 
Stations  Scientific Vessels 
(Tourist Vessels) 
[NGO Vessels] 
Protected 
areas 
72% 3 39 3(6)[1] 20 
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APPENDIX 4 
TOURIST STATISTICS ANALYSIS 
 
 
SOURCES 
 
All figures are taken from IAATO, IAATO Tourist Statistics <http://www.iaato.org/tourism_stats.html> and do 
not include vessels with less than 12 passengers or non-IAATO members. 
 
IAATO, 2003-4 Number of Tourists per Site per Vessel – All Antarctic Sites, (2004) < 
http://image.zenn.net/REPLACE/CLIENT/1000037/1000116/application/vnd.ms-
excel/touristsitevisitct_byvessel_all.xls> at 3 January 2010. 
 
IAATO, 2004-5 Number of Tourists per Site per Vessel – All Antarctic Sites, (2005) < 
http://image.zenn.net/REPLACE/CLIENT/1000037/1000116/application/vnd.ms-
excel/visitorsitevisitct_byvessel_all0.xls> at 3 January 2010. 
 
IAATO, 2005-6 Number of Tourists per Site per Vessel – All Antarctic Sites, (2006) < 
http://image.zenn.net/REPLACE/CLIENT/1000037/1000116/application/vnd.ms-
excel/visitorsitevisitct_byvessel_all2.xls> at 3 January 2010. 
 
IAATO, 2006-7 Number of Tourists per Site per Vessel – All Antarctic Sites, (2007) < 
http://image.zenn.net/REPLACE/CLIENT/1000037/1000116/application/vnd.ms-excel/VSV-vessel-all-all.xls> at 
3 January 2010. 
 
IAATO, 2007-8 Number of Tourists per Site per Vessel – All Antarctic Sites, (2008) < 
http://image.zenn.net/REPLACE/CLIENT/1000037/1000116/application/vnd.ms-
excel/Visitorsitevisitct_byvessel_all1.xls> at 3 January 2010. 
 
IAATO, 2008-9 Number of Tourists per Site per Vessel – All Antarctic Sites, (2009) < 
http://image.zenn.net/REPLACE/CLIENT/1000037/1000116/application/vnd.ms-
excel/10.visitorsitevisitct_byvessel_all6sheets.xls> at 3 January 2010. 
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TABLE 1: TRENDS OF VISITORS AT SITES PROTECTED BY SITE GUIDELINES 
 
 2008-9 2007-8 2006-7 2005-6 2004-5 2003-4 
Site 
Guidelines 
Aitcho - 
Barrientos Island 5568 6083 6362 5600 3520 5508 2005 
Cuverville Island 15244 19790 15607 10921 10523 13980 2005 
Jougla Point 8431 11252 8927 7547 7169 7913 2005 
Penguin Island 1737 2189 1480 1724 1419 2647 2005 
Goudier Island 13863 16640 15266 11472 8954 12496 2006 
Hannah Point 2678 2039 94 5601 3873 4973 2006 
Neko Harbor 12470 14023 13107 11749 9452 9627 2006 
Paulet Island 7814 4978 5561 4507 3611 1968 2006 
Petermann 
Island 9098 13247 11241 9215 2756 7543 2006 
Pléneau Island 7422 6739 6258 4592 1825 6223 2006 
Turret Point 273 994 141 414 253 115 2006 
Yankee Harbour 2,072 3987 3273 2521 1,872 3,497 2006 
Brown Bluff 5752 6674 7434 5629 5116 2293 2007 
Snow Hill 
Emperor 
Rookery 807 572 1008 0 64 0 2007 
Snow Hill Island 284 276 0 520 1150 72 2007 
Devil Island 2852 925 2809 2370 1992 529 2008 
Half Moon Island 11844 17984 13281 12086 9819 10871 2008 
Shingle Cove 346 92 1014 282 307 1069 2008 
Whalers Bay 12128 14858 15347 13749 10570 11928 2008 
Baily Head 1989 1937 2279 3504 1294 2459 2009 
Cape Royds 236 147 377 390 502 398 2009 
Detaille Island 1402 1071 754 155 0 1073 2009 
Horseshoe Island 1020 337 261 0 323 229 2009 
Stonington 
Island 1153 450 330 0 98 219 2009 
Telefon Bay 3049 3068 3252 2184 1510 1541 2009 
Winter Island 198 360 425 52 0 70 2009 
Total Visitors to 
all sites 340634 379626 326331 237412 174355 223166  
Total Sites 
(Recruitment) 202 186 193 181 175 151  
Average increase 
in visitors per 
site per year 
(Overall) -193 287 461 348 -279   
Average increase 
in visitors per 
year  -1192.579 914.9333 954.5 790.25 n/a n/a  
Average increase 
in visitors per 
site per year   239.5714 100 546.4286 1165.955 -818.038 239.5714  
 
Before Site Guidelines Adopted 
After Site Guidelines Adopted  
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TABLE 2: VISITORS TO CONTINENTAL SITES IN THE 2008/2009 SEASON 
 
Visitation Locations Total Visitors Claimant State 
Cape Washington 196 Australia 
Commonwealth Bay 100 Australia 
Franklin Island 169 Australia 
Terra Nova Station 48 Australia 
Cape Decouverte 41 France 
Cape Jules 220 France 
Cape Mergerie 41 France 
Dumont D'Urville Station 443 France 
Port Martin 266 France 
Cape Adare 369 New Zealand 
Cape Bird 111 New Zealand 
Cape Colbeck 99 New Zealand 
Cape Evans 227 New Zealand 
Cape Gray 85 New Zealand 
Cape Hallett 270 New Zealand 
Cape Royds 236 New Zealand 
Coulman Island 442 New Zealand 
Drygalski Ice Tongue 198 New Zealand 
Inexpressible Island 116 New Zealand 
McMurdo Ice Channel 47 New Zealand 
McMurdo Station 267 New Zealand 
Mertz Glacier Tongue 308 New Zealand 
Possession Island 162 New Zealand 
Ross Ice Shelf 241 New Zealand 
Ross Sea 84 New Zealand 
Scott Base 83 New Zealand 
Taylor Valley/Canada Glacier 155 New Zealand 
Patriot Hills 282 Unclaimed 
Total 5306 
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APPENDIX 5: 
ANALYSIS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF BIOSECURITY MEASURES IN 
THE CBD BY AT CONSULTATIVE PARTIES AND CCAMLR 
MEMBERS BASED ON NATIONAL REPORTS SUBMITTED UNDER 
ARTICLE 26 OF THE CBD, 2001-2009 
 
SOURCE: 
 
CBD, National Reports Analyser (2010) <http://www.cbd.int/reports/analyzer.shtml> at 20 February 2010. 
 
Note: Most are Third National Reports submitted 2005-2009, four are Second National Reports submitted 
from 2001-2002; Italy, Slovakia and Switzerland, and consequentially have no information on the 
implementation of the Guiding Principles under CBD COP Decision VI/23. 
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KEY: 
 
Points are allocated, according to meeting the requirements of the question under the reporting process, 
referring to relevant obligations under the CBD. Some questions are allocated additional points, as they 
identify multiple components of a biosecurity system. For the purpose of the analysis of the current applicable 
system, only those measures reported as in place are allocated points (19 = best possible within parameters).   
 
CP: Consultative Party to the AT 
NCP: Non Consultative Party to the AT 
CM: Member of CCAMLR 
NCM: Party to CCAMLR, but not member of the Commission 
 
 3 2 1 0 
1. Please indicate the level of priority your country accords to the 
implementation of various articles, provisions and relevant programmes 
on the work of the Convention...8(a) Invasive Alien Species. 
 High Medium Low 
45. Has your country identified alien species introduced into its territory 
and established a system for tracking the introduction of alien species? 
Major NNS 
identified, 
surveillance 
Some NNS 
identified, 
surveillance 
Some NNS 
identified 
No 
46. Has your country assessed the risks posed to ecosystems, habitats or 
species by the introduction of alien species? 
 Most alien 
species 
Some NNS of 
concern 
No 
47. Has your country undertaken measures to prevent the introduction 
of, control or eradicate, those NNS which threaten ecosystems, habitats 
or species? 
 Comprehensive 
measures 
Some 
measures 
No/being 
considered 
48 In dealing with the issue of invasive species, has your country 
developed, or involved itself in mechanisms for international 
cooperation including the exchange of best practises? 
Multilateral Regional and/or 
sub regional 
Bilateral only No 
49. Is your country using the ecosystem approach and precautionary 
principle and bio-geographical approaches as appropriate in its work on 
alien invasive species? 
  Yes No 
50. Has your country identified national needs and priorities for the 
implementation of the Guiding Principles? 
  Yes No/being 
considered 
51. Has your country created mechanisms to coordinate national 
programs in applying the Guiding Principles? 
  Yes No/being 
considered 
52. Has your country reviewed relevant policies, legislation and 
institutions in the light of the Guiding Principles and adjusted or 
developed policies, legislation and institutions? 
 Some 
adjustments 
and 
developments 
completed  
Review 
complete 
/ongoing 
development 
No/review 
under way 
53. Is your country enhancing cooperation between various sectors in 
order to improve prevention, early detection, eradication and/or 
control of invasive species? 
  Yes No/being 
considered 
54. Is your country collaborating with trading partners and neighbouring 
countries to address threats of invasive alien species to biodiversity in 
ecosystems that cross international boundaries 
  Yes No/being 
considered 
55. Is your country developing capacity to use risk assessment to 
address threats of invasive alien species to biodiversity and incorporate 
such methodologies in environmental impact assessment (EIA) and 
strategic environmental assessment (SEA)? 
 Yes, 
comprehensive 
activities 
Yes, some No 
56. Development of financial measures and other policies and tools to 
promote activities to reduce the threats of invasive species 
    
160. Has your country put in place mechanisms to control pathways of introduction of alien species in the marine and coastal 
environment? 
- Mechanisms to control potential invasions from ballast water have 
been put in place 
  Yes No 
- Mechanisms to control potential invasions from hull fouling have been 
put in place 
  Yes No 
- Mechanisms to control potential invasions from hull fouling have been 
put in place 
  Yes No 
- Mechanisms to control potential invasions from aquaculture have 
been put in place 
  Yes No 
- Mechanisms to control potential invasions from accidental releases, 
such as aquarium releases, have been put in place 
  Yes No 
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TABLE 1: IMPLEMENTATION OF CBD, ARTICLE 8(H) AND DECISION V/8 OF THE CBD COP 
 
 
ATS Status Priority Surveillance/
Knowledge 
Base 
Risk 
Assessment 
Prevention 
and 
Response 
International 
Cooperation 
(Decision V/8) 
Ecosystem 
/Precautionary 
/Bio-geographic 
approach (Decision V/8) 
Argentina CP/CM 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Australia CP/CM 2 1 2 2 3 1 
Belgium CP/CM 1 2 1 1 1 0 
Brazil CP/CM 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Chile CP/CM 1 1 2 1 3 1 
China CP/CM 2 1 1 1 2 1 
Denmark CP 0 1 1 1 2 1 
Finland CP/NCM 1 2 1 1 3 1 
France CP/CM 2 3 1 1 3 0 
Germany CP/CM 2 1 1 1 3 1 
Hungary CP 1 3 2 1 3 0 
India CP/CM 2 2 1 1 2 1 
Japan CP/CM 2 3 1 2 3 1 
Netherlands CP 1 1 1 2 3 1 
New Zealand CP/CM 2 2 2 1 3 1 
Norway CP/CM 2 1 1 1 3 1 
Poland CP/CM 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Korea CP/CM 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Russia CP/CM 1 2 1 1 3 1 
South Africa CP/CM 2 1 1 1 3 0 
Spain CP 2 0 1 1 2 1 
Sweden CP/CM 1 1 2 1 3 1 
Ukraine CP/CM 0 1 0 1 2 1 
UK CP 2 2 2 1 3 1 
Namibia CM 1 2 1 1 2 1 
 
TABLE 2: CBD DECISION VI/23 – GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
 
 
AT Status Identified 
Priority 
and 
Needs 
Created 
mechanism 
Reviewed 
and 
Adjusted 
Policy 
Cooperation 
between 
sectors 
Cooperation 
with trading 
partners 
Incorporate 
risk 
assessment 
into EIA 
and SEA 
Financial 
measures 
and other 
policies 
Argentina CP/CM 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Australia CP/CM 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Belgium CP/CM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil CP/CM 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Chile CP/CM 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
China CP/CM 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Denmark CP 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Finland CP/NCM 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
France CP/CM 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Germany CP/CM 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
India CP/CM 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Japan CP/CM 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Netherlands CP 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
New Zealand CP/CM 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Norway CP/CM 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Poland CP/CM 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Korea CP/CM 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Russia CP/CM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Africa CP/CM 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Spain CP 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Sweden CP/CM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ukraine CP/CM 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
UK CP 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Namibia CM 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
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TABLE 3: COP DECISION IV/5 - PROGRAMME OF WORK ON MARINE AND COASTAL 
BIODIVERSITY ELEMENT 5: ALIEN SPECIES AND GENOMES 
 
 AT Status 
Ballast 
Water Hull Fouling Aquaculture Accidental 
Argentina CP/CM 1 0 1 0 
Australia CP/CM 1 0 0 0 
Belgium CP/CM 0 0 0 0 
Brazil CP/CM 1 0 1 0 
Chile CP/CM 1 1 1 0 
China CP/CM 1 0 1 0 
Denmark CP 1 0 1 0 
Finland CP/NM 1 0 1 0 
France CP/CM 0 0 1 0 
Germany CP/CM 1 0 0 0 
India CP/CM 1 0 1 0 
Japan CP/CM 0 0 1 0 
Netherlands CP 1 0 0 0 
New Zealand CP/CM 1 0 0 0 
Norway CP/CM 1 0 1 0 
Poland CP/CM 1 0 1 0 
Korea CP/CM 1 0 1 0 
Russia CP/CM 0 0 0 0 
South Africa CP/CM 1 0 0 0 
Spain CP 1 0 1 0 
Sweden CP/CM 0 0 0 0 
Ukraine CP/CM 1 0 0 0 
UK CP 1 0 0 0 
Namibia CM 0 0 1 0 
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APPENDIX 6 
BIOSECURITY MEASURES EMPLOYED BY AUSTRALIA AND NEW 
ZEALAND IN SUB-ANTARCTIC AND ANTARCTIC AREAS 
 
SOURCES 
 
The references used to compile this appendix include a number of different documents and policies, listed in 
the following table. The scope of activity on the islands and continent differ significantly and a categorical 
analysis of this kind cannot be relied on as an entirely accurate depiction of the current biosecurity measures 
applied in the sub-Antarctic and Antarctic environment.  
 
 New Zealand Australia 
Legislation and 
Regulations 
Biosecurity Act 1993 
Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1999 
Maritime Transport Act 1994 
Antarctic 
Antarctic (Environmental Protection) Act 1994 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources Act 1981 
Marine Protection Rules,  Part 160 – Prevention of 
Pollution by Sewage from Ships in the Antarctic 
Treaty Area (effective 20 August 1998); Part 170 – 
Prevention of Pollution of Garbage from Ships and 
Offshore Installations (effective 30 July 2009). 
MAFBNZ, Import Health Certificate for Ballast Water 
(2005). 
Sub-Antarctic 
Reserves Act 1977 
Marine Reserves Act 1971 
Conservation Act 1987 
Quarantine Act 1908 
EPBC Act 1999 
EPBC Regulations 2000 
Antarctic 
Antarctic (Environmental Protection) Act 1994 
Antarctic Treaty (Environment Protection) 
(Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 
1993 
Antarctic Treaty (Environment Protection) (Waste 
Management) Regulations 1994 
Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships) Act 1983, Section 26BA-BC – Discharge of 
sewage in the Antarctic Area; Section 26F(8) – 
Discharge of garbage in the Antarctic Area. 
Sub-Antarctic 
EPMO 1987 
NPRM Act (Tasmania) 2002 
Management Plans, 
Policy and Guidelines 
Antarctic 
Antarctica New Zealand, New Zealand’s Antarctic 
and Southern Ocean Science Strategy (2009). 
Antarctica New Zealand, Biosecurity and NNS Policy, 
Health, Safety and Environment  Policy – 7, (2009). 
ANZ, Waste Management Handbook (2007 
MFAT, New Zealand procedures for tourists and non-
governmental visitors to Antarctic, (2009). 
Antarctica New Zealand, Environmental Code of 
Conduct, (2006). 
Sub-Antarctic 
DOC, NZSAI Research Strategy (2005). 
DOC, Operational Procedures for Management and 
Research Expeditions in the New Zealand Sub-
Antarctic (2008). 
DOC, Island Biosecurity Plan (2004). 
DOC, NZSAI Conservation Management Strategy 
1998-2008 [extended to 2012]. 
Antarctic 
AAD, Australian Science Strategy (2009). 
AAD, Australian Guidelines for preparation of IEEs 
and CEEs (2005). 
Sub-Antarctic 
AAD, Heard Island and McDonald Islands Marine 
Reserve Management Plan (2005). 
Parks and Wildlife Service (Tasmania), Macquarie 
Island Nature Reserve and World Heritage Area 
Management Plan (2006). 
Parks and Wildlife Service (Tasmania), Guidelines for 
Tourist Operations and Visits to Macquarie island 
Nature Reserve and World Heritage Area (2009). 
Interim Management Arrangements for the 
Macquarie Island Marine Park (2009). 
Secondary Materials New Zealand, ‘A Framework for Analysing and 
Managing non-native species Risks in Antarctica,’ 
XXXII ATCM (2009), IP 36, page 4. 
S Potter, ‘Quarantine Management of Australia’s 
Antarctic Program’ (2006). 
S Potter ‘The Quarantine Protection of Sub-Antarctic 
Australia: Two Islands, Two Regimes’ (2007). 
Australia, ‘Australia’s Quarantine Practises’, XXVII 
ATCM (2004) 
Kaye, S. B., D. Rothwell and S. Dando, The laws of the 
Australian Antarctic Territory (1999) 
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GLOSSARY AND KEY 
 
1. Application Process 
2. Preparation for transit 
3. Transit 
4. Arrival 
5. On Land/Within Marine Area 
6. Surveillance 
7. Response 
S. Science Specific 
T. Tourism Specific 
F. Fishing Specific 
NZ-M – Minimum Impact Islands of the New Zealand Sub-Antarctic 
NZ-R – Refuge Islands of the New Zealand Sub-Antarctic 
NZ-A – Ross Dependency and New Zealand Nationals in the Antarctic area 
A-M – Macquarie Island 
A-H – Heard and McDonald Islands 
A-A – Australian Antarctic Territory and Australian Nationals in the Antarctic area 
Specific designation of marine area provided where biosecurity measures apply.  
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TABLE 1: APPLICATION PROCESS AND PREPARATION FOR TRANSIT 
Biosecurity Measure NZ-M NZ-R NZ-A A-M A-H A-A 
1.1 EIA required for activity. No No Yes1 No No Yes2 
1.2 Work with Domestic Biosecurity Agencies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1.2 Permit required for entry to marine area No No No Yes3 No No 
1.3 Permit required for landing Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
1.4 EIA required for infrastructure development Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1.T.1 Landing for tourist purposes prohibited. Yes No4 No No5 No6 No 
1.F.1 Fishing in marine area prohibited. No No7 No8 Yes9 Yes No10 
1.5 Biosecurity measures required in EIA or Permit 
Application 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1.S.1 Priority placed on research proposal that support NNS 
biosecurity measures 
Yes Yes No11 Yes Yes No12 
1.6 Biosecurity risk assessment carried out on all activity No13 No No14 No No No 
1.7 Suppliers made aware of biosecurity policy Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
2.1 Separate quarantine store biosecurity plan Yes Yes No15 No16 No17 No 
2.2 All stores18 to be inspected before departure Yes Yes No19 Yes Yes No20 
2.3 Treatment of stores before departure to minimise NNS 
risks 
No Yes21 No Yes22 Yes23 Yes24 
2.4 Sniffer dogs to be used in the pre-departure inspection Yes Yes No Yes Yes No25 
2.5 Personal equipment to be cleaned and inspected before 
departure 
Yes Yes26 No Yes Yes No 
2.6 Previous port of call to be Australian/AQIS/NZ controlled No27 No28 No Yes No No 
2.7 Inspection and cleaning of ship’s hull required before 
departure 
Yes29 Yes30 No Yes31 Yes32 No 
2.8 Requirement to apply anti-foulants to ship’s hulls No No No No Yes33 No 
2.9 Requirement for ships to be inspected prior to departure Yes Yes No Yes34 No No 
2.1S Third party hand inspection of all equipment and 
supplies before departure 
Yes Yes35 No No No36 No 
2.11 All visitors must be informed of quarantine procedures Yes Yes Yes37 Yes Yes Yes38 
 
                                                                
1 Not for fishing activities.  
2
 Ibid. 
3 Section 37 of the Tasmanian NPRMA  restricts access to the reserve to 3 nautical miles of the reserve. 
4 Limited numbers of tourists permitted within specific areas. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Fishing prohibited in Auckland Islands Marine Reserve. 
8 Permit required, conditional on CCAMLR approval. No fishing permitted in the South Orkney marine protected area. 
9 Within 3 nautical miles of the reserve and within the Marine Reserve. 
10
 Permit required, conditional on CCAMLR approval. No fishing permitted in the South Orkney marine protected area. 
11 Draft science strategy “supports biodiversity research related to...New Zealand’s commitments to the CBD.”  
12
 Human impacts targeted in Australian Antarctic Science Strategy. 
13 Risk assessment carried out for islands, not marine areas. 
14 Carried out on scientific program in 2008. 
15 Biosecurity measures in place in relation to stores. 
16
 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18
 Including all cargo, effects and food. 
19 Stores for Antarctica New Zealand supported events will be inspected prior to departure. 
20 Stores for AAD supported events will be inspected prior to departure. 
21 Equipment and materials considered to be high risk may be subjected to fumigation. 
22 Fumigation of timber products or other approved treatment of timber prior to departure. 
23
 Ozone treatment of produce during transit for AAD operations. 
24
 Ibid; fumigation and treatment of high risk goods before transit. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Footwear to be thoroughly scrubbed and washed in disinfectant. 
27 Ships must be certified within 28 days of visit to island, so practically limited to New Zealand ports. 
28
 Ibid. 
29 Sub-Antarctic Vessel Inspection Certificate valid for 28 days from date of inspection. 
30
 Ibid. 
31 Not routinely compliance checked by land manager (Potter 2007). 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34
 Discretionary (Potter 2007). 
35 Island Biosecurity Plan 2.4.3: The inspector is DOC personnel but “preferably” should not be travelling to the island, meaning the inspector is not the 
government representative, further ensuring independence. 
36 Third party hand inspection of all personal effects landed . 
37
 Not applicable to fishing vessels. 
38
 Ibid. 
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TABLE 2: TRANSIT AND ARRIVAL 
 
Biosecurity Measure NZ-M NZ-R NZ-A A-M A-H A-A 
3.2 Authorised official to accompany any visit to ensure 
compliance with quarantine requirements 
Yes Yes No39 No Yes40 No41 
3.3 No departure during night unless well lit port Yes Yes No No No No 
3.5 Laying of rodent baits and traps on ships No No No No Yes No 
3.6 Insect trapping on ships No No No No Yes No 
3.7 Disinsection of Aircraft No No Yes No No Yes 
3.8 Containerization of cargo during shipment, where 
practicable 
Yes Yes No No No Yes 
3.9 Equipment must be transferred to and from area in 
rodent proof containers 
Yes Yes No No No Yes 
3.10 Actions to ensure cleanliness of stores and transport 
between areas 
Yes Yes No Yes42 Yes No 
3.11 Ban on transporting live plants and animals unless 
specifically permitted 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4.1 Ballast water discharge prohibited in marine area No43 No44 No Yes45 Yes46 No 
4.2 No ships may moor to store No47 No48 No No Yes49 No 
4.3 Laying of rodent baits and traps at landing area No50 No51 n/a52 No Yes No 
4.4 Loading and unloading supervised by authorised 
representative 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
4.5 Pre-landing scrubbing of footwear  Yes Yes No No No No 
4.6 Ban on landing all foods apart from emergency supplies No 
 
No No Yes No No 
4.7 Ban on landing live plants and animals unless specifically 
permitted 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4.8 Ban on import of soil Yes Yes No53 Yes Yes No54 
4.9 Ban on landing fresh fruit and vegetables NZSAI-M NZSAI-R No Yes55 Yes No 
4.10 Ban on landing poultry meat and eggs No Yes56 No Yes Yes57 No 
4.11 Ban on landing viable seeds and viable fungal products Yes58 Yes59 No No Yes No 
4.13 Ban on dogs No No60 Yes No61 No62 Yes 
4.14 Requirement for outer clothing to be new or used only 
at area 
No No No No Yes No 
4.15 Pre-landing scrubbing of footwear Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
 
  
                                                                
39
 Except for tourist vessels wishing to land in the Ross Dependency.  
40 Discretionary (Potter 2007). 
41
 Discretionary in relation to tourist vessels wishing to land in the AAT (Potter 2006). 
42 Not routinely checked by land manager (Potter 2007). 
43 All ballast water discharged in New Zealand waters must be preapproved by MAFBNZ. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Within 12 nautical miles of land and in marine reserve. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Mooring only permitted at approved places. 
48 Mooring only permitted at approved places. 
49 Other than small supply  vessels. 
50 Permanent trap and bait stations exist near most landing areas that must be maintained. 
51
 Ibid. 
52 Rodents well established on island. 
53
 PEPAT, Annex II, Article 4(9) prohibits the introduction of non sterile soil. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Unless land manager is satisfied they have been effectively treated to eliminate the risk of introducing associated alien species and diseases. 
56 Eggs are permitted but shells must be sealed as rubbish and removed. 
57
 Other than egg powder or products containing egg powder, which can be taken ashore if kept in sealed containers and opened only in an enclosed shelter. 
58 Unless permitted. 
59 Unless permitted. 
60 Dogs must be certified for DOC use and “may need to be screened for pathogens”. 2.5.2. 
61
 Subject to permit. 
62
 Ibid. 
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TABLE 3: PREVENTION, SURVEILLANCE, RESPONSE AT LOCATION 
 
Biosecurity Measure NZ-M NZ-R NZ-A A-M A-H A-A 
5.1 Unpacking of equipment must be undertaken to avoid 
introduction of NNS 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
5.2 Signs with biosecurity principles at landing locations No Yes No No No No 
5.3 Hydroponics banned Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
5.1S Cleaning of equipment and clothing between areas Yes Yes Yes No No No 
5.2S Disinfection of scientific equipment in contact with 
animals between areas 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
5.4 Restrictions on taking certain food stuffs off station n/a n/a No Yes N/a No 
5.5 All waste must be removed Yes63 Yes64 No No No No 
5.6 All waste must be removed, incinerated or disposed in a 
way to minimise impacts 
Yes65 Yes66 Yes No Yes Yes 
5.7 Potential NNS harvesting waste must be removed Yes67 Yes68 No No69 Yes70 No 
5.8 Any huts must be rodent proof Yes Yes No No No No 
5.9 Moving between areas, biosecurity standards must be 
applied as if moving from mainland 
Yes Yes No No No No 
6.1 Management staff trained to detect and recognise NNS 
and NNS signs 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No71 
6.2 Procedures in place for visitors to report suspected NNS 
or disease outbreak. 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
6.3 Presence of permanent NNS surveillance equipment Yes Yes No72 No No No 
6.4 Database of NNS maintained Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
6.1.T Tourist vessels required to report and monitor NNS n/a Yes No Yes Yes No 
6.1.S Priority placed on science that supports NNS monitoring Yes Yes No No Yes No 
7.1 Contingency plan for NNS found during transit to area Yes Yes No No No No 
7.2 Contingency plans for NNS found in area Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes73 
7.3 Procedures in place to immediately respond if NNS 
detected 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes74 
7.4 All visitors participate in long term NNS control programs Yes Yes N/A Yes No N/A 
7.5 Commitment to eradicate invasive NNS from area Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
7.6 Costs of management action to be recovered from those 
responsible for introduction of NNS 
No No No75 No Yes No76 
 
  
                                                                
63 With exception of faeces to be deposited in pit toilets, at least 50 metres away from nearest ground water supply.  
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid.  
66
 Ibid.  
67 Ibid.  
68
Ibid.  
69 Human faeces deposited into the sea from field huts, bagged and carried to the sea or station in “Zone B”. Otherwise no requirement for disposal, other 
than not feeding foods to wildlife.  
70 Incinerated and removed. 
71
 Unusual mortality event plan in place (disease only). 
72 Monitoring and control systems maintained as required. 
73 Unusual mortality event plan in place (disease only). 
74 Unusual mortality event plan in place (disease only). 
75
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2 
76
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2 
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APPENDIX 7 
BUILDING BIOSECURITY INTO EXISTING RESOLUTIONS AND 
PROCEDURES 
 
 Tool Relevant Guidance Objective of Amendment(s) 
EIA 1. Revised EIA guidelines 
2. Intercessional Consideration 
of Draft CEEs 
Any risk of introducing NNS, without a clear demonstration of preventative 
measures (including contingency plans) that reduce the risk to a negligent 
level, should be defined as more than a minor or transitory impact and 
require a full CEE. (1) 
Preventing the introduction NNS should be considered at all stages of the 
decision making process. (1) 
Intercessional Consideration of Draft CEEs to give particular attention to issue of 
NNS. (2) 
Protected Areas  1. Guidelines for the 
implementation of the 
Framework for Protected Areas 
2. Guide to the Preparation of 
Management Plans for Specially 
Protected Areas 
3. Checklist to assist in the 
inspections of ASPAs and ASMAs 
4. SGMP of the CEP 
Consideration given to areas at risk of NNS introduction in establishing a 
framework of protected areas. (1) 
“In all instances special precautions should be taken to prevent the introduction 
of NNS.” (2) 
Inspection checklist to include “Evidence of NNS mitigation measures” and 
“Presence or evidence of NNS.” Samples should be taken of local biota to 
check for NNS presence. (3) 
SGMP to identify and highlight biosecurity risks in proposed management plans. 
Marine Pollution 1. Ballast Water Management 
Guidelines 
Encourage ratification and implementation of BWM Convention among Parties. 
Require all ships in Antarctic Treaty area to implement approved ballast water 
treatment method by 2012. 
Ballast water exchange as a method, to be phased out by 2012. 
Inspection 1. Inspection Checklist Inspection checklist to include “Evidence of NNS mitigation measures” and 
“Presence or evidence of NNS.” Samples should be taken of local biota to 
check for NNS presence. (1) 
Reporting 1. Information Exchange 
Requirements 
Environmental information on Compliance with the Protocol to include “2.4.3 
Monitoring activities report...Presence of NNS in transit locations, stations 
and field camps.” “2.4.5. Steps taken to minimise the introduction of NNS 
from transit, station activities, field camps and waste management” 
“3.4. Contingency Plans: Title of Contingency Plan(s) for...NNS Introduction”  
Science 1. SCAR Environmental Code of 
Conduct for Terrestrial Scientific 
Field Research in Antarctica 
(revision 12 January, 2009) 
Integrate or produce guidelines for marine research. 
Include monitoring for NNS in all studies and contingency plans. 
Tourism 1. General Principles of Antarctic 
Tourism 
2. Tourist Guidelines 
3. Site Guidelines 
No tourist operator should intentionally or unintentionally introduce any NNS 
into the AT area through their activities and preventative, surveillance and 
response measures based on a precautionary and ecosystem approach 
should continue to be built into operational procedures. (1) 
Operators must take a strict precautionary approach to NNS in the AT area and 
employ comprehensive systems to exclude their introduction or 
establishment in the AT area. (2) 
“Special precautions should be taken to prevent the introduction of NNS”. (3)  
IAATO Bylaws 1. Article X: Operational 
Procedures 
All ships must employ ballast water treatment systems approved by MEPC 
under the BWM Convention. 
All ships entering the Antarctic area must have their hulls cleaned of all NNS and 
inspected before departure. 
Waste management and landing procedures must not introduce NNS into the 
Antarctic environment. 
CCAMLR CM 1. 26-01 (Environmental 
Measures) 
2. 91-02 (Allocation of CEMP 
sites) 
3. 91-03 (Protection of South 
Orkneys) 
[See IAATO Bylaws above] (1)  
Decontamination of all fishing equipment required at all times fishing 
equipment has been in contact with the water column. (1) 
Special precautions should be taken to prevent the introduction of NNS in CEMP 
sites and MPAs (2). 
No discharges should be permitted in MPAs (3).  
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APPENDIX 8 
ANTARCTIC ACTORS TREATY MATRIX 
 
 
States included in matrix: AT Parties, CCAMLR Parties and Flag States listed on the CCAMLR IUU Vessel List and 
IAATO vessel registry. 
 
SOURCES: 
 
Format adapted from: M Rogan-Finnemore, The Legal Implications of Bioprospecting in the Antarctic, (LLM, University of Canterbury, 
2005), 147-148. 
 
The Antarctic Treaty System:  
Status - AT Secretariat, Home/Antarctic Treaty System/Parties, <http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_parties.aspx?lang=e> at 7 
July 2010 
AT - The Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 1 December 1959. 402 United Nations Treaty Series 71 (entered into force 
23 June 1961) 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 4 October 1991. 30 International Legal 
Materials 1455 (entered into force 14 January 1998) 
CCAMLR - Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, opened for signature on 20 May 1980, 19 
International Legal Materials (1980) (entered into force 7 April 1982) 
CCAS - Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, opened for signature on 1 June 1972, 29 UST 441 (entered into 
force March 11 1978) 
PEPAT- Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 4 October 1991, 30 
International Legal Materials (1991) (entered into force 14 January 1998) 
 
UNEP 
Status –  CBD, List of Parties, <http://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml> at 7 July 2010; CMS, Parties to the 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (2010) < http://www.cms.int/about/part_lst.htm > at 
7 July 2010 
CMS - Convention on the conservation of migratory species of wild animals, opened for signature 23 June 1979. 1615 
United Nations Treaty Series 356 (entered into force 1 November 1983) 
CBD - Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992. 1760 United Nations Treaty Series 79 (entered 
into force 29 December 1993) 
 
Law of the Sea 
Status - UNCLOS, Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement relating to the 
implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the 
Convention relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf> at 7 July 2010 
UNCLOS - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982. 1833 United Nations 
Treaty Series 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). < http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf> 
FSA - The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
1995, opened for signature 4 August 1995, 34 International Legal Materials 1542 (entered into force 11 December 2001)  
 
IMO 
Status – IMO, Status of Conventions by Country <http://www.imo.org/conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=248> 
IMO - Convention on the International Maritime Organization, opened for signature 6 March 1948 as amended. 108 United 
Nations Treaty Series (entered into force 23 April 1947)  
MARPOL - International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, opened for signature 2 November 1973 as 
modified by the 1978 Protocol, opened for signature 26 November 1983 and as regularly amended. 1340 United Nations 
Treaty Series 61 (entered into force 2 October 1983) [Annex I, Annex II, Annex IV and Annex V]. 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, opened for signature 1 November 1974 as amended. 1184 United 
Nations Treaty Series 278 (entered into force 25 May 1980) 
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UNESCO 
Status – UNESCO, Legal Instruments/Conventions < http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=12025&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=-471.html> at 9 July 2010. 
Convention concerning the protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, opened for signature 16 November 1972, 
1037 United Nations Treaty Series 151 (entered into force 17 December 1975). 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, opened for signature 21 December 
1975. 996 United Nations Treaty Series 245 (entered into force 21 December 1975). 
 
FAO 
Status - FAO Legal Office, Conventions and Agreements concluded under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution 
<http://www.fao.org/Legal/treaties/list1-e.htm> at 9 July 2010. 
Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, opened for 
signature 22 November 2009. FAO Tre-154601 (not in force). 
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the 
High Seas, opened for signature 29 November 1993. FAO TRE-001183 (entered into force 24 April 2003). 
International Plant Protection Convention, 17 November 1997. 2367 United Nations Treaty Series (entered into force 2 
October 2005) 
 
World Trade Organisation 
WTO, Members and Observers, < http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm> at 23 July 2008. 
KEY 
 
Italics Party that has formally claimed or reserved the right to claim a sector of Antarctica  
X First level Party which has Ratified, Accepted or Approved that instrument. 
C ‘Second-level’ Contracting Party to that instrument  
- Not a party to that instrument. 
 
Table sorted according to ratification of PEPAT and AT, then alphabetically.  
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Party  Instrument 
ATS UNEP FAO  IMO/UNCLOS UNESCO 
A
T 
C
C
A
S 
C
C
A
M
LR
 
P
EP
A
T 
C
B
D
 
C
M
S 
A
C
A
P
 
FA
O
 C
o
m
p
ly
 
FA
O
 P
SA
 
FA
O
 IP
P
C
 
W
TO
 
IM
O
  
SO
LA
S 
 
U
N
C
LO
S 
FS
A
 
M
A
R
P
O
L 
 A
 I/
II 
M
A
R
P
O
L 
A
 IV
 
M
A
R
P
O
L 
A
 V
 
A
FC
 
B
W
M
 
W
H
C
 
R
am
sa
r 
Antigua and Barbuda - - - - X X - - - X X X X X - X X X X X X X 
Argentina X X X X X X X X - X X X X X C X X X - - X X 
Australia X X X X X X X X C X X X X X X X X X X - X C 
Austria C - - - X X - - - X X X X X X X X X - - X X 
Bahamas - - - - X - - - - X C X X X X X - X X - - X 
Barbados - - - - X - - X - X X X X X X X X X - X X X 
Belgium X X X X X X - - - X X X X X X X X X X - X X 
Brazil X X X X X - - X C X X X X X X X X X - X X X 
Bulgaria X - C X X X - - - X X X X X X X X X X - X X 
Canada C X C X X - - X C X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Chile X X X X X X X X - X X X X X - X X X - - X X 
China X X X X X - - - - X X X X X C X X X - - X X 
Columbia C - - - X - - - - X X X X C - X X X - - X X 
Cook Islands - - C - X X - X - X - X X X X X -  X X X X 
Cuba C - - - X X - - - X X X X X - X - X - - X X 
Czech Republic C - - C X X - - - X X X X X X X X X - - X X 
Denmark C - - - X X X - - X X X X X X X X X X - X X 
Ecuador X - - X X X - - - X X X X - - X X X - - X X 
Equatorial Guinea - - - - C - - - - X C X X X - X X X - - X X 
Estonia C - - - X X - - - X X X X X X X X X X - X X 
European Community - - X - X X - X C X X X X X X X X X - - X - 
Finland X - C X X X - - - X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
France X X X X X X X - - X X X X X X X X X X - X X 
Germany X X X X X X - - - X X X X X X X   - - X X 
Greece C - C X X X - - - X X X X X X X X X X - X X 
Guatemala C - - - X  - - - X X X X X - X X X - - X X 
Hungary C - - - X X - - - X X X X X X X X X X - X X 
India X - X X X X - - - X X X X X X X X X - - X X 
Italy X X X X X X - - - X X X X X X X X X - - X X 
Japan X X X X X - - X - X X X X X X X X X X - X X 
Korea, DPR C - - - X - - - - X - X X C - X X X - - X - 
Korea, Republic X - X X X - - X - X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Liberia - - - - X X - - - X C X X X X X X X X X X X 
Malta - - - - X X - - - X X X X X X X - X X X X X 
Mauritius - - C - X X - X - X X X X X X X X X - X X X 
Namibia - - X - X - - - - X X X X X X X - X - X X X 
Netherlands X - C X X X - - - X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
New Zealand X C X X X X X X C X X X X X X X - X - - X X 
Nigeria - - - - X X - - - X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Norway X X X X X X X X C X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Panama - - - - X X - - - X X X X X X X X X X - X X 
Papua New Guinea C - - - X - - - - X X X X X X X X X - - X X 
Peru X - C X X X X - C X X X X - - X X X - - X X 
Poland X X X X X X - - - X X X X X X X X X X - X X 
Romania C - - X X X - - - X X X X X X X X X X - X X 
Russian Federation X X X X X - - - C X C X X X X X X X - - X X 
Slovak Republic C - - - X X - - - X X X X X X X X X - - X X 
South Africa X X X X X X X - - X X X X X X X - X - X X X 
Spain X - X X X X X - - X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Sweden X - X X X X - - - X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Switzerland C - - C X - - - - X X X X X - X X X - - X X 
Togo - - - - X X - - - X X X X X - X X X - - X X 
Turkey C - - - X - - - - X X X X - - X - X - - X X 
Ukraine X X X X X X - - - X X X X X X X X X - - X X 
United Kingdom X X X X X X X - - X X X X X X X X X X - X X 
United States X X X X C - - X C X X X X C X X - X - - X - 
Uruguay X - X X X X X X C X X X X X X X X X - - X X 
Vanuatu - - C - X - - - - X X X X X C X X X X - X X 
Venezuela C - - - X - - - - X X X X - - X X X - - X X 
 
